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INTRODUCTION 
A persistent challenge to originalist theories of constitutional 
interpretation is the claim that originalism, if faithfully and consistently 
applied, would lead to results that modern Americans would find 
“intolerable.”1 While originalists have adopted a number of strategies in 
responding to such criticisms, one particularly common approach has been 
to deny the underlying factual premise by seeking to demonstrate that 
originalism would not, in fact, lead to intolerable consequences.2 
An important focus of this debate has been the question of whether 
originalism is capable of justifying the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education.3  From an early date, certain originalists 
attempted to defend the holding of Brown, if not necessarily its reasoning, 
as consistent with originalism notwithstanding the widespread belief that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers did not intend to prohibit 
racially segregated public schools. 4   Given the central role Brown has 
assumed in modern constitutional theory, originalists’ desire to reconcile 
the decision with their own methodology is unsurprising.  As Professor 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING 
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA, 76 (2005) (asserting that if “taken seriously,” 
originalism “would lead in intolerable directions.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION 12-18 (2010) (identifying the constitutionality of sex discrimination, the 
inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to the states and the unconstitutionality of many federal 
labor, environmental and consumer protection laws as examples “of what the law would be 
if originalism were to prevail.”); cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. L. REV. 857, 898 (2009) (describing 
and responding to criticisms of originalism grounded in the “argument from bad results”).    
2 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 899 (asserting that “original meaning textualism 
does not yield bad outcomes” or at least “yields fewer than its critics imagine”); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 663, 686 (2009) (arguing that “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights and “the extension 
of the Constitution’s equality command to sex discrimination” are “correct on originalist 
grounds”). 
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 12-15 (1971) (contending that originalism could support a “plausible” 
resolution of Brown consistent with the Court’s holding); Edwin Meese, III, Construing the 
Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 27 (1985) (contending that Brown did not involve 
“adapting a ‘living,’ ‘flexible’ Constitution to new reality” but rather “restoring the original 
principle of the Constitution to constitutional law.”).  For the more conventional view, see, 
for example, Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995) (“[T]he 
overwhelming consensus among legal academics has been that Brown cannot be defended 
on originalist grounds.”); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the 
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (deeming it an “obvious conclusion” 
from the historical evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was not “meant to apply … to 
… segregation.”).   
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Michael McConnell explains: 
Such is the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not 
produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is 
seriously discredited.  Thus, what once was seen as a weakness in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown [i.e., the apparent inconsistency of the 
decision with the original understanding] is now a mighty weapon against the 
proposition that the Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood by 
the people who framed and ratified it.5 
Over time, the number of originalists willing to question Brown’s 
correctness has declined, such that the ability of originalism to justify the 
Court’s decision is now a widely shared assumption of originalist 
scholarship.6   
A similar story cannot be told, however, about Brown’s companion 
case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 7  which invalidated a similar racial segregation 
policy applicable to public schools in the District of Columbia.  Because the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies only to “state” 
governments, 8  the holding in Brown did not control the resolution of 
Bolling, which presented the distinct question of whether the Constitution 
prohibits the federal government from discriminating on the basis of race.  
The Court answered that question in the affirmative and based its decision 
on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.9  The Bolling Court made 
no effort to ground its holding in the original meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment and only a cursory effort to reconcile its decision with either 
the text of the Due Process Clause or the Court’s own earlier interpretations 
of that provision.  Instead, the lynchpin of the Court’s analysis was Chief 
Justice Warren’s conclusory assertion that “[i]n view of our decision that 
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated 
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would 
                                                 
5 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 952-53 (1995).  This observation is hardly unique to Professor McConnell. See, 
e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the 
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 n.4 (1986) (“For a generation, one 
criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been whether that theory explains why 
[Brown] was correct.”).   
6 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1 at 901 (arguing that Brown is “right on original-
meaning textualist grounds that focus on the meaning of the words of the Equal Protection 
Clause rather than subjective specific intention or expectation”); Calabresi & Fine, supra 
note 2, at 686 (“[W]e think Brown v. Board of Education is correct on originalist 
grounds.”).    
7 347 U.S. 498 (1954). 
8  U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 1 (“No state shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
9 347 U.S. at 499-500. 
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impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”10   
The considerable textual and historical difficulties presented by the 
Bolling opinion—which from start to finish, spans only three pages of the 
United States Reports11—are well known.12  The failure of the Bolling Court 
to support its decision with textual or historical analysis and the Court’s 
decision to ground its holding in a provision that most scholars agree was 
originally understood to regulate only matters of procedure,13 has led most 
to conclude that the Court’s holding was unsupportable on originalist 
grounds.14   
Early originalists, such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, condemned 
the decision as “exemplif[ying]” the Warren Court’s “naked judicial 
revision of the Constitution.”15 Over time, such explicit originalist critiques 
have grown increasingly rare, as originalist theory has moved away from its 
early focus on criticizing the Warren Court and as Bolling’s core holding 
has become more firmly entrenched in modern constitutional law.16   But 
Bolling has not inspired the same vigorous efforts at originalist 
                                                 
10 Id. at 499. 
11 Id. at 498-500.   
12 See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, III, Forget the Fundamentals:  Fixing Substantive Due 
Process, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 997 (2006) (observing that “[t]he argumentation … in 
Bolling is somewhat less than satisfactory” and that “[t]his fact has been widely noted”).    
13 See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 
120 YALE L.J. 408, 428-60 (2010) (examining evidence indicating that meaning of Fifth 
Due Process Clause in 1791 likely did not encompass substantive rights). 
14 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 18 (1980) (describing the proposition “that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” as 
“gibberish both syntactically and historically.”); Peter J. Rubin, Taking its Proper Place in 
the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection 
Component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L. REV. 1879, 1879-80 (2006) 
(“[I]t is widely accepted, by those who defend the decision as well as those who attack it, 
that [Bolling’s] doctrinal innovation cannot be easily justified by the Fifth Amendment’s 
text or its history ….”). 
15 Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment:  The Beckoning Mirage, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 
955, 975 (1990); see also, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 83-84 (1990) (expressing sympathy for the result 
reached in Bolling “as a matter of morality and politics,” but nonetheless criticizing the 
decision as a “clear rewriting of the Constitution by the Warren Court”); Lino A. Graglia, 
Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
773-74 (1998) (citing Bolling as an example of “the irrelevance of the Constitution to 
constitutional law”). 
16 See, e.g., Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 94, 104 
(2010) (observing that “as official racial discrimination became a consensus evil, Bolling 
ceased to have detractors”); cf. Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 599, 599-601, 607-08 (2004) (observing that unlike early originalism, modern 
originalism “is no longer primarily a critique of the Warren Court’s rights jurisprudence”). 
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rehabilitation that have been offered in defense of Brown.  For example, 
Professor McConnell, the leading academic originalist defender of Brown, 
did not even mention Bolling in his pathbreaking 1995 article Originalism 
and the Desegregation Decisions, 17  which sought to justify Brown as 
consistent with the understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
framers.18  This relative inattention to Bolling is consistent with originalist 
scholarship more generally, which has devoted relatively little attention to 
either the decision itself or to the broader federal antidiscrimination norm 
for which the case has come to stand.19   
The presumed inability of originalism to justify Bolling presents a 
continuing challenge to originalist methods of constitutional interpretation.  
Although Bolling has not attained Brown’s status as a touchstone of 
interpretive correctness, the decision itself is both reasonably well known 
and politically popular.20  More significantly, Bolling’s core holding—that 
the federal government, like the states, is prohibited from engaging in racial 
                                                 
17 McConnell, supra note 5. 
18 Professor McConnell did address Bolling in a subsequent work but did not attempt 
to defend the case’s constitutional holding, suggesting instead that the same result could 
have been reached by narrowly construing Congress’s statutory grant of authority to the 
District of Columbia’s local government.  See Michael W. McConnell, McConnell, J., 
concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE 
SAID 166-68 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).    
19 See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-
Conscious Law:  An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 480 (1998) (observing 
that because Bolling “has not acquired the iconic status of Brown,” “there are almost no 
originalist studies of the federal government's power to enact race conscious laws”).  There 
have been occasional efforts to ground an originalist defense of Bolling in provisions other 
than the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 768-72 (1999) (arguing that Bolling could be justified by the 
original meanings of, among other provisions, the Bill of Attainder and Titles of Nobility 
Clauses of Article I); Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling, & Orginalism: Why Ackerman and 
Posner (Among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 53, 69-72 (1995) (suggesting the 
Ninth Amendment as “a much more plausible basis” for Bolling).   But the dominant 
scholarly reaction has been to regard such arguments as “unconvincing apologetics.”  
Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 977 n.7 (2004); see also, e.g., 
Michael C. Dorf, A Nonoriginalist Perspective on the Lessons of History, 19 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 351, 357 (1996) (referring to originalist defenses of both Brown and Bolling 
and observing that “at some point, one wonders whether the revisionism is not motivated 
by the hope that original meaning can be made to fit the preferred modern understanding”).   
20 A good indication of Bolling’s popularity is provided by the testimony of Judge 
Robert Bork during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987.  Although Judge Bork 
expressed a willingness during those hearings to revisit several cases he believed had been 
incorrectly decided, he refused to endorse a similar approach to Bolling, suggesting that the 
decision should be allowed to stand as a matter of stare decisis.  See Primus, supra note 16, 
at 109 (observing that Bork “pronounced himself willing to hack away a good deal of 
modern constitutional law in the name of the integrity of the Constitution itself—but … 
would not dream … of overruling Bolling.”).  
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discrimination—is an important part of modern constitutional doctrine that 
is embraced across a broad range of ideological and jurisprudential 
perspectives. 21   Unsurprisingly, the assumed inability of originalism to 
justify the constitutional ban on federal discrimination is frequently invoked 
by critics as a principal example of the type of “intolerable” result that 
originalism requires.22 
But such uses of Bolling by originalism’s critics tell only half the story.  
When discussed outside the specific context of the originalism debate, 
scholarly reaction to the Warren Court’s rather cavalier treatment of text 
and history in Bolling is decidedly more ambivalent.  Despite its firmly 
entrenched status in modern constitutional doctrine, Bolling has long 
occupied a somewhat “uncomfortable place in the constitutional cannon.”23  
The conventional academic narrative surrounding the decision views the 
Court’s holding as unsupportable on traditional interpretive grounds and as 
premised on considerations that were primarily political rather than legal in 
nature.24  But even among scholars who embrace this “political” explanation 
and view the decision as normatively justified, there often remains a 
pervading sense of discomfort with the “controversial and even dangerous 
form of argument” such a justification requires.25  
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom regarding Bolling’s 
assumed originalist indefensibility.  Although the specific rationale on 
which the Warren Court relied is difficult to defend on originalist grounds, 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1823 (2005) (“Justices of all substantive persuasions have felt entitled not only to 
uphold Bolling but also to expand upon its commitments”).  
22 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63 (asserting that “[h]onest [originalists] have 
to admit that according to their method, the national government can segregate the armed 
forces, public schools, or anything it chooses”); STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 14 (observing 
that “[e]ven the originalists who think they can justify Brown find it difficult to escape 
th[e] conclusion” that “[t]he federal government could discriminate against racial 
minorities (or anyone else) pretty much any time it wanted to”); Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,232-33 (1980) (“[A] 
moderate originalist cannot easily justify the incorporation of principles of equal treatment 
into the due process clause of the fifth amendment … .”).   
23 Rubin, supra note 14, at 1882. 
24  See, e.g., id. at 1880 (“The conventional account is that the decision was … 
essentially political rather than judicial”). 
25 Fallon, supra note 21, at 1835; see also Rubin, supra note 14, at 1896 (observing 
that “even many supporters of the Bolling decision … readily accepted or internalized the 
criticism of the decision’s reasoning and accepted … that it represented a breathtaking (and, 
corollary, legally indefensible) innovation”); cf. David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal 
Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1253 (2004) (observing 
that many “scholars more sympathetic to Warren Court jurisprudence embrace the result in 
Bolling, but reject, or at least refuse to endorse, its reliance on the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause”).   
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it does not follow that the holding itself is similarly indefensible.  In fact, a 
surprisingly strong originalist argument supporting both Bolling’s specific 
holding and the broader unconstitutionality of most forms of invidious 
federal racial discrimination26 can be made by looking to the original public 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, which 
provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside.”27   
This Article is not the first to suggest the Citizenship Clause, which, 
unlike the Equal Protection Clause, applies to the federal government as 
well as the states,28 as a possible alternative basis for Bolling’s constitutional 
holding.  A number of prominent constitutional scholars, including 
Professors Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Drew Days and Bruce Ackerman, have 
suggested that the Citizenship Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause, 
might have provided a more textually defensible basis for the Bolling 
decision. 29   But existing scholarship drawing a connection between the 
Citizenship Clause and the prohibition of federal racial discrimination has 
been largely content to suggest the connection without engaging in the type 
of detailed historical analysis necessary to ground the connection firmly in 
the actual original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.30  The relative 
                                                 
26  I use the term “invidious” to bracket the important question of whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only laws that burden minority groups or whether it also 
prohibits “benign” race-conscious enactments intended to benefit minorities, such as race-
based affirmative action. Cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 478 n.3 (drawing similar distinction 
between “invidious” and “benign” color-conscious laws).  Though I do not take a position 
on that question here, I am reasonably confident that, whatever the correct answer to this 
question may be as a matter of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, that answer 
should be the same for both state and federal policies.  See infra Section IV.B (discussing 
overlap between federal and state equality requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment).     
27 U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 1. 
28 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1999) (“[T]he protection afforded to 
the citizen by the Citizenship Clause … is a limitation on the powers of the National 
Government as well as the States.”). 
29 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19, at 768-69;  Jack Balkin, Opinion of Jack Balkin, C.J., 
in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 18, at 87; 
Drew S. Days, III, Drew S. Days, III (concurring), in id. at 92, 97-98; Bruce Ackerman, 
Bruce Ackerman (concurring), in id. at 100, 114-16; cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 482, 584-
86 (concluding that the Citizenship Clause was susceptible to an interpretation that “some 
originalists might accept as limiting federal power to enact laws invidiously burdening 
minorities”).  
30 For example, in a 1999 article, Professor Amar supported his suggestion that the 
Citizenship Clause might support the result in Bolling with a single sentence from Justice 
Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson—an opinion written nearly twenty-eight 
years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.  See Amar, supra note 19, at 768-69 
(pointing to Harlan’s statement that “All citizens are equal before the law” as support for 
reading the Citizenship Clause to include an equality component) (quoting Plessy v. 
8 ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING [2012 
paucity of supporting evidence identified in the most prominent scholarly 
discussions drawing a link between Bolling and the Citizenship Clause has 
contributed to the perception that the Citizenship Clause justification, like 
other attempted originalist defenses of Bolling, reflects nothing more than 
an effort by clever lawyers to find historical support for a result they favor 
on non-originalist grounds.31  
The Citizenship Clause argument, however, is not so easily dismissed.  
The Citizenship Clause was adopted in 1868—following a Civil War fought 
over the issue of slavery and the adoption of a constitutional amendment 
forbidding the practice.  And while race-based discrimination had hardly 
been eradicated by the time of that provision’s adoption, protecting the civil 
rights of free African Americans was a principal goal of the Amendment 
and the Citizenship Clause itself was specifically targeted at repudiating the 
racist logic of Chief Justice Taney’s infamous Dred Scott decision.32  When 
considered in combination, these circumstances confer upon the Citizenship 
Clause argument an aura of historical plausibility that arguments grounded 
in the original meaning of constitutional provisions adopted in the late 
eighteenth century cannot hope to match.   
Moreover, as Part I of the Article explains, the Citizenship Clause was 
adopted against a longstanding political and legal tradition that closely 
associated the status of “citizenship” with the entitlement to legal equality.  
Although the precise contours of this equal citizenship principle were ill-
defined—as were the mechanisms through which constitutional citizenship 
could be acquired—there was a strong presumption throughout the 
antebellum period that a person’s status as a “citizen” entitled that person to, 
at a minimum, full legal equality with respect to “fundamental” civil 
rights.33 Part I also explores the challenges this egalitarian conception of 
citizenship created when applied to the rights and privileges of free African 
Americans and the legal theories through which free blacks’ claims to 
citizenship and legal equality were defended and denied.34 
                                                                                                                            
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 556 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)); see also, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY, 381-82 (2005) (citing negative public reaction 
to Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Dred Scott and Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in 
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 (1896) as support for an “equal citizenship” 
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause).              
31  See, e.g., Martha Minow, A Proper Objective: Constitutional Commitment and 
Educational Opportunity after Bolling v. Sharpe and Parents Involved in Community 
Schools, 55 HOW. L.J. 575, 596-97 (2012) (referring to Citizenship Clause and other 
alternative textual arguments for Bolling as “imaginative” but declaring that such 
“arguments can make no claim to discerning the original intent of the framers”). 
32 Cf. infra Part I.C (discussing Taney’s Dred Scott opinion). 
33 See infra Part I.A. 
34 See infra Parts I.B and I.C. 
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Part II examines the political debates leading up to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption, focusing particularly on the debates surrounding 
the adoption of the Citizenship Clause’s predecessor provision in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which attempted to extend citizenship to free blacks by 
statute, and the conceptions of “citizenship” reflected in the drafting and 
ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  These debates 
reflect the profound influence of the Civil War in shifting mainstream 
Republican thinking toward recognizing blacks’ status as United States 
citizens and linking that status with their claims to legal equality.35  Nor 
were Republicans alone in linking the status of citizenship with the 
entitlement to legal equality.  During both the Civil Rights Act debates and 
the subsequent Fourteenth Amendment debates, opponents of black equality 
repeatedly asserted that extending citizenship to blacks would require not 
only that they be given equal civil rights, such as the right to contract and to 
own property, but full political rights and privileges as well.36   
Part III examines the persistence of these understandings in early 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, including in debates 
surrounding early Congressional efforts to enforce the Amendment and in 
early judicial decisions examining its meaning.  Part III also explores the 
shift away from the citizenship-focused account of the Amendment in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s notorious 1873 decision in the Slaughter-
House Cases,37 which imposed a narrow and constrained interpretation on 
the Amendment’s Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses that 
effectively negated those Clauses’ ability to provide meaningful protection 
to civil rights. 
Part IV examines the evidence considered in Parts I through III of the 
Article in light of modern originalist theory.  Although the diversity of 
originalist theories renders it difficult to make categorical claims about 
whether a particular outcome either is or is not reconcilable with 
“originalism” in the abstract, this Part argues that there is a strong argument 
for recognizing an equality component in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause that would require that the federal government extend to 
all citizens equality rights that are at least as broad as those that states are 
required to extend to all “persons” under the Equal Protection Clause.  
* * * 
Of course, any comprehensive originalist defense of Bolling would 
almost certainly require a defense of Brown’s interpretive correctness as 
                                                 
35 See infra notes 168-176 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 200, 259-271 & 290 and accompanying text. 
37 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
10 ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING [2012 
well.38  As noted above, the proposition that Brown can be reconciled with 
originalism has been embraced by many self-described originalist scholars.  
But this position remains deeply controversial.39  The question of Brown’s 
consistency with the original understanding and/or meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is among the most thoroughly examined questions 
in all of constitutional law and attempting to engage this question 
adequately would take me far afield from the core focus of the present 
inquiry.40  For purposes of this Article, I will therefore limit myself to the 
more modest objective of demonstrating that Bolling is no more 
problematic than Brown as a matter of constitutional text and original 
meaning.  This proposition is sufficiently novel and controversial to merit 
sustained attention.41  
I. CONSTITUTIONAL “CITIZENSHIP” BEFORE THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT  
A.  Republican “Citizenship” and Equality in Early America 
The change in governmental form that accompanied the American 
Revolution resulted in a changed relationship between the people and their 
respective governments that was reflected in the terminological change 
from “subjects” to “citizens.”42  As historian Gordon Wood observes, the 
very idea of “[r]epublican citizenship” during the Founding era “implied 
equality.”43     
                                                 
38 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 291, 326 (2000) (“Clever lawyers can concoct all sorts of arguments for why 
Bolling is no more problematic than Brown but for an originalist that still leaves the puzzle 
of Brown itself.”) (footnote omitted). 
39 See supra note 6. 
40 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MARYLAND L. REV. 
978, 982 (2012) (“The original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause regarding 
racial segregation was debated extensively in the briefing to Brown v. Board of Education 
and has been a central concern of constitutional historians and theorists ever since.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
41  Even originalists who defend Brown as correctly decided often concede the 
unavailability of any similar defense of Bolling’s constitutional holding.  See, e.g., BORK, 
supra note 15, at 83-84; McConnell, supra note 18, at 166-68; Paulsen, supra note 1, at 
901.  
42 See, e.g., GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 169 
(1991) (discussing relationship between citizenship and republicanism in Revolution-era 
American thought).     
43 Id. at 233; see also, e.g., DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION: 
POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN UNION 1774-1804, at 11 (2009) (“When 
dressed in the language of Revolution, subjecthood and citizenship were understood to be 
polar opposites with subjecthood representing a feudal status of perpetual allegiance and 
inferiority, and citizenship representing a ‘modern’ status of equality and freedom …”).  As 
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The idea that American citizenship necessarily implied equal citizenship 
was commonplace in American political and legal writing of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  For example, in a 1784 pamphlet 
urging the adoption of a new constitution for his state, South Carolina 
politician Thomas Tudor Tucker described the constitution as “a social 
covenant entered into by express consent of the people, upon a footing of 
the most perfect equality with respect to every civil liberty.”44  “No man,” 
according to Tucker, “has any privilege above his fellow-citizens, except 
whilst in office, and even then, none but what they have thought proper to 
vest in him, solely for the purpose of supporting him in the effectual 
performance of his duty to the public.”45  A pamphlet discussing the nature 
of United States citizenship published in 1787 by Tucker’s fellow South 
Carolinian, David Ramsay, described American “citizens,” as distinguished 
from English “subjects,” as being “so far equal, that none have hereditary 
rights superior to others,” with each citizen possessing “as much of the 
common sovereignty as another.”46  Chief Justice John Jay’s 1793 opinion 
in Chisolm v. Georgia,47 explained his rejection of state sovereign immunity 
by reference to the difference between the European systems, which 
regarded the person of the sovereign “as the object of allegiance, and 
exclude[d] the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject,” and the 
American system, in which “the citizens ... are equal as fellow citizens, and 
as joint tenants in the sovereignty.”48   
                                                                                                                            
Wood observes, the term “citizen” itself had etymological roots connecting the idea of 
“citizenship” with the inhabitants of a town or city, and thus stood in contradistinction to 
members of “the landed nobility or gentry.” WOOD, supra note 42, at 233;  see also, e.g., 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3rd ed. 1768) (unpaginated) 
(defining “citizen” as “a townman; not a gentleman”); see also id. (defining “gentleman” as 
“a man of birth; a man of extraction, though not noble”).   
44 PHILODEMUS (THOMAS TUDOR TUCKER), CONCILIATORY HINTS, ATTEMPTING, BY A 
FAIR STATE OF MATTERS, TO REMOVE PARTY PREJUDICE (CHARLESTON, 1784), reprinted in 
1AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760–1805, at 606, 612–13 
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
45 Id. at 613. 
46 DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE CHARACTER 
AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, 5 (1789). 
47 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
48 Id. at 471-72 (Jay, C.J.); see also, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH 
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE CONSTITUTION, (Appendix), 28 (Henry St. George 
Tucker, ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (describing the 
“perfect equality of rights among citizens” as “indispensably necessary to the very 
existence of” the American species of democracy); BENJAMIN LYNDE OLIVER, THE RIGHTS 
OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN: WITH A COMMENTARY ON STATE RIGHTS, AND ON THE 
CONSTITUTION AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, at 51 (1832) (observing that “[a]s all 
men are naturally equal in their rights, there can be no doubt … that no individual would be 
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During the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, this 
principle of citizen equality became a staple of American political rhetoric 
and was closely associated with the political ideology of the era’s dominant 
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian political coalitions. 49   This principle also 
manifested itself in the era’s legal doctrine, particularly in the substantial 
body of state-court decisions prohibiting “special” or “class” legislation that 
imposed special burdens or accorded special benefits to particular “classes” 
of citizens.50   
B.  The Problem of Free Black Citizenship  
1. The Uncertain Status of United States Citizenship Under the 
Constitution of 1787 
Though the original Constitution of 1787 presupposed a class of persons 
identified as “citizens of the United States,” it said virtually nothing about 
the identities of such “citizens” or what rights or privileges attached to the 
status of citizenship.51  The Constitution explicitly conferred a handful of 
relatively narrow rights on United States “citizens,” including eligibility for 
certain federal offices and the ability to maintain actions in the federal 
courts in certain categories of cases. 52   The Privileges and Immunities 
                                                                                                                            
willing to join in organizing a society, unless he were put on an equal footing with others, 
as to all rights secured to him in the social compact, or constitution of society.”); Wilkins’ 
Lessee v. Allenton, 3 Yeates 273 (Pa. 1801) (rejecting proposed construction of a land 
grant as “oppose[d]” to “that just equality, which ought to prevail amongst the citizens of a 
free government”). 
49  On the role of civic equality in Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideology, see, for 
example, HOWARD GILLMAN:  THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE at 33-45 (1993); cf. WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, 36-
38 (1988) (observing linkage between ideas of equality and “citizens’ rights” rhetoric in 
antebellum political and legal arguments).  
50  See, e.g., Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 127 (Vt. 1825) (“An act conferring upon any 
one citizen, privileges to the prejudice of another, and which is not applicable to others, in 
like circumstances, … does not enter into the idea of municipal law, having no relation to 
the community in general.”); GILLMAN, supra note 49, at 22-60 (describing public and 
judicial resistance to such “class legislation” during the antebellum period); Melissa 
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color-Blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
245, 251-68 (1997) (same).   
51 Cf. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 85 (Philadelphia, 2nd ed., 1829) (“It cannot escape notice that no definition of 
the nature and rights of citizens appears in the Constitution.  The descriptive term is used 
with a plain indication that its meaning is understood by all …”).  
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (eligibility for House of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3 
(Senate eligibility); id. art. II, § 1 (presidential eligibility); id. art. III, § 2 (designating 
citizenship of the parties as a basis for jurisdiction for certain categories of suits). 
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Clause of Article IV (also known as the Comity Clause) suggested the 
existence of a much broader and more amorphous category of “privileges 
and immunities” of citizenship that the Constitution itself did not define. 53   
Although the plain language of the Comity Clause appeared to require 
that each state extend to citizens of other states literally “all” the privileges 
and immunities its own citizens possessed,  this interpretation was almost 
uniformly rejected by antebellum courts, which instead embraced a 
narrower interpretation of the provision as extending only to “fundamental” 
state-law rights and privileges. 54   Justice Bushrod Washington’s circuit 
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,55 one of the leading antebellum authorities on 
the meaning of the provision, exemplified this approach.  Washington  
identified the “privileges and immunities” protected by the Clause as “those 
... which are in their nature fundamental,” “which belong of right to the 
citizens of all free Governments” and “which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, 
from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.” 56  
Washington also suggested an illustrative, though explicitly non-exhaustive 
list of the rights he viewed as falling within the scope of the provision’s 
protection.57  
The ambiguity surrounding the rights attaching to citizenship was 
                                                 
53 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
54 See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 336 (1988) (“[M]ost courts concluded that the concept of 
privileges and immunities did not encompass all rights which were associated with 
citizenship in a particular state; rather, only those rights which were in some sense 
‘fundamental’ were viewed as protected.”). 
55  6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); see also John Harrison, 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1398 (1992) 
(describing Corfield  as “the most famous Comity Clause case of all”).   
56 Id. at 551-52.   
57 Washington provided the following illustrative list of rights he viewed as falling 
within the scope of the provision’s protection: 
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, 
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the 
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind 
in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or 
personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the 
other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges 
and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description 
of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective 
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in 
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, 
are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities … 
Id. at 551-52. 
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matched by a similar ambiguity regarding the persons entitled to 
recognition as “citizens.”  The Constitution gave Congress the power to 
prescribe a “uniform Rule of Naturalization”58 but was otherwise silent on 
the question of how citizenship could be acquired.  The dominant view 
during the antebellum period was that United States citizenship was 
derivative of state citizenship, with state citizenship generally viewed as 
following the English common law jus soli doctrine, which recognized birth 
within a nation’s territory as sufficient to establish citizenship.59 
While this jus soli principle worked tolerably well as applied to white 
Americans, it presented special problems as applied to other groups, 
particularly Native Americans, slaves and free African Americans.60  The 
denial of citizenship to Native Americans and African American slaves 
raised relatively few conceptual difficulties.  Most American courts and 
legal commentators viewed the birthright citizenship principle as 
inapplicable to Native Americans due to the allegiance they owed to their 
quasi-sovereign tribal governments, which placed them in a position 
analogous to that of foreigners.61 The denial of citizenship to slaves was 
similarly easy to justify based on their legal status as property and a civil 
law tradition, stretching back to ancient Rome, which recognized an explicit 
distinction between “slave” and “citizen.”62  The legal status of free blacks, 
however, was not so easily assimilated to a pre-existing legal status that 
could be defined in contradistinction to the status of “citizen.”63   
Under English law, both free-born African Americans and emancipated 
slaves had been considered English subjects based on their birth within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign.64  But this formal legal status was 
                                                 
58 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 
59 See, e.g., JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–
1870, 287 (1978); (“Americans” of the antebellum period “merely continued to assume that 
‘birth within the allegiance’ conferred the status [of citizenship] and its accompanying 
rights.”). 
60  See generally id. at 288-333 (discussing contested citizenship status of Native 
Americans and African Americans). 
61 See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN U.S. HISTORY,  106-10, 181-85 (1997); KETTNER, supra note 59, at 288-300.   
62 See, e.g., KETTNER, supra note 59, at 311 (“Although it was impossible to avoid 
confronting problems of slave status … the debates could be argued in terms that did not 
raise the issue of citizenship explicitly.”); Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681, 738-43 (1997) (discussing influence 
of Roman law distinction between citizens and slaves on antebellum legal thought). 
63  KETTNER, supra note 59, at 311 (observing that “when free Negroes were 
considered within the context of the general assumptions governing the concept of 
citizenship, there seemed to be no theoretically consistent way to deny them the rights and 
privileges of citizens.”). 
64 SMITH, supra note 61, at 64-65. 
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not viewed as implying legal equality with white subjects and free blacks 
were widely subjected to various civil and political disabilities, including 
denial of the right to vote and hold office, the right to serve on juries and to 
testify against whites. 65   Though the separation from England and the 
transition of former colonists from English “subjects” to American 
“citizens” highlighted the ambiguous legal status of free blacks in the newly 
independent states, the change in governmental form led to relatively few 
practical changes in their legal treatment.  Both northern and southern states 
maintained a variety of race-based distinctions that had existed under 
Colonial-era laws and enacted new racially discriminatory legislation to 
address newly perceived problems.66   
2. The Missouri Controversy and the Emergence of Free Black Citizenship 
as a National Political Issue 
Explicit consideration of the citizenship status of free blacks was 
relatively rare during the nation’s earliest years and opinion among those 
who did address the issue was divided.67 But in 1820, the question of free 
blacks’ citizenship emerged as a source of national political controversy 
when anti-slavery northern members of Congress sought to derail 
Missouri’s application for statehood under an aggressively pro-slavery 
constitution that would require the state’s legislature to “prevent free 
negroes and mulattoes from coming to and settling in this State, under any 
pretext whatsoever.” 68  Anti-slavery forces contended that this proposed 
migration restriction would violate the rights of free black citizens under the 
Comity Clause.69 
Supporters of Missouri’s admission responded to such arguments by 
denying that free blacks either were or could be “citizens” of any state 
within the meaning of the Constitution. The denial of free blacks’ 
citizenship by supporters of Missouri’s admission rested on a strongly 
                                                 
65  Id. at 65.  Bans on interracial marriage and sexual relations also existed throughout 
the American colonies.  Id. 
66 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 494-513 (surveying race-based laws restricting 
legal rights of free blacks in both northern and southern states following the Revolution). 
67 MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL, 52-53 
(2006). 
68  For useful discussions of the political background of the controversy over 
Missouri’s admission, see ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS 
AFTERMATH, 33-141 (2007); and DON E. FEHRENBACHER THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, 100-13 (1978). 
69 See, e.g., 37 Annals of Cong., 16th Cong. 2d Sess., at 47 (1820) (Rep. Burris) 
(contending that proposed migration restriction as “entirely repugnant to the Constitution 
of the United States.”); id. at 92 (Rep. Otis) (proposed restriction was in “palpable collision 
with” the Comity Clause). 
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egalitarian conception of citizenship that insisted on the full political and 
civil equality of all citizens.   For example, Representative Louis McLane of 
Delaware declared his understanding “that a person, to be a ‘citizen’ under 
one government, must be a member of the civil community, and entitled as 
[a] matter of right to equal advantages in that community.”70  Representative 
Philip Barbour of Virginia similarly contended that that “[t]he term citizen 
… could not with propriety be applied to anyone unless … he should be 
possessed of all at least of the civil rights, if not of the political, of every 
other person in the community, under like circumstances, of which he is not 
deprived for some cause personal to himself.”71 The corollary of such claims 
was that the unequal treatment of free blacks under the existing laws of 
most states, including northern states where slavery was illegal, 
demonstrated that such individuals could not truly be considered “citizens” 
of any state. 72   Those opposed to Missouri’s admission countered such 
arguments by observing that many white citizens, including women, 
children and property-less white men, did not enjoy full civil and political 
privileges in many states but were nonetheless recognized as “citizens” of 
those states.73   
The controversy over Missouri’s proposed exclusion of free blacks 
ended somewhat anticlimactically in a compromise that allowed the state’s 
admission under its proposed constitution—including the provision 
restricting free blacks’ migration—but that premised admission on the state 
legislature’s acknowledgement that the constitution would “never be 
construed to authorize the passage of any law ... by which any citizen, of 
either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of 
                                                 
70 Id. at 615.  
71 Id. at 545; see also, e.g., id. at 585 (Rep. Archer) (arguing that while “[c]itizens 
might be admitted in various degree to the exercise of political rights” and “might even be 
admitted in various degrees to the enjoyment of civil rights,” “those could not be 
considered as belonging to the ranks of citizens who, … by … the positive enactments of 
law, were every where excluded from an equality with even the lowest rank of citizens, as 
respected the ordinary and most essential relations of domestic and social rights.”). 
72  See, e.g., id. at 546 (Rep. Barbour) (contending that free blacks could not be 
considered citizens of any state because such individuals were “in all the States deprived of 
many of the rights of white men.”); id. at 87-88 (Rep. Holmes (pointing to denial of voting 
rights and right to keep and bear arms as illustrating that free blacks were not citizens); cf. 
id. at 93-94 (Rep. Otis) (observing that the arguments of nearly all proponents of 
Missouri’s admission rested upon “a single foundation stone,” namely the contention that 
free blacks “were not citizens … because … they are, or have been, made liable to certain 
disabilities not common to … free white citizens”). 
73 See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (Rep. Otis) (observing that “[i]n every country women and 
minors are subject to disqualifications” in the exercise of important civil and political 
rights”); id. at 596 (Rep. Hemphill) (observing that “[d]iscriminations are familiar to us, in 
the several States, both as to political and civil rights; but it never was believed that they 
effected a total extinguishment of citizenship”). 
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any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under 
the Constitution of the United States.”74  
The resolution of the Missouri controversy did not end the sectional 
debate over the citizenship of free blacks and their rights under the Comity 
Clause.  In 1822—less than a year after the Congressional debates over 
Missouri concluded—South Carolina enacted a law authorizing state 
officials to board any ship entering the state’s harbors and arrest any 
African American crew members found on board.75  The passage of this law, 
and similar “Negro Seamen’s Acts” by other southern states,76 prompted 
strenuous objections from New England states, led by Massachusetts, which 
objected that South Carolina’s conduct violated the Article IV Comity 
Clause. In response to Massachusetts’ objections, and its efforts to institute 
a legal challenge to the law’s constitutionality, 77   the South Carolina 
legislature issued a proclamation denying that “free negroes or persons of 
color” were “citizens of the United States” within the meaning of the 
Comity Clause and condemning Massachusetts’ for its attempted 
interference with the internal affairs of a sister state.78   
The antagonism between the southern states and the New England states 
regarding the constitutionality of the Negro Seamen’s Acts kept the 
question of free black citizenship alive as a national political issue 
throughout the antebellum period.79 
                                                 
74 Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. L. REV. 61, 87-88 (2011). 
75 See generally W. Jeffrey Bolster, “To Feel Like a Man”: Black Seamen in the 
Northern States, 1800–1860, 76 J. AM. HIST. 1173, 1192-93 (1990) (describing the Negro 
Seamen’s Acts of South Carolina and other southern states). 
76  Similar laws were subsequently adopted by North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, and Louisiana.  Id. at 1192. 
77 In 1844, Massachusetts sent official delegations to South Carolina and Louisiana to 
protest those states’ Negro Seamens’ Acts and to institute legal challenges to the acts.  Both 
delegations were forced to leave shortly after their arrival in the destination states after 
local officials made clear that they would not be protected against mob violence.   PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY, 109 n.28 (1981); see also WILLIAM 
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848, 
128-40 (1977).  The mistreatment of the Massachusetts delegation became a staple of 
antislavery political rhetoric that was repeatedly invoked throughout the antebellum period.  
See Maltz, supra note 54, at 340-41. 
78 STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, 
238 (Herman V. Ames, ed. 1970).  The legislatures of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia and 
Mississippi all issued proclamations endorsing the actions of South Carolina and 
condemning Massachusetts.  Id. at 237. 
79 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 54, at 340 (observing that the “Negro Seamen’s Acts 
were a more or less constant source of friction in the antebellum era”). 
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3. Legal Theories of Free Black Citizenship 
The controversy over the citizenship of free blacks and their rights 
under the Comity Clause did not confine itself to the political arena.  During 
the middle and later decades of the antebellum period, arguments 
concerning the citizenship of free blacks were frequently pressed upon 
courts and other legal officials resulting in an extensive body of legal 
decisions and commentary addressing the issue.  The legal theories 
developed in connection with such claims gave rise to at least three distinct 
theories of free blacks’ citizenship—(1) the pro-Southern, anti-citizenship 
position, which viewed the pervasive denial of legal equality to free blacks 
as conclusive evidence of their incapacity for citizenship; (2) the 
abolitionist position, which accepted the posited link between citizenship 
and equality suggested by the pro-Southern position but argued that free 
blacks were citizens and thus entitled to the same civil rights as white 
citizens; and (3) a more moderate pro-citizenship position, which attempted 
to steer a middle ground between these two extremes by defending the 
citizenship of free blacks while, at the same time, embracing an extremely 
narrow conception of what “citizenship” entailed. 
a. The Anti-Citizenship Position 
In 1822, less than a year after the issue of free black citizenship emerged 
as a point of national contention in the Missouri debates, Kentucky’s 
highest court decided Amy v. Smith—one of the earliest cases to address the 
question of whether free blacks could be considered “citizens” within the 
meaning of the Comity Clause.80 The plaintiff, a purported “free woman of 
color” who alleged she was being unlawfully held as a slave, claimed 
citizenship under the laws of Pennsylvania and Virginia based on her 
temporary residence in those states and contended that the refusal of 
Kentucky to recognize her claim to freedom violated her rights under the 
Comity Clause. 81   Echoing the arguments offered by pro-slavery forces 
during the Missouri debates, the Kentucky court held that no one could, “in 
the correct sense of the term,” be considered “a citizen of a State, who is not 
entitled, upon the terms prescribed by the institutions of the State, to all the 
rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the highest class 
of society.” 82   Because “[f]ree negroes and mulattoes” were “almost 
everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people,” the court 
believed that “national sentiment on the subject” warranted a “presumption 
                                                 
80 Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326, 327 (Ct. of App. 1822).   
81 Id. at 327. 
82 Id. at 333. 
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that no State had made persons of color citizens,” unless “positive evidence 
to the contrary” could be shown.83   
In dissent, Judge Benjamin Mills called attention to the many 
absurdities the majority’s restrictive definition of “citizenship” would 
require, including denying citizenship to not only all women and children 
but also to all white males who lacked the requisite age and residency 
requirements for the state’s highest offices.84  Mills identified the majority’s 
“mistake” as having arisen from its failure to “attend[] to a sensible 
distinction between political and civil rights.”85  According to Mills, civil 
rights, including “liberty of person and of conscience, the right of acquiring 
and possessing property, of marriage and the social relations, of suit and 
defense, and security in person, estate and reputation,” along “with some 
others which might be enumerated,” were what “constitute the citizen.”86  
Political rights, by contrast, were “not necessary ingredients” of citizenship 
and a state could thus “deny all her political rights to an individual” without 
depriving that person of citizenship.87   
The large majority of antebellum courts faced with claims regarding the 
citizenship of free blacks adopted the more restrictive conception of 
citizenship endorsed by the majority in Amy v. Smith rather than the more 
permissive view urged by Judge Mills.88  Almost invariably, these courts 
premised their rejection of free blacks’ claims to citizenship on the unequal 
legal treatment of free blacks under existing state laws.89   
                                                 
83 Id.   
84 Id. at 342.  Two years earlier, Mills had authored an opinion rejecting an argument 
that free blacks were not protected by the bill of rights in the state’s constitution, observing 
that although such individuals did not possess “every benefit or privilege which the 
constitution secures,” they were nonetheless “in some measure, parties” to the political 
compact and thus within the scope of many of the constitution’s protections.  Ely v. 
Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 70 (1820).    
85 Id.   
86 Id.  
87 Id.   
88 See GRABER, supra note 67, at 29 (observing that “[v]irtually every state court that 
ruled on black citizenship before 1857 concluded that free persons of color were neither 
state nor American citizens.”). 
89 See, e.g., State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 339 (1838) (“[F]ree negroes, by 
whatever appellation we call them, were never in any of the States, entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens, and consequently were not intended to be included, 
when this word [i.e., the word “citizens” in the Comity Clause] was used in the 
Constitution”); Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 42-43 (1837) (holding that exclusion of 
“all coloured persons” from the elective franchise indicated that “such persons were 
considered as excluded from the social compact” and thus could not claim protection under 
equality provision in state’s bill of rights); Cooper and Worsham v. The Mayor and 
Aldermen of Savannah, 4 Ga. 68, 72 (1848) (“Free persons of color have never been 
recognized here as citizens; they are not entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the 
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Though no federal case prior to Dred Scott “explicitly discussed who 
was eligible for American citizenship,”90 the anti-citizenship position was 
endorsed by multiple officials in the federal Executive branch.  In 1821, 
U.S. Attorney General William Wirt, a Virginia slaveowner, issued a formal 
opinion denying that free blacks of his native state could be “citizens of the 
United States” within the meaning of the federal Constitution.91  Invoking 
the Comity Clause and the apparent absurdity of allowing “a person born 
and residing in Virginia, but possessing none of the high characteristic 
privileges of a citizen of the State” to nevertheless acquire “all the 
immunities and privileges of a citizen” upon removing to a different state, 
Wirt declared his opinion that a “citizen of the United States,” within the 
meaning of the Constitution was limited to “those only who enjoyed the full 
and equal privileges of white citizens in the State of their residence.”92  
Wirt’s decision that free blacks could not be “citizens” within the meaning 
of the Constitution was followed by his successors Caleb Cushing93 and, in 
an unpublished opinion that foreshadowed the reasoning of his later Dred 
Scott opinion, future Chief Justice Roger Taney.94   
Although the citizenship question arose in a variety of contexts, the 
specter of the Comity Clause—and the rights that might be claimed by free 
                                                                                                                            
legislature, or to hold any civil office.”); Aldridge v. The Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. 
Cas.) 447, 449 (1824) (holding that “[n]otwithstanding the general terms used” in the 
state’s bill of rights, free blacks could not claim protection under it because “[t]he 
numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people in our Statute Book … demonstrate, 
that” the constitution was “not considered to extend equally to both classes of our 
population.”).  
90 GRABER, supra note 67, at 53.      
91 William Wirt, Rights of Virginia Free Negroes, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 506 (Nov. 7, 
1821).  Although the opinion addressed the meaning of the phrase “citizens of the United 
States” in a federal statute, Wirt “presum[ed] that the description, ‘citizens of the United 
States,’ as used in the constitution, has the same meaning that it has in the several acts of 
Congress,” allowing the constitutional description to serve as the “standard of meaning” for 
interpreting the statute.  Id. at 506-07. 
92 Id. at 507. 
93 See Caleb Cushing, Right of Expatriation, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 139, 142 (Oct. 31, 
1856); see also Caleb Cushing, Relation of Indians to Citizenship, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746, 
751-52 (July 5, 1856).   
94 Roger B. Taney, The South Carolina Police Bill, reprinted in H. Jefferson Powell, 
Attorney General Taney & the South Carolina Police Bill, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 75, 101 
(2001).  The only moderate dissent on this point issuing from the Attorney General’s office 
during the antebellum period came from Attorney General Hugh Legare, who, in a brief 
1843 opinion, interpreted a federal statute restricting eligibility to purchase federal lands to 
“citizens of the United States” as having been intended to exclude only aliens and not 
native-born free blacks.  Hugh S. Legare, Pre-emption Rights of Colored Persons, 4 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 147,147 (1843).  Legare made clear, however, that his opinion went solely to 
the legislative intent underlying the particular statute at issue and did not address the 
question of black citizenship more generally.  Id. 
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blacks if they were recognized as “citizens” within the meaning of that 
Clause—pervaded discussions of blacks’ citizenship, even when the Clause 
itself was not directly at issue.95  A common assumption among those who 
espoused the anti-citizenship view was that if free blacks were recognized 
as “citizens” within the meaning of the Comity Clause, they would be 
entitled to claim an equality of rights when travelling in southern states with 
all citizens of the destination state—including rights that the destination 
state had reserved to its white citizens.96  Implicit in this assumption was a 
conception of the Comity Clause as encompassing not only a bare 
protection against residency-based discrimination but rather a guarantee of 
substantive equality with respect to certain rights that inhered in the status 
of citizenship itself.97  The anti-citizenship position thus implicitly rejected 
the proposition that individual states could limit the “privileges and 
immunities” to which free blacks from other states would be entitled by 
imposing similar restrictions on their own free black populations.98   
                                                 
95 For example, in rejecting a claim that free blacks should be considered “freemen” 
within the meaning of a state constitutional voting rights provision, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court identified the federal Comity Clause as an “insuperable” obstacle to such 
an interpretation, suggesting that, if Pennsylvania conferred citizenship on its free blacks, 
such citizenship would “overbear the laws” of southern states imposing “countless 
disabilities” on free blacks in those states.   Hobbs & Others v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa. 
1837). 
96 See, e.g., Wirt, supra note 91, at 507 (assuming that “if a person born and residing in 
Virginia, but possessing none of the high characteristic privileges of a citizen of the State,” 
were recognized as a “citizen” under the federal Constitution, such person could “acquire[] 
all the immunities and privileges of a citizen” in a different state “although he possessed 
none of them in the State of his nativity”). 
97 As the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained in rejecting a claim to free black 
citizenship under the Comity Clause:   
[I]n speaking of the rights which a citizen of one State should enjoy in every other 
State as applicable to white men, it is very properly said that he should be entitled 
to all the “privileges and immunities” of citizens in such other State. The meaning 
of the language is, that no privilege enjoyed by, or immunity allowed to, the most 
favored class of citizens in said State shall be withheld from a citizen of any other 
State. How can it be said that he enjoys all the privileges of citizens, when he is 
scarcely allowed a single right in common with the mass of the citizens of the 
State?  It can not be; and therefore either the free negro is not a citizen in the sense 
of the Constitution, or, if a citizen, he is entitled to “all the privileges and 
immunities” of the most favored class of citizens. 
State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 339 (1838); cf. 2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE 
LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 352-53, 376 (1862) (contending 
that the construction of the Comity Clause “which harmonizes best with the general 
character of the Constitution” was as a protection of individual rights that were national in 
character). 
98 Cf. infra Part I.B.3 (describing moderate pro-citizenship position). 
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b. The Abolitionist Position 
The origins of abolitionist theories of free black citizenship can be 
traced to the prosecution of Connecticut educator Prudence Crandall in the 
1830’s. 99   Crandall was prosecuted under an ordinance prohibiting the 
education of non-resident free blacks without the consent of local 
authorities.100  Crandall’s attorneys, led by William W. Ellsworth and Calvin 
Goddard, constructed a defense based on the proposition that the 
Connecticut statute under which Crandall was prosecuted violated the 
Comity Clause by denying free blacks from other states the right to seek an 
education in the state.  The judge presiding at Crandall’s trial—Chief 
Justice David Daggett of the Connecticut Supreme Court—rejected this 
argument, instructing the jury that “it would be a perversion of terms” to 
say that free blacks were citizens within the meaning of that provision in the 
Comity Clause.101  
In his argument before the Connecticut Supreme Court on appeal, 
Ellsworth insisted that “[a] distinction founded in color in fundamental 
rights is novel, inconvenient and impracticable.”102  Because free blacks, by 
virtue of their birth, owed allegiance to the government and were bound to 
follow its laws, Ellsworth argued that they were entitled to claim from the 
government the “correlative” obligation of “protection and equal laws.”103  
Ellsworth drew upon Justice Washington’s explication of the Comity 
Clause in Corfield as a guarantee of “fundamental rights” and  insisted that 
education was such a fundamental right, describing it as the “fundamental 
pillar on which our free institutions rest ...”104  Citing the constitutional 
treatise of Justice Story, who had described the Comity Clause as having 
established a “general citizenship” among the citizens of the several 
states,105  Ellsworth contended that the purpose of the Comity Clause had 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 77, at 163-66; Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes 
Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
165, 174-75 (2011). 
100  The background of Crandall’s prosecution and its influence on subsequent 
abolitionist theories of free black citizenship are discussed in WIECEK, supra note 77, at 
163-64. 
101 Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 347 (1834) (quoting trial court’s jury instruction). 
102 REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL 
PLFF. IN ERROR VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS AT 
THEIR SESSION AT BROOKLYN, JULY TERM 1834, 6 (Boston, Garrison & Knapp, 1834). 
103 Id. at 7.   
104 Id. at 12. 
105 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
675 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“The intention of this clause was to confer on [the 
citizens of each state], if one may so say, a general citizenship, and to communicate all the 
privileges and immunities which citizens of the same State would be entitled to under like 
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been “to declare a citizen of one state to be a citizen of every state, and as 
such, to clothe him with the same fundamental rights, be he where he might, 
which he acquired by birth in a particular state.”106   
Though Ellsworth’s arguments were not embraced by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court, which overturned Crandall’s conviction on technical 
grounds,107 they proved highly influential in the subsequent development of 
abolitionist theories of constitutional citizenship.108   In 1835, New York 
abolitionist William Jay published a tract condemning the American 
Colonization Society, in which he devoted nineteen pages to contesting the 
constitutional theories underlying the trial court’s controversial jury 
instruction denying that free blacks were citizens.109  In that same year, the 
Ohio Antislavery Convention adopted arguments similar to those of 
Ellsworth and Goddard in condemning various “enactments in the Ohio 
legislature, imposing disabilities upon the free blacks, emigrating from 
other states,” as inconsistent with the Comity Clause and thus “entirely 
unconstitutional.”110   
Similar invocations of the Comity Clause in defense of the rights of free 
blacks recurred in abolitionist constitutional arguments throughout the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century.  Leading abolitionists, including 
Charles Dexter Cleveland, Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin Shaw and Byron 
Paine, all invoked the Comity Clause in condemning South Carolina and 
other southern states for imprisoning the “free citizens of Massachusetts” 
and other Northern states pursuant to their infamous “Negro Seamen’s 
Acts.”111  Certain “radical” abolitionists, including Lysander Spooner and 
                                                                                                                            
circumstances.’”). 
106 Id. at 11. 
107 Crandall, 10 Conn. at 372. 
108 See WIECEK, supra note 77, at 163-66; Howard J. Graham, The Antislavery Origins 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479, 505 (describing Ellsworth and 
Goddard’s arguments as “the first comprehensive crystallization of abolitionist 
constitutional theory”). 
109  WILLIAM JAY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CHARACTER AND TENDENCY OF THE 
AMERICAN COLONIZATION AND AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETIES 38-45 (4th ed. 1837).  
Both the attorney who prosecuted the case and Chief Justice Daggett who presided over the 
trial were members of the American Colonization Society and Jay argued that the 
prosecution had been motivated by a desire to further the Society’s goal of encouraging 
free blacks to migrate to American-established colonies in Africa.  Id. 
110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIO ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION: HELD AT PUTNAM, ON 
THE TWENTY-SECOND, TWENTY-THIRD, AND TWENTY-FOURTH OF APRIL, 36-40 (Beaumont 
& Wallace, 1835); see also Graham, supra note 102, at 494-98. 
111 See Charles Dexter Cleveland, Address of the Liberty Party of Pennsylvania to the 
People of the State, in SALMON PORTLAND CHASE & CHARLES DEXTER CLEVELAND, ANTI-
SLAVERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at 47 & n.* (Philadelphia, J.A. Bancroft & Co. 
1867); see also Barnett, supra note 99, at 193-94, 213-15, 219, 241-42 (summarizing 
arguments of Cleveland, Chase, Shaw and Paine regarding citizenship and privileges or 
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Joel Tiffany, sought to demonstrate that not only free blacks but slaves as 
well were “citizens” of the United States by virtue of their birth on U.S. 
soil.112  Spooner and Tiffany contended that the citizenship of free blacks, 
combined with the Comity Clause, provided the federal government with 
constitutional authority to abolish the slave laws of the southern states.113  
Although more mainstream abolitionists generally rejected the argument 
that the federal government had constitutional authority interfere with 
slavery in the states,114 both the nationalistic conception of “citizenship” 
embraced by the radicals and their vision of the Comity Clause as 
protecting equality with respect to a nationally determined baseline of 
“fundamental” rights were well within the mainstream of abolitionist 
political thought.115  Mainstream abolitionists rejected both the proposition 
that states were free to deny citizenship to their free, native-born inhabitants 
and the related claim that states were free to limit the rights of free black 
travelers from other states by denying similar rights to their own similarly 
situated black inhabitants.116   
The mainstream abolitionist position thus shared a good deal in 
common with the theories underlying the denial of black citizenship.  Like 
opponents of black citizenship, abolitionists viewed the Comity Clause as 
protecting rights that persons enjoyed by virtue of their status as United 
States citizens, rather than rights conferred by the local law of any particular 
state.  And, like the opponents of black citizenship, abolitionists denied that 
the rights of sojourning citizens were limited by the destination state’s 
treatment of its own similarly situated inhabitants.  The two sides obviously 
differed on the question of how citizenship was acquired and the consequent 
eligibility of free blacks to claim that status.  But the logic of both the 
abolitionist and the anti-citizenship positions required that all those who 
were entitled to citizenship must be extended full equality with respect to all 
                                                                                                                            
immunities). 
112  See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN 
SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN 
RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT, 84-97 (Miami, Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (reprint) 
(1849); LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY, 90-94 (Boston, 
Bela Marsh 1847). 
113 TIFFANY, supra note 112, at 95-97; SPOONER, supra note 112, at 93-94; see also 
Barnett, supra note 99, at 205-08, 224-28.   
114 Barnett, supra note 99, at 191. 
115  See id. at 254 (summarizing arguments of numerous abolitionist leaders that 
“equated the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States with their 
fundamental rights … rather than the privileges or benefits conferred by state law” and 
observing that these arguments “did not mention discrimination against out-of-staters” but 
rather “simply condemned the violations of the fundamental rights of persons from outside 
the state, regardless of how in-staters were treated.”).  
116 Id. at 253-54. 
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“fundamental” rights of citizenship.117 
c. The Moderate Pro-Citizenship Position 
The anti-citizenship position endorsed by the majority of southern 
courts and the pro-citizenship theories of abolitionists did not exhaust the 
conceptual possibilities regarding the citizenship of free blacks.  A third 
view, embraced by certain moderate jurists, including Chancellor James 
Kent of New York, denied the strongly egalitarian premises underlying both 
the anti-citizenship and abolitionist positions by rejecting their common 
assumption that recognizing particular persons as “citizens” would 
necessarily entitle them to full legal equality.   
In the initial edition of his highly influential treatise on American law, 
Kent obliquely suggested this position by using the example of “free 
persons of colour” to illustrate his understanding of the Comity Clause.118  
According to Kent, that provision entitled citizens to only “the privileges 
that persons of the same description are entitled to in the state to which the 
removal is made, and to none other.”119  “[T]herefore,” according to Kent, if 
“free persons of colour are not entitled to vote in Carolina; free persons of 
colour emigrating there from a northern state, would” likewise “not be 
entitled to vote.” 120   Kent’s treatise rigidly adhered to the birthright 
citizenship rule and acknowledged no exception from that principle based 
on color.121   
In subsequent editions, Kent and his son William, who assumed control 
of the treatise after his father’s death in 1847, continued to endorse the 
native-birth citizenship test notwithstanding the increasing strain placed on 
that position as applied to free blacks by the growing body of case law 
rejecting claims of black citizenship. While acknowledging that “[t]he 
African race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste of inferior 
rank and condition in society,” and pointing readers to several cases 
expressing the “judicial sense of their inferior condition,” Kent’s treatise 
nonetheless maintained that “[t]he better opinion” was that “[i]f a slave born 
in the United States ... be lawfully discharged from bondage, or if a black 
man be born within the United States, and born free,” such a person would 
“become[] thenceforward a citizen,” though he would remain subject to 
“such disabilities as the laws of the states respectively may deem it 
                                                 
117  Cf. supra Section I.B.3.a (describing theories underlying the anti-citizenship 
position). 
118  See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 605 (New York, O. 
Halsted 1827). 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 33-36. 
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expedient to prescribe to free persons of color.”122    
C.  The Dred Scott Decision and Its Aftermath 
By far the most salient judicial decision addressing the citizenship of 
free blacks at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption was the 
United States Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.123  
The Dred Scott decision is particularly relevant for purposes of 
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause as the 
majority’s holding that free blacks could not be considered “citizens” within 
the meaning of the Constitution provided the principal impetus for that 
Clause’s adoption.124  
The basic facts of the case are relatively straightforward—the plaintiff, 
an African American born into slavery, brought suit in a federal court in 
Missouri claiming that he and his family had gained their freedom when his 
former master had brought them to live temporarily in two jurisdictions 
where slavery was illegal—the state of Illinois and the federal territory of 
Wisconsin.125  The defendant, Scott’s new owner, sought dismissal of the 
case arguing that the federal court lacked diversity jurisdiction under Article 
III because Scott was not a “citizen” of Missouri as he had alleged in his 
pleading.126  
1. Chief Justice Taney’s Opinion 
At the outset of his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Taney framed 
the question the case presented as being whether: 
a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, 
[can] become a member of the political community formed and brought into 
                                                 
122 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 290-92 n.(b) (William Kent, 
9th ed. 1858).  A similar position was embraced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 
State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 21 (1838), a rare decision by a southern court acknowledging the 
citizenship of free blacks.  While the North Carolina court declared that “slaves 
manumitted here become free-men-and therefore if born within North Carolina are citizens 
of North Carolina,” id. at 24, it made clear that the legislature could prescribe different 
punishments for different “classes” of citizens, including prescribing harsher punishments 
for free blacks than for similarly situated white citizens.  Id. at 37.   
123 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
124 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1873) (Citizenship Clause 
was adopted primarily “[t]o remove th[e] difficulty” presented by the holding in Dred Scott 
concerning African American citizenship). 
125 See Scott, 60 U.S. at 397-99.  Additional details regarding the background of the 
case and its complex procedural history are provided in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 68, at 
239-304. 
126 60 U.S. at 400. 
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existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled 
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument 
to the citizen.127 
Taney’s framing of the relevant inquiry as whether the Constitution 
authorized recognition of free blacks as “member[s] of the political 
community” brought into existence by the United States Constitution 
shifted attention away from the specific language of Article III, which 
focused solely on whether the parties to the case were “[c]itizens of 
different states,” 128  to the separate question of United States citizenship.  
Taney’s decision to frame the question as one of United States citizenship, 
rather than state citizenship, was consistent with what had by then become 
the standard approach to framing questions of free black citizenship by both 
sides of the controversy.129 
Taney denied that there was any necessary connection between “the 
rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the 
rights of citizenship as a member of the Union.”130  While each state had the 
right “confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen ... and to 
endow him with all its rights,” such rights were “confined to the boundaries 
of the State” and did not constitute the person so designated “a citizen in the 
sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States.”131 
Congress’s exclusive power over naturalization deprived the individual 
states of the power to “introduce a new member into the political 
community created by the Constitution …”132 
Because the states could not unilaterally confer national citizenship, the 
key question, according to Taney, was whether members of the African race 
had been “citizens” of the original thirteen states at the time of the 
Constitution’s adoption.133  After surveying a variety of discriminatory laws 
that had existed in the northern states at the time of the Constitution’s 
adoption, Taney concluded that it would: 
hardly [be] consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose that they 
regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a 
class of beings whom they had thus stigmatized ... and upon whom they had 
                                                 
127 Id. at 403. 
128 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
129 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 74, at 93 (observing that “both sides in the Comity 
Clause controversies took for granted that the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the 
Comity Clause were rights secured to citizens of the United States.”).   
130 60 U.S. at 405. 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 406-07 
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impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation.134 
“More especially,” Taney argued, it could not “be believed that the large 
slaveholding States regarded [free blacks] as included in the word citizens, 
or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to 
receive them in that character from another State,” as doing so would 
necessarily “exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from 
the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own 
safety.”135   
This reasoning was sufficient to support Taney’s conclusion that Scott 
“was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts.”136  But two 
additional aspects of his opinion, neither of which was strictly necessary to 
the case’s outcome, warrant mention.  First, although no federal statute had 
attempted to confer citizenship on former slaves or their descendants, Taney 
went out of his way to declare that any such law would be unconstitutional 
because Congress’s naturalization power was “confined to persons born in a 
foreign country, under a foreign Government” and was “not a power to raise 
to the rank of a citizen any one born in the United States, who … belongs to 
an inferior and subordinate class.”137   
Second, Taney adopted a relatively expansive view of the “privileges 
and immunities” protected by the Comity Clause.  Among other things, 
Taney insisted that if free blacks were recognized as “citizens” within the 
meaning of the Comity Clause, such persons would not only possess “the 
right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in 
companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction,” but also the 
rights to “full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects 
upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon 
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”138  Taney 
rejected a contrary interpretation of the Comity Clause that would have 
allowed states to subject free black citizens of other states to the same 
police regulations applied to their own free black inhabitants, on the ground 
that such an interpretation would render the provision “unmeaning” and 
leave the sojourning citizen without any rights “but what the State itself 
chose to allow him.”139   
                                                 
134 Id. at 416. 
135 Id. at 416-17.     
136 60 U.S. at 427.   
137 Id. at 417.   
138 Id. at 422-23. 
139 Id. at 423.  Justice Daniel’s concurring opinion was even more expansive on this 
point.  See id. at 476 (“[T]here is not, it is believed, to be found … an exposition of the 
term citizen which has not been understood as conferring the actual possession and 
 2012] ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING 29 
2. Justice Curtis’s Dissent 
The principal dissent on the citizenship issue was authored by Justice 
Benjamin Curtis.  Rather than disputing Taney’s reading of Article III, 
Curtis acquiesced in Taney’s framing of the relevant question as being one 
of Scott’s eligibility for United States citizenship rather than state 
citizenship.140  Curtis observed that the “natural born citizen” qualification 
for presidential eligibility set forth in Article II presupposed the existence of 
“citizens of the United States” at the time of the Constitution’s adoption in 
1787 and observed that “it may safely be said that the citizens of the several 
States” at that time were “citizens of the United States” within the meaning 
of the Constitution. 141   Therefore, according to Curtis, “[t]o determine 
whether any free persons, descended from Africans held in slavery were 
citizens of the United States ... at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution of the United States, it is only necessary to know whether any 
such persons were citizens of either of the States ... at the time of” the 
Constitution’s adoption.142   
“Of this,” Curtis asserted, “there can be no doubt,” pointing principally 
to the fact that free blacks were allowed to vote under the laws of at least 
five states at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.143  But while Curtis 
endorsed the proposition that “every free person born on the soil of a State, 
who is a citizen of that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a 
citizen of the United States,”144 he premised this conclusion on a particularly 
narrow conception of what such “citizenship” entailed.  Agreeing with 
Taney that “the enjoyment of the elective franchise” was not “essential to 
citizenship,”145 Curtis went further, contending “that citizenship, under the 
Constitution of the United States, is not dependent of a particular political 
or even of all civil rights,” claiming that “any attempt so to define it must 
                                                                                                                            
enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment, of an entire equality of 
privileges, civil and political.”).  
140 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 571 (Curtis, J. dissenting) (“[U]nder the allegations contained 
in this plea, and admitted by the demurrer, the question is, whether any person of African 
descent, whose ancestors were sold as slaves in the United States, can be a citizen of the 
United States.”).  By contrast, Curtis’s fellow dissenter, Justice McLean, emphasized the 
disconnect between Taney’s framing of the question and the plain language of Article III, 
which focused on state citizenship.  Id. at 532-33 (McLean, J. dissenting)..     
141 Id. at 572. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 572-73.  Curtis also pointed to the drafting history of the Comity Clause’s 
predecessor provision in the Articles of Confederation and, particularly, to the rejection of 
a proposal to limit that provision to “white” inhabitants.  Id. at 575-76.   
144 Id. at 576. 
145 Id. at 581.  
30 ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING [2012 
lead to error.”146  Just as the question of “[t]o what citizens the elective 
franchise shall be confided” was “a question to be determined by each State, 
in accordance with its own views of the necessities or expediencies of its 
conditions,” the question of “[w]hat civil rights shall be enjoyed by its 
citizens, and whether all shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or 
lost” was “to be determined in the same way.”147   
Thus, according to Curtis, the Comity Clause did “not confer on ... 
citizens ... specific and enumerated privileges and immunities” and did not 
entitle them to “[p]rivileges and immunities which belong to certain citizens 
of a State, by reason of ... causes other than mere citizenship.”148  Instead, 
each state was left free to “so frame their Constitutions and laws” as to 
prescribe additional limitations or qualifications on the exercise of 
particular privileges or immunities subject only to the restriction on overt 
residency-based discrimination.149  Curtis’s views thus appear to correspond 
reasonably closely to those of Chancellor Kent and other supporters of the 
moderate pro-citizenship position, who endorsed both an expansive view of 
the class of persons entitled to recognition as “citizens” and a narrow 
conception of what “citizenship” entailed.150 
3. Aftermath of the Scott Decision 
The public reaction to the Dred Scott decision was both immediate and 
intense.  Democrats in both the North and the South celebrated Taney’s 
citizenship ruling as well as the majority’s further holding that Congress 
lacked constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in the federal territories.151  
Northern Republicans were equally united in condemning the Court’s 
territorial ruling, which struck at one of the core unifying principles of the 
Republican coalition.152  Reaction to the Court’s citizenship ruling among 
mainstream Republicans was somewhat more muted due to the greater 
diversity of Republican opinion on the question and the danger that 
focusing on that aspect of the Court’s decision might associate the party too 
                                                 
146 Id. at 583. 
147 Id.   
148 Id. at 583-84. 
149 Id.  
150 See supra Section I.B.3.c  Kent and Curtis appear to have held similar views on the 
slavery question.  See, e.g., JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN 
CONSERVATISM, 1763-1847, 274-75, 309-10 (1939) (discussing Kent’s “contemptuous” 
attitude toward abolitionism and other social reform movements); Paul Finkelman, Scott v. 
Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 3, 30 (2007) (describing Curtis as a conservative Massachusetts Whig who “was not 
even moderately antislavery”).  
151 GRABER, supra note 73, at 33. 
152 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 68, at 417-19. 
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closely with the still unpopular cause of racial equality.153   
The most consequential challenge to Taney’s citizenship ruling came in 
an official opinion from Attorney General Edward Bates in November 
1862.154  Bates, an “ultraconservative” Republican from Missouri,155 was no 
enthusiast for black equality, having previously “advocated compulsory 
deportation of emancipated slaves.”156  But in response to a formal request 
from Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase—a leading abolitionist and one of 
the founders of the Republican Party—Bates issued an opinion concluding 
that a “free man of color, ... if born in the United States, is a citizen of the 
United States.”157  This opinion not only contradicted the Scott decision but 
also conflicted with opinions issued by Bates’s own predecessors in 
office.158 
Bates opened his opinion with a complaint that he had been unable to 
locate “in our law books and the records of our courts, ... a clear and 
satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the United States” and that 
“[e]ighty years of practical enjoyment of' citizenship, under the 
Constitution, have not sufficed to teach us either the exact meaning of the 
word, or the constituent elements of the thing we prize so highly.” 159 
According to Bates, “[t]he phrase, ‘a citizen of the United States,’ without 
addition or qualification, means neither more nor less than a member of the 
nation,” who was “bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on 
the one side and protection on the other.”160   
In discussing citizenship, Bates cautioned, it was essential “to mark the 
natural and characteristic distinction between political rights,” which 
“belong to all citizens alike, and cohere in the very name and nature of 
citizenship,” and “political powers,” including the powers of “voting and 
holding office,” which did “not belong to all citizens alike, nor to any 
citizen, merely in virtue of citizenship” but rather “depend[] upon 
extraneous facts and superadded qualifications ...”161  Bates thus insisted 
                                                 
153 Id. at 428-30 (discussing “dilemma confronting Republicans” when discussion of 
the decision shifted from slavery to race and citizenship). 
154 Edward Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382 (Nov. 29, 1862). 
155 FEHRENBACHER, supra note 68, at 564-65. 
156 ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY, 235 
(2011). 
157 Bates, supra note 154, at 413.  On the events leading up to the issuance of Bates’s 
citizenship opinion, see James P. McClure, Leigh Johnsen and Michael Vanderlan, 
Circumventing the Dred Scott Decision: Edward Bates, Salmon P. Chase, and the 
Citizenship of African Americans, 43 CIVIL WAR HISTORY 279 (1997).  
158 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing opinions of William Wirt 
and Caleb Cushing).     
159 Bates, supra note 154, at 383. 
160 Id. at 388. 
161 Id. at 399. 
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that recognizing free blacks as “citizens” would not require that they be 
given the right to vote or hold office, just as white women and children 
could be acknowledged as “citizens” even though they did not possess such 
rights.162  But while Bates’s opinion was relatively clear in denying that 
citizenship alone conferred rights of political participation, it was decidedly 
less clear in specifying what rights and privileges did attach to that status.  
Indeed, the only right incident to citizenship that Bates specifically 
acknowledged was the citizen’s correlative claim to “protection” from the 
government in exchange for his or her reciprocal duty of “allegiance.”163 
Bates was clear, however, that whatever rights did attach to the status of 
citizenship were by their very nature equal, observing that all citizens “are 
politically and legally equal” and that “the child in the cradle and its father 
in the Senate,” are “equally citizens of the United States.”164 
II. THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Civil War forced many Americans to confront for the first time 
questions of citizenship that had been left unresolved during the antebellum 
period. 165   In many ways, the War itself could be viewed as a contest 
between competing conceptions of citizenship, with the Union committed to 
a theory of paramount national citizenship under which citizens owed 
principal allegiance to the federal government and the Confederacy 
committed to a state-centered theory under which citizens owed principal 
allegiance to their respective state governments with federal allegiance 
owed only derivatively and contingently so long as the state chose to 
continue its membership in the Union.166  The Union ultimately prevailed in 
this contest by force of arms and imposed its vision of paramount national 
citizenship on the defeated Confederate states.167   
                                                 
162 Id. at 387. 
163 Id. at 388. 
164 Id. 
165
See, e.g., Michael Vorenberg, Reconstruction as a Constitutional Crisis, in 
RECONSTRUCTIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE POSTBELLUM UNITED STATES 168-70 
(Thomas J. Brown, ed. 2008) (discussing importance of “institutions such as prize courts, 
claims commissions, and pension bureaus,” established during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction in forcing Americans to “confront for themselves the ambiguity of their 
national identity.”). 
166 See, e.g., KETTNER, supra note 59, at 340 (characterizing the war as “a struggle 
over the nature of the community created in 1789”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 
872-73 (1986) (describing resolution of questions regarding the nature of American 
citizenship as “a corollary of the more fundamental constitutional issue central to the Civil 
War, namely, whether ultimate sovereignty was constitutionally delegated to the national 
or to the state governments”). 
167 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 61, at 274-75 (describing Union policies requiring 
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This newly nationalistic conception of citizenship was matched by a 
shift in mainstream Republican thinking regarding the citizenship of free 
blacks.  From the outset of the War, abolitionist leaders had urged Congress 
to allow black soldiers to serve in the Union military, believing that such 
service would strengthen their claims to citizenship and full legal 
equality.168    Though the eventual admission of black soldiers was driven 
more by considerations of military necessity than by racial egalitarianism, 
the participation of black military units had the anticipated effect of moving 
northern public opinion, and especially Republican opinion toward 
supporting black citizenship. 169   By the war’s conclusion, mainstream 
Republican opinion had shifted decisively toward recognizing freedom and 
native birth as the sole criteria of United States citizenship without regard to 
race or color.170  Thus, Union general (and future Republican politician) 
Benjamin Butler could confidently predict in January 1865, shortly after the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment had been approved by Congress, that upon 
that Amendment’s ratification, “every negro slave” would be “made a 
citizen of the United States, entitled as of right to every political and legal 
immunity and privilege which belongs to that great franchise.”171      
But almost immediately after the War’s conclusion, this expansive, 
nationalistic conception of citizenship was tested by the infamous “Black 
Codes” enacted by virtually all of the newly reconstructed southern state 
governments. 172  These laws “restricted freed slaves’ rights to make and 
enforce private contracts, to own and convey real and personal property, to 
hold certain jobs, to seek relief in court, and to participate in common life as 
ordinary citizens.”173  The Black Codes threatened to undermine the recently 
adopted Thirteenth Amendment by maintaining the free black populations 
of the southern states in a permanently subordinate condition and reducing 
substantial portions of the black population to slavery-like conditions.  
                                                                                                                            
defeated or defecting Confederate troops to swear supreme loyalty to the national 
government).  
168 On the connection between black military service and blacks’ claims to citizenship 
and to political and civil equality more generally, see, for example, JAMES MCPHERSON, 
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, 562-67 (1988); SMITH, supra note 61, at 274-75; and HERMAN 
BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMENS’ RIGHTS 
1861-1866, 19-35 (2000).  
169 See, e.g., BELZ, supra note 168, at 25-35. 
170 Id. at 25-27; EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS, 
1863-1869, 5-11 (1990).     
171 SPEECH OF MAJ.-GEN. BENJ. F. BUTLER, UPON THE CAMPAIGN BEFORE RICHMOND, 
1864, DELIVERED AT LOWELL, MASS. , Jan. 29, 1865, 82 (Wright & Potter, 1865).   
172 On the background of the Black Codes and the specific disabilities imposed on the 
freed slaves by such laws, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-1866, at 199-202 (1988). 
173 Harrison, supra note 55, at 1388.   
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Reports of the Black Codes and of racial violence against former slaves 
“aroused an indignation” in the North “that spread far beyond the Radical 
circles.” 174  President Andrew Johnson’s apparent acquiescence in the 
southern states’ efforts to reestablish a labor system approximating slavery 
opened a rift between his administration and mainstream Republicans in 
Congress and impelled Congressional Republicans to undertake their own 
efforts to ensure equality of civil rights for free blacks in the southern 
states. 175  From the outset, these efforts to secure legal equality for free 
blacks drew upon and were closely intertwined with, the Republican vision 
of paramount national citizenship.176 
A.  The Civil Rights Bill and the Attempt to Define Citizenship by Statute 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is sometimes 
characterized as having been tacked on as a last-minute “afterthought” 
preceded by relatively little debate or deliberation, 177  the Amendment’s 
definition of United States citizenship closely tracked a similar definition 
that had been included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.178  The citizenship 
provision in the Civil Rights Act was extensively debated in both the House 
and the Senate and twice approved by large majorities in both houses of 
Congress (the second time over President Johnson’s veto) before the 
proposal to add a similar definition to the Fourteenth Amendment was first 
introduced in the Senate on May 30, 1866.179  In view of this background, 
the debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship declaration 
reflect an important source for understanding the Citizenship Clause’s 
original meaning.180   
As originally proposed, the Civil Rights bill, like the original version of 
                                                 
174 FONER, supra note 172, at 225. 
175 Id. at 225-27, 239-55. 
176 See, e.g., ROBERT J. KACZYROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 34 
(1987) (observing that the “members of the [Republican] Party were virtually unanimous in 
the early months of 1866 in defining the freedom of the Negro in terms of United States 
citizenship”).       
177 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 580 (characterizing the Citizenship Clause as 
“something of an afterthought”); Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American 
Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 374 (1973) (asserting that Citizenship Clause was 
added “[a]s an afterthought” to assuage uncertainty regarding the meaning of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause). 
178 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
179 See infra Part II.C. 
180 See Mark Shawhan, By Virtue of Being Born Here:  Birthright Citizenship and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 2-3 (2012) (observing that 
“[p]revious scholarship on the [Citizenship] Clause” has “given only limited consideration 
to the debates over the [Civil Rights] Act”). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, did not contain any declaration of 
citizenship.181  On January 29, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, 
the bill’s principal sponsor in the Senate, introduced an amendment 
declaring “all persons of African descent born in the United States” to be 
citizens.182  The next day, Trumbull proposed a further revision removing 
the reference to “African descent” and declaring “all persons born in the 
United States, and not subject to any foreign power” to be citizens of the 
United States.183 
In his speech introducing the bill—which, in addition to defining 
citizenship, prohibited “discrimination in civil rights or immunities among 
the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of slavery” and specifically prohibited 
discrimination with respect to certain designated rights 184 —Trumbull 
identified the legislation as a response to the Black Codes and other 
discriminatory legislation in the southern states targeted at the recently 
emancipated slaves.185  Drawing upon Blackstone, Trumbull—who earlier in 
his career had served as a justice on the Illinois Supreme Court—declared 
that “[i]n the definition of civil liberty,” it “ought to be understood ...  that 
the restraints introduced by the laws should be equal to all, or as much so as 
the nature of things will admit.”186 Therefore, “any statute which is not equal 
to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to 
                                                 
181 For a concise summary of the bill’s origins and early drafting history, see David P. 
Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 394-97 (2008).      
182 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
183 Id. at 498. 
184 As originally proposed, the bill’s first section, which Trumbull identified as “the 
basis of the whole bill,” provided in full: 
That all persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby declared 
to be citizens of the United States, and there shall be no discrimination in civil 
rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United 
States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; but the 
inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of 
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of 
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Id. at 474. 
185 Id. at 498. 
186 Id.  The definition of “civil liberty” quoted by Trumbull was not in Blackstone’s 
original eighteenth-century treatise but rather was added by a later editor and appeared in 
most early nineteenth century American versions.  Saunders, supra note 50, at 272 n.117. 
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other citizens,” was “an unjust encroachment upon his liberty” and a “badge 
of slavery” prohibited by the Constitution.187   
In an effort to “arrive at a more correct definition of the term ‘citizen of 
the United States,’” Trumbull surveyed several sources discussing the rights 
protected by the Article IV Comity Clause, focusing particularly on Justice 
Washington’s Corfield decision, which Trumbull described as “the most 
elaborate [decision] upon this clause in the Constitution” and as 
“enumerat[ing] the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United States 
which are set forth in the first section of this bill.”188  Though Trumbull 
recognized that the Comity Clause cases addressed only the rights that 
citizens enjoyed upon removing from their home state to a different state, he 
contended that “the native-born citizens of the State itself” should be even 
more entitled to the equal enjoyment of such rights.189   
Following the orthodox Republican position, Trumbull declared that 
“[i]n my judgment, persons of African descent born in the United States, are 
as much citizens as white persons who are born in the country.”190 Trumbull 
acknowledged, however, that “in the slaveholding States, a different 
opinion has obtained” and identified the southern states’ denial of blacks’ 
citizenship as the “principle” upon which “many of their laws making 
                                                 
187 Id.   
188 Id. at 474-75.  Trumbull then quoted a lengthy portion of Justice Washington’s 
Corfield opinion identifying the “privileges and immunities of citizens” protected by the 
Comity Clause.  Id. at 475 (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52).  Trumbull also cited and 
quoted from other Comity Clause cases, including Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 
(Md. 1797) and Abbott v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89 (1827), as well as from Justice 
Story’s constitutional treatise, as indicative of the rights belonging to citizens of the United 
States.  Id. at 474-75.    
189 Id. at 475.  When challenged by an opponent of the bill, Trumbull conceded that the 
Comity Clause cases he discussed in his opening speech “relate entirely to the rights which 
a citizen in one state has on going into another State, and not to the rights of the citizens 
belonging to the State,” but explained that he had introduced the cases “for the purpose of 
ascertaining, if we could, by judicial decision, what was meant by the term ‘citizen of the 
United States.’”  Id. at 600.  Trumbull further explained his purpose in discussing the cases 
as follows: 
[I]nasmuch as there had been judicial decisions upon this clause of the 
Constitution in which it had been held that the rights of a citizen of the United 
States were certain great fundamental rights …, I reasoned from that, when the 
Constitution had been amended and slavery abolished, and we were about to pass 
a law declaring every person, no matter what color, born in the United States a 
citizen of the United States, the same rights would then appertain to all persons 
who were clothed with American citizenship.  That was the object for which the 
cases were introduced. 
Id. 
190 Id. 
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discriminations between the whites and the colored people are based ...”191  
Although Trumbull viewed the citizenship provision as merely 
“declaratory” of existing law, he argued that, even if this position were 
incorrect, it was nonetheless “competent for Congress” to “settl[e]” the 
citizenship question by passing a law “declaring all persons born in the 
United States to be citizens thereof.”192  
Trumbull and most of the bill’s other supporters identified the recently 
enacted Thirteenth Amendment as the principal source of constitutional 
authority for the bill’s non-discrimination provisions. 193   Opponents, 
however, were quick to point out that this argument reflected a questionable 
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment’s text and found little support in the 
Amendment’s preenactment history. 194   Although most Congressional 
Republicans adhered to the Thirteenth Amendment rationale, doubts about 
the constitutional authority conferred by that measure led supporters to 
supplement their Thirteenth Amendment arguments with other sources of 
constitutional authority, including Congress’s naturalization power.  This 
line of argument was previewed in Senator Trumbull’s opening speech in 
support of the measure in which he declared that a declaration of citizenship 
pursuant to Congress’s naturalization power would “entitl[e]” the persons 
so declared to “the rights of citizens,” including “[t]he great fundamental 
rights set forth in this bill.”195  
Other members of Congress offered similar justifications for the 
proposed legislation grounded in either Congress’s naturalization power or 
the federal government’s inherent power to protect the rights of its citizens.  
For example, Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio—who had 
entertained doubts about the measure’s constitutionality—explained his 
eventual decision to support the bill by observing that  “the right of all 
citizens to be secured in the enjoyment of whatever privileges their 
citizenship does secure upon them” was “in its very nature equal” and that 
the federal government possessed both the power and the duty to protect the 
“fundamental” civil rights of its citizens against state infringement. 196  
                                                 
191 Id.  Among supporters of the bill, the view that the citizenship provision was 
declaratory of existing law was nearly universal. See, e.g., id. at 1262 (Rep. Broomall); id. 
at 1115 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook) ; id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer). 
192 Id. 
193 See, e.g., id. at 475 (Sen. Trumbull); id at 503-04 (Sen. Howard); id. at 1151-52 
(Rep. Thayer).   
194  See generally Currie, supra note 181, at 395-97 (summarizing, and expressing 
sympathy with, the opponents’ objections to the Thirteenth Amendment rationale).      
195 Id.   
196  Id. at 1293.  In explaining his support for the bill, Shellabarger placed great 
emphasis on the distinction between citizens’ substantive rights, which he viewed as 
beyond the power of Congress to define and regulate, and their equality rights, which he 
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Similarly, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, the Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee and the principal sponsor of the Civil Rights 
bill in the House, claimed that “so far as [the bill] declares the equality of 
all citizens, it merely affirms existing law” and that Congress possessed the 
inherent authority to protect the rights of its citizens against state 
infringement.197 Representative M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania likewise 
pointed to Congress’s naturalization power as support for both the 
citizenship declaration and the substantive provisions of the bill, arguing 
that under that power, Congress “has ample authority to confer the rights of 
citizenship upon this class of people.”198  
Arguments such as these evince a commonly held view among 
Congressional Republicans that the legal status of “citizenship” carried with 
it certain inherent rights, including, at a minimum, the right to equal 
treatment with respect to the “fundamental” rights specifically identified in 
the bill.  For the most part, opponents of the measure did not contest the 
position that equality of “civil rights” inhered in the very nature of 
citizenship.199   To the contrary, opponents embraced this definition as a 
                                                                                                                            
viewed as within the scope of Congress’s power to protect: 
Now, Mr. Speaker, if this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate 
these civil rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., 
then it would, as seems to me, be an assumption of the reserved rights of the 
States and the people. But, sir, except so far as it confers citizenship, it neither 
confers nor defines nor regulates any right whatever. Its whole effect is not to 
confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights 
and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike 
without distinctions based on race or former condition in slavery. 
Id.   
197 Id. at 1117-18.  According to Wilson: 
If citizens of the United States, as such, are entitled to possess and enjoy the great 
fundamental civil rights which it is the true office of Government to protect, and 
to equality in the exemptions of the law, we must of necessity be clothed with the 
power to insure to each and every citizen these things which belong to him as a 
constituent member of the great national family. 
Id. at 1118.  He further explained that “the possession of these rights by the citizens raises 
by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect them.”  Id. at 1119. 
198 Id. at 1152.  See also, e.g., id. at 1266 (Rep. Raymond) (“I desire, as the next step of 
elevating [the African] race, to give them the rights of citizenship, or to declare by solemn 
statute that they are citizens of the United States, and thus secure to them whatever rights, 
immunities, privileges and powers belong as of right to all citizens of the United States… . 
I for one am not inclined to disparage American citizenship … [T]he right of citizenship 
involves everything else.  Make the colored man a citizen of the United States and he has 
every right which you or I have as citizens of the United States …”). 
199  See, e.g., id. at 477-78 (Sen. Saulsbury) (“A civil right I define to be a right 
belonging to the citizen, and which he possesses only by virtue of citizenship.  I know of 
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means of arguing that the bill’s protection would extend beyond the rights 
specifically enumerated in the bill and would thus confer suffrage and other 
politically unpopular rights upon the newly freed slaves.200   
While the bill’s opponents did not contest the supporters’ broad 
conception of citizenship, they did contest the authority of Congress to 
confer citizenship by statute.  Relying heavily on Taney’s Dred Scott 
opinion, opponents contended that African Americans were not citizens of 
the United States and that Congress lacked authority to confer citizenship 
upon anyone other than foreign-born aliens.201  Among those expressing this 
view was Senator Peter Van Winkle, a conservative Republican from West 
Virginia.202 Though Van Winkle opposed making blacks citizens as a matter 
of policy, he expressed a willingness “have the question submitted ... to the 
people of the United States” in the form of a constitutional amendment.203  
Van Winkle further declared that if such an amendment were adopted, he 
would “feel very different about the vote that I should give in relation to 
subject in my own State,” suggesting that if the Constitution were amended 
to confer citizenship on blacks, he would “feel that they are entitled to the 
right of suffrage” as a result.204   A similar sentiment was expressed by 
Indiana Democrat Thomas Hendricks, who criticized the bill’s citizenship 
provision as reflecting the objectionable principle that “all persons living in 
this country are to be equal before the law without distinction of color,” but 
conceded that “if it is satisfactory to the white men of this country to admit 
into the political community Indians and other colored people, I shall no 
                                                                                                                            
no clearer definition of civil rights than that …”); id. at  1122 (Rep. Rogers) (defining 
“civil rights” as the “privileges and immunities created and granted to citizens of a country 
by virtue of the sovereign power under which the citizen lives”). 
200 See, e.g., id. at 478 (Sen. Saulsbury) (arguing that “civil rights” included the right to 
vote); id. at 500 (Sen. Cowan) (arguing that the bill would prohibit all discrimination based 
on race and would thus outlaw segregated schools); id. at 505 (Sen. Johnson) (contending 
that the law would “repeal all legislation” barring intermarriage between blacks and 
whites); id. at 1121 (Rep. Rogers) (arguing that bill would confer voting rights and prohibit 
bans on intermarriage and segregated schools).  In response to such criticisms, the bill’s 
sponsors agreed to remove the bill’s general prohibition on “discrimination in civil rights 
or immunities,” thereby limiting the bill to prohibiting discrimination only insofar as it 
affected those rights specifically enumerated in the bill itself.  MALTZ, supra note 170, at 
68-69. 
201 See, e.g., id. at 504 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 523 (Sen. Davis); id. at 1155 (Sen. 
Eldridge). 
202 Id. at 497 (Sen. Van Winkle ) (“I think it needs a constitutional amendment to make 
these people citizens of the United States.”). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 497.  Van Winkle further pledged that if blacks were “admitted to the rights 
of citizenship” by a majority of the people through constitutional amendment, he would be 
“among the first to endeavor to do my whole duty toward them by recognizing them as 
citizens in every respect.”  Id. at 498. 
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longer object.”205   
As statements such as these suggest, the view that the status of 
citizenship conferred upon its recipients at least some minimal level of 
equality rights was widely shared among both supporters and opponents of 
the Civil Rights bill.206   The principal difference between the contending 
sides was not whether “citizenship” carried with it an entitlement to equal 
governmental treatment, but rather the scope of such equality rights and 
whether Congress possessed constitutional authority to confer such 
citizenship on native-born blacks. 
Indeed, the view that citizenship did not carry with it an entitlement to 
equal civil rights and privileges, at least with respect to those rights 
specifically enumerated in the proposed Civil Rights bill, appears to have 
been expressly defended by only one member of Congress—Republican 
Senator John Henderson of Missouri.  During an extended debate regarding 
various proposals to amend the citizenship declaration so as to exclude 
members of Indian tribes, Henderson questioned whether there would be 
any harm in extending citizenship to such individuals on the ground that an 
Indian “may be a citizen of the United States and yet not have all the 
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the State in which he may be.”207  
Henderson’s subsequent suggestion that the states would retain “a perfect 
right” to deny Indians “the right to make contracts” notwithstanding a law 
declaring them to be citizens drew an immediate and apparently 
spontaneous protest from Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson of 
Maryland,208 and appears to have provoked genuine puzzlement on the part 
of Republican supporters of the bill.209  Henderson’s argument does not 
                                                 
205 Id. at 574. 
206  Cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 580-81 (observing that “Reconstruction era 
constitution makers inherited, accepted, and even celebrated the norm” of citizen equality). 
207 Id. at 571. 
208 The exchange between Henderson and Johnson was as follows:   
Mr. HENDERSON… . Why, sir, I suppose that any State, even after we declared 
the Indians to be citizens of the United States would have the perfect right, if it 
saw fit, … to deny them the right to make contracts. 
Mr. JOHNSON:  Oh, no. 
Id. at 572.  Johnson, a prominent Supreme Court advocate and former Attorney General of 
the United States, was considered “the leading constitutional authority in the Senate during 
the Reconstruction era.”  Kaczorowski, supra note 166, at 892 n.119.    
209 See, e.g., id. at 573 (Sen. Williams) (“I do not exactly understand what the Senator 
means when he insisted that Congress shall make them citizens and does not claim that any 
right attaches to that character”); id. at 574 (Sen. Ramsey) (contending that “confer[ring] 
on all these Indians the rights of citizenship” would abolish the “many differences in State 
laws between these Indians and white men”).  As noted below, Henderson may have 
subsequently changed his own view regarding the rights that attach to United States 
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appear to have been accepted by any other member of Congress and the 
proposed revision to which he had objected—inserting language that 
specifically excluded “Indians not taxed” from the citizenship definition—
passed by a three-to-one margin in the Senate and remained in the final 
version of the Civil Rights Act.210 
The final version of the Civil Rights bill passed in the House on March 
13, 1866 and was approved two days later by the Senate, which had already 
given its assent to an earlier version of the bill.211  Although the bill passed 
by wide margins in both Houses, President Andrew Johnson nonetheless 
vetoed the bill on March 27, 1866.212  Johnson’s veto marked the definitive 
break between his administration and Congressional Republicans and set 
the stage for a dramatic override vote.213   
The Congressional deliberations preceding the override vote consisted 
primarily of two speeches, one delivered by Trumbull in the Senate and the 
other by Representative William Lawrence of Ohio in the House. 214  
Responding to the claim in Johnson’s veto message that acknowledging 
Congress’s authority to pass the bill would concede a similar authority to 
require black suffrage, Trumbull denied that citizenship carried with it 
“political privileges” but reiterated his earlier stated view that United States 
citizenship did entail equality with respect to certain rights, including the 
“fundamental” civil rights enumerated in the bill: 
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; and what are 
they?  They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free 
citizens, or free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, 
and they belong to them in all the States of the Union.  The right of American 
citizenship means something.  It does not mean, in the case of a foreigner, that 
when he is naturalized he is left entirely to the mercy of State legislation.  He 
has a right, when naturalized, to go into any State of the Union and to reside 
there and the United States government will protect him in that right.215  
In the House, the task of responding to Johnson’s veto message fell to 
Representative Lawrence, who, like Trumbull, had served as a state court 
                                                                                                                            
citizenship prior to the final vote on the Fourteenth Amendment.  See infra note 273.   
210 Id. at 575 (recording vote on proposed amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 
31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (“[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any 
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United 
States …”) (emphasis added). 
211 Shawhan, supra note 180, at 32. 
212 Id.  
213 See FONER, supra note 172, at 250 (“For Republican moderates, the Civil Rights 
veto ended all hope of cooperation with the President”).   
214 Shawhan, supra note 180, at 32-33. 
215 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). 
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judge before his election to Congress. 216   After briefly surveying and 
summarizing the legal authorities that had been offered earlier in the 
debates in support of both the preexisting nature of the birthright citizenship 
rule and Congress’s authority to declare such a rule by statute, Lawrence 
concluded that “[t]here is, then a national citizenship” and that this 
“citizenship implies certain rights which are to be protected ...”217  Like 
Trumbull, Lawrence pointed to the rights identified in Justice Washington’s 
Corfield opinion and other Comity Clause cases as indicative of the rights 
belonging to all United States citizens. 218   These rights, according to 
Lawrence, were inherently equal in nature, being so “necessary and 
important to all citizens” that “to make inequalities in” them would be “rank 
injustice.” Therefore, “[a]ny law that invades [this] fundamental equality is 
void ...”219  According to Lawrence, the rights protected by the bill inhered 
by their nature in “national citizenship” such that,  
[f]rom the very nature of citizenship ... it must be clear that this bill creates no 
new right, confers no new privilege but is declaratory of what is already the 
constitutional rights [sic] of every citizen of every State, that equality of civil 
rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all 
State authority.220  
Shortly after Trumbull and Lawrence delivered their respective 
speeches, the Senate (on April 6) and the House (on April 10) approved the 
bill by the requisite two-thirds majorities sufficient to enact the Civil Rights 
bill into law over the President’s veto.221 
B.  The Privileges or Immunities “of Citizens of the United States” 
The debates surrounding the proposed Civil Rights bill coincided with 
consideration of various proposals for constitutional amendments that 
eventually culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment.222  One such proposal, 
which provided an important template for language that was eventually 
selected for inclusion in the Amendment’s first section, was introduced by 
                                                 
216 McConnell, supra note 5, at 1003; cf. id. at 994 (describing Lawrence as “one of the 
most careful lawyers among the Republican proponents” of the subsequent Civil Rights 
Act of 1875). 
217 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866).  
218 Id. at 1835-36. 
219 Id. at 1846. 
220 Id. 
221 See Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1809 (Apr 6, 1866) (Senate vote); id. at 1861 
(Apr 10, 1866) (House vote). 
222 A useful timeline of the Congressional deliberations concerning the proposed Civil 
Rights bill and the contemporaneous deliberations that eventually culminated in the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment is provided in MALTZ, supra note 170, at 44-45. 
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Representative John Bingham of Ohio on February 26, 1866.  Bingham’s 
proposal provided that: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.223 
The “privileges and immunities” language of Bingham’s proposal mirrored 
the language of the Comity Clause and Bingham himself argued that the 
proposed amendment would “not impose upon any State of the Union, or 
any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which is not now 
enjoined upon them by the very letter of the [existing] Constitution.”224  
Rather, the sole effect of the amendment, according to Bingham, would be 
to confer upon Congress sufficient legislative power to ensure that the states 
complied with their preexisting duties.225     
But Bingham’s understanding of what the existing Article IV provision 
required differed from the orthodox understanding of that provision.226  In a 
January 1866 speech in support of an early version of his proposal, 
Bingham explained his understanding that Article IV’s “privileges and 
immunities” language contained an unstated “ellipsis” identifying the rights 
protected by the provision as rights citizens possessed by virtue of their 
United States citizenship: 
When you come to weigh these words, “equal and exact justice to all men,” go 
read, if you please, the words of the Constitution itself: “The citizens of each 
State (being ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis ‘of the United 
States’) in the several States.” This guarantee is of the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States in, not of, the several States.227   
Although Bingham’s “ellipsis” phrasing was unusual, his association of 
Article IV with rights of United States citizenship was hardly unheard of.  
Throughout the antebellum period, the Comity Clause was routinely 
paraphrased as protecting the “the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States.”228  Bingham’s interpretation of the provision, however, 
                                                 
223 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866). 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226  On Bingham’s constitutional theories, which were heavily influenced by 
abolitionist constitutionalism, see, for example, Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 346-49 (2011). 
227 Id. at 158. 
228 See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403 (Taney, C.J.) (interpreting term “citizens” as 
used in the Comity Clause and elsewhere in the Constitution to mean “citizens of the 
United States”); id. at 571 (Curtis, J. dissenting) (same); Wirt, supra note 91, at 507 (same).  
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diverged from the standard comity-based reading as a protection of 
travelers’ interstate rights by reading it to protect citizens’ intrastate rights 
against their own state governments as well.229      
Other members of the 39th Congress appear to have understood that 
Bingham’s proposal would do more than authorize federal legislation to 
protect the rights of non-residents under the traditional understanding of the 
Comity Clause. For example, Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York 
declared his understanding that Bingham’s proposal was designed “to 
provide that no State shall discriminate between its citizens and give one 
class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another.”230  Though 
Hotchkiss supported the policy of this proposal, he opposed Bingham’s 
amendment based on his understanding that it would unduly broaden the 
powers of Congress while leaving the rights of citizens vulnerable to repeal 
“[s]hould the power of” the federal government “pass into the hands of the 
rebels ...”231  Hotchkiss opposed leaving the rights of citizens “to the caprice 
of Congress” and insisted that protection against discrimination “should be 
a constitutional right that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens ... by 
mere legislation.”232   
Immediately after Hotchkiss spoke, the House (Bingham included) 
voted to postpone consideration of the amendment indefinitely.233  Bingham 
thereafter persuaded the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, of which he 
was a member, to include a substantially revised version of his proposal as 
the first section of a new five-part amendment that formed the template for 
the Fourteenth Amendment.234 Bingham’s revised language, which tracks 
the language eventually included in Section One’s second sentence, 
followed Hotchkiss’s suggestion by replacing the grant of power to 
Congress with a directly enforceable declaration of rights.235  Bingham’s 
                                                 
229 Cf. Maltz, supra note 54, at 337 (“Bingham’s invocation of the comity clause as a 
limitation of a state to deal with its own citizenry was truly novel.”).  Bingham believed 
that the “privileges and immunities” referred to in Article IV included the substantive 
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longstanding academic debate.  See generally Hamburger, supra note 74, at 64 nn. 8&9 
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230 Id. at 1095 (emphasis added).  
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234 MALTZ, supra note 170, at 84-92.  
235 A separate grant of enforcement power was provided by the Amendment’s fifth 
section.  See U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
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revised version also departed from his original strategy of attempting to 
track the language of the Comity Clause verbatim and instead explicitly 
identified the “privileges or immunities” protected by the provision as 
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
Bingham’s translation of the Comity Clause’s “privileges and 
immunities” language as a specific reference to privileges and immunities 
belonging to United States citizens provided further support to the inference 
that the provision would do more than protect non-residents against state 
discrimination, which, as noted above, had been suitably clear to at least 
certain members of Congress under Bingham’s original language.236 This 
inference is strengthened by reading Bingham’s revised version in light of 
earlier discussions of the Comity Clause by Trumbull, Wilson and other 
supporters of the Civil Rights Act who acknowledged the orthodox 
understanding of the provision as a protection against residency-based 
discrimination but insisted that the rights recognized by the provision 
inhered in the very nature of citizenship itself.237 
Though a few Congressmen persisted in understanding Bingham’s 
revised language as nothing more than a reiteration of the Comity Clause as 
traditionally understood, 238 the more common understanding was that the 
provision operated as a more general protection of the rights pertaining to 
United States citizenship. 239  This understanding is clearly reflected in the 
remarks of Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan when introducing the 
proposed amendment in the Senate. 240   Howard began his remarks by 
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238 The most prominent example is Senator Luke Poland of Vermont, who, in a speech 
delivered after Bingham’s May 10 remarks, asserted that the “privileges or immunities” 
language in Bingham’s revised proposal “secures nothing beyond what was intended by the 
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or Immunities Clause, an important focus of which involves the question of whether the 
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e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, III, What If Slaughter House Had Been Decided Differently?, 45 
IND. L. REV. 61, 67-70 (2011) (summarizing reasoning underlying both antidiscrimination 
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See infra Part IV.  But this conclusion does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the 
latter provision might also be read to protect certain substantive rights against state 
infringement.  See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 55, at 1424-25 (considering this possibility).   
The latter possibility involves questions that are beyond this Article’s scope. 
240 Professor Lash describes Howard’s speech as “[p]robably the most studied speech 
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observing that “[t]he first clause of this section relates to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States as such, and as distinguished 
from all other persons not citizens of the United States.” 241   While 
acknowledging the difficulty of “defin[ing] with accuracy what is meant by 
the expression, ‘citizen of the United States,’” Howard observed that the 
phrase had been “held by the courts to [mean] a person who was born 
within the limits of the United States and subject to their laws.”242   
Howard then turned to a discussion of the Comity Clause, observing 
that prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, the citizens of each 
state had been “in a qualified sense at least, aliens to one another” and that 
the purpose of the Comity Clause had been “to prevent such confusion and 
disorder, and to put the citizens of the several States on an equality with 
each other as to all fundamental rights” by “constitut[ing] ipso facto the 
citizens of each one of the original States citizens of the United States.”243  
Though Howard declined “to go at any length into th[e] question” of what 
“privileges and immunities” the citizens of the several states possessed 
under the Comity Clause, he referred to Justice Washington’s Corfield 
opinion as indicative “of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary” 
regarding the meaning of that provision. 244  Howard then pointed to the 
rights protected by the Comity Clause, “whatever they may be,” as well as 
“the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of 
the Constitution” as “a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, ... 
guarantied by the Constitution or recognized by it,” that were “secured to 
the citizen solely as a citizen of the United States and as a party in their 
courts.”245    
Howard’s speech has been the subject of a great deal of modern 
commentary, most of which focuses on the extent to which his remarks 
support “incorporation” of the bill of rights against state governments 
and/or substantive protection of other “fundamental” rights through the 
                                                                                                                            
of the Thirty-ninth Congress regarding the Fourteenth Amendment …”  Lash, supra note 
235, at 402.   
241 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
242 Id.  Howard’s speech was delivered before the addition of the Citizenship Clause, 
which was added by the Senate on May 30.  See infra Section II.C. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. Howard observed that the Supreme Court had not “undertaken to define either 
the nature or extent of the privileges and immunities” protected by the Comity Clause and 
alluded to a decision “not many years since” when the Court had “very modestly” declined 
to address the question.  Id.  Howard’s statement most likely referred to Connor v. Elliott, 
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rights asserted and denied therein.”  59 U.S. at 593.  
245 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause.246  For purposes of the present inquiry, 
however, two features of Howard’s speech stand out as particularly 
significant.  First, Howard identified the rights protected by the proposed 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as rights pertaining to United States 
citizenship “as such,” distinguishing them from whatever rights may be 
possessed by persons who are not citizens.  Second, Howard associated 
these rights of United States citizenship with the rights protected by the 
Article IV Comity Clause, which, under the orthodox understanding of that 
provision (including the understanding reflected in Corfield, Howard’s 
principal illustrative source) were understood as antidiscrimination rights 
rather than as directly enforceable substantive rights.   
Thus, whatever Howard’s personal understanding of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, his speech seems to provide relatively strong evidence 
that at least one plausible way of understanding the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s reference to the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” would be as referring to a class of preexisting rights that 
individuals already possessed by virtue of their United States citizenship 
and that these rights included, at least, the types of non-discrimination rights 
that were protected under the traditional Corfield-based interpretation of the 
Comity Clause. 
C.  The Addition of the Citizenship Clause 
The initial version of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that emerged 
from the Joint Committee and that was approved by the House on May 10, 
1866 contained no citizenship declaration, beginning instead with what is 
now the second sentence of Section One.247  When the Amendment was 
introduced in the Senate on May 23, Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio 
proposed that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States” be replaced with a reference to “the privileges or immunities of 
persons born in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof.”248  In 
explaining his proposed revision, Wade cautioned that the “the word 
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‘citizen’” was “a term about which there has been a good deal of 
uncertainty in our Government,” that “courts” had “stumbled on the 
subject,” and that even in the then-recent Congressional debates, the 
question had still been “regarded by some as doubtful.”249  Although he 
considered the question “settled by the civil rights bill” Wade warned that, 
absent a “strong and clear” description of the persons protected by the 
amendment, it might be “construe[d] ... in such a way as we do not think it 
liable to construction.”250      
Debate quickly turned to other provisions of the proposed amendment 
and no further action was taken on Wade’s proposal.251  But after that day’s 
adjournment, Senate Republicans caucused together and agreed upon an 
alternative revision that addressed Wade’s concerns.252  On May 30, Senator 
Howard proposed to add to the Amendment a new introductory sentence 
declaring “all persons born in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof” to be “citizens of the United States and of the States 
wherein they reside.”253  Howard’s proposal, which closely tracks the final 
language of the Citizenship Clause, 254  was modeled upon, but did not 
perfectly mirror,  the similar citizenship definition in the recently adopted 
Civil Rights Act.255  In introducing the proposed revision, Howard noted 
tersely that he did “not propose to say anything on that subject except that 
the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to 
need any further elucidation in my opinion.”256   
Immediately after Howard proposed his revision, conservative Senator 
James Doolittle of Wisconsin, who opposed the Amendment, proposed to 
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a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.”  Id. 
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further revise the citizenship declaration by adding the phrase “excluding 
Indians not taxed,” which had appeared in the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship 
definition but not in Howard’s proposal.257   Not to be outdone, Senator 
Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, another opponent of the Amendment, made 
a lengthy speech questioning whether the proposed citizenship definition 
would extend to “the child of the Chinese immigrant in California” or the 
“child of the Gypsy born in Pennsylvania.”258   
At the outset of his remarks, Cowan affected uncertainty regarding the 
“legal definition of ‘citizenship of the United States,’” observing that: 
[s]o far as the courts and the administration of the laws are concerned, I have 
supposed that every human being within their jurisdiction was in one sense of 
the word a citizen, that is, a person entitled to protection; but in so far as the 
right to hold property, particularly the right to acquire title to real estate was 
concerned that was a subject entirely within the control of the States... . I have 
supposed further, that it was essential to the existence of society itself, and 
particularly essential to the existence of a free State, that it should have the 
power, not only of declaring who should exercise political power within its 
boundaries but that if it were overrun by another and a different race, it would 
have the right to absolutely expel them.259 
Cowan inquired “[a]re those people [i.e., gypsies], by a constitutional 
amendment, to be put out of the reach of the State in which they live? ... If 
the mere fact of being born in the country confers that right, then they will 
have it; and I think it will be mischievous.”260  Expressing similar concerns 
regarding the dangers of a future influx of Chinese immigrants, Cowan 
concluded that “before we assert broadly that everybody who shall be born 
in the United States shall be taken to be a citizen of the United States, we 
ought to exclude others besides Indians not taxed” because other groups 
might be more dangerous if so recognized.261  
The principal response to Cowan came from Senator John Conness of 
California.  Conness dismissed Cowan’s stated concerns regarding the 
Chinese, insisting that “this portion of our population [i.e., the children of 
Chinese immigrants] is very small indeed and never promises to be very 
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large.”262  As for the purported problem of gypsies in Pennsylvania, Conness 
observed that though he had “lived in the United States for now many a 
year,” he had “heard more about Gypsies within the last two or three 
months than I have heard before in my life.”263   
Conness’s dismissive response avoided a direct engagement with 
Cowan’s professed uncertainty regarding the nature of United States 
citizenship.  Notably, however, neither Conness nor any other Senator 
provided what might have been the most natural response to Cowan’s stated 
concerns had it been thought applicable—i.e., that recognition of a person 
as a “citizen of the United States” would not, as Cowan suggested “put him 
out of reach of State power” but would merely confer a formal legal status 
entitling the person to, for example, sue in the federal courts and be elected 
to federal office.  This narrow conception of citizenship had been urged on 
the Senate only a few months earlier by Senator Henderson of Missouri in 
connection with the Civil Rights Act debates.264  But as noted above, no 
other participant in those debates endorsed Henderson’s description of what 
citizenship entailed and nobody so much as mentioned such a possibility 
during the Senate debate on May 30.   
To the extent the remarks of participants in the May 30 debate touched 
on the legal rights corresponding to citizenship, such remarks (with the 
arguable exception of Cowan’s) uniformly endorsed a conception of 
“citizenship” that would encompass, at least, the equal enjoyment of basic 
civil rights to the same extent enjoyed by other citizens.  For example, in his 
response to Cowan, Conness observed that the nation had already “declared 
... by law” in the Civil Rights Act that the U.S. born children of Chinese 
immigrants would be citizens and that he himself had “voted for the 
proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatever born in 
California should be citizens of the United States, entitled to equal civil 
rights with other citizens of the United States.” 265   Moments later, he 
described what he understood to be the effect of the proposed declaration of 
citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment: 
Here is a simple declaration that a score or a few score of human beings born 
in the United States shall be regarded as citizens of the United States, entitled 
to civil rights, to the right of equal defense, to the right of equal punishment 
for crime with other citizens; and that such a provision should be deprecated 
by any person having or claiming to have a high humanity passes all my 
understanding and comprehension.266 
                                                 
262 Id. at 2891.     
263 Id. at 2892.   
264 See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text. 
265 Id. at 2891. 
266 Id. at 2892. 
 2012] ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING 51 
To Conness at least, recognition as a “citizen” meant something more than 
having a formal legal status and entailed, at least, a “right of equal defense 
[and] of equal punishment for crime” to the same extent that other citizens 
were defended or punished in like circumstances. 
A similar conception of citizenship was reflected in the parallel debate 
between Senators Doolittle and Howard regarding whether or not the 
Citizenship Clause should expressly exclude “Indians not taxed.”  Notably, 
both Doolittle and Howard agreed that Native Americans who maintained 
their tribal relations should be excluded from citizenship but merely 
disagreed as to whether Doolittle’s “Indians not taxed” language or 
Howard’s “subject to the jurisdiction” alternative was better suited to 
achieving that end.  After insisting that both the “wild Indians of the plains” 
and those confined to reservations were subject to the laws of the United 
States and thus “subject to” its jurisdiction, Doolittle remarked: 
Mr. President, citizenship, if conferred, carries with it, as a matter of course, 
the rights, the responsibilities, the duties, the immunities, the privileges of 
citizens, for that is the very object of this constitutional amendment to 
accomplish.267  
In reply, Senator Howard, argued that Native Americans who 
maintained their tribal relations were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the 
United States within the meaning of his proposal and characterized 
Doolittle’s proposed alternative as “an unconscious attempt ... to naturalize 
all the Indians within the limits of the United States” because each state 
could extend citizenship to its Native American residents simply by taxing 
them.268  Howard remarked that he was “not quite so liberal in” his views as 
to agree to such a proposal and observed that he was:  
not yet prepared to pass a sweeping act of naturalization by which all the 
Indian savages, wild or tame, belonging to a tribal relation, are to become my 
fellow-citizens and go to the polls and vote with me and hold lands and deal in 
every other way that a citizen of the United States has a right to do.269 
Though Howard’s suggestion that recognizing Indians as  “citizen[s] of the 
United States” would confer upon them a “right” to “go to the polls and 
vote” might charitably be attributed to the type of hyperbole one might 
expect in an extemporaneous exchange, 270  his suggestion is nonetheless 
                                                 
267 Id. at 2893 (emphasis added). 
268 Id. at 2895. 
269 Id. (emphasis added). 
270 In his earlier speech introducing the proposed Amendment in the Senate on May 10, 
Howard had expressly denied that the Amendment would “give … the power to Congress 
of regulating suffrage in the states,” a view he maintained after the Amendment’s 
ratification.  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866); see also Cong. Globe, 40th 
Cong. 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869) (Sen. Howard) (denying that Amendment conferred voting 
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clear evidence that citizenship was viewed by members of the 39th 
Congress as anything but inconsequential and that such members fully 
expected that recognizing particular classes of persons as “citizens” would 
have significant practical and legal consequences. 
Doolittle’s proposed revision was rejected by a vote of 30 to 10 and 
debate quickly moved on to other Sections of the Amendment. 271   This 
marked the end of substantive debate on the proposed addition of the 
Citizenship Clause, which spans less than eight pages of the Congressional 
Globe and consumed, at most, a few hours of the Senate’s time.272  The 
House approved the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment on June 11, 
1866 without substantive debate on the addition of the Citizenship Clause.273  
After that, the focus of debate over the Amendment shifted from Congress 
to the states.   
D.  The Ratification Debate in the States 
As noted above, the Senate’s relatively abbreviated discussion of the 
Citizenship Clause prior to its inclusion in the Fourteenth Amendment has 
led many modern scholars to view the provision as an “afterthought” that 
added relatively little of substance to the proposed Amendment.274  But if 
                                                                                                                            
rights). 
271 Id. at 2897. 
272 See id. at 2890-97. 
273 Discussion of the Citizenship Clause in the House was limited to the following brief 
statement by Representative Thaddeus Stevens summarizing the changes that had been 
made in the Senate: 
The first section is altered by defining who are citizens of the United States and of 
the States. This is an excellent amendment, long needed to settle conflicting 
decisions between the several States and the United States. It declares this great 
privilege to belong to every person born or naturalized in the United States. 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866).  On June 8, Senator Henderson of 
Missouri delivered a speech in which he argued that the proposed citizenship definition 
was merely declaratory of existing law.  Id. at 3031-32.  Henderson claimed that if he was 
right regarding the preexisting legal status of the birthright citizenship rule, then it would 
“be a loss of time to discuss the remaining provisions of” Section One because “they 
merely secure the rights that attach to citizenship in all free Governments.”  Id. at 3031.  As 
discussed above, Henderson was the lone member of Congress who had argued during the 
earlier Civil Rights Act debates that a conferral of citizenship would not necessarily carry 
with it an entitlement to equal civil rights.  See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.  
His speech of June 8, which treated the specific requirements of the Amendment’s Due 
Process, Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses as mere entailments of the 
citizenship recognized by the Amendment’s first sentence, strongly suggests that he had 
been persuaded by the more expansive conception of citizenship defended by other 
members of the 39th Congress.          
274 See supra note 177. 
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one looks instead to the debates surrounding ratification of the Amendment 
in the states, a much different picture emerges.  Rather than being viewed as 
an inconsequential addition, the Amendment’s declaration of constitutional 
citizenship was frequently treated in the ratification debates as a central 
focus, and, in some cases, the central focus, of the Amendment’s first 
Section.     
For example, in August 1866, Senator Trumbull delivered a widely 
publicized speech in Chicago275 in which he characterized Section One as 
“declar[ing] the rights of the American citizen” and as a mere “reiteration of 
the Civil Rights Bill.”276 The Civil Rights Bill, in turn, was described by 
Trumbull as having been “intended ... to confer upon every person born 
upon American soil the right of American citizenship, and every thing 
belonging to the free citizen of the Republic.” 277   “In other words,” its 
purpose “was to make all people equal before the law” with respect to rights 
of contract, property and “every right which belongs to man as a man.”278  
Although Trumbull characterized Section One as “an unnecessary 
declaration, perhaps, because all the rights” identified in that provision 
already “belong to the citizen,” he noted that it was “nonetheless thought 
proper to put in the fundamental law the declaration that all good citizens 
were entitled alike to equal rights in this Republic ... and that all who were 
born here or who ... were naturalized were to be deemed citizens of the 
United States in every State where they might happen to dwell.”279  These 
remarks, all of which focused on the constitutional declaration of 
citizenship and the concomitant entitlement of citizens to equal rights, 
reflected the entirety of Trumbull’s comments on Section One. 
To similar effect were the remarks of Senator Henry Lane of Indiana in 
a speech delivered a few weeks after Trumbull’s Chicago speech in which 
he characterized “[t]he first clause in the Constitutional Amendment” as 
“simply a re-affirmation of the first clause in the Civil Rights Bill, declaring 
the citizenship of all men born in the United States, without regard to race 
or color.”280 In September of the same year, the National Union Republican 
                                                 
275 Trumbull’s speech originally appeared in the Chicago Tribune on August 4, 1866 
and was subsequently republished in full the next day in the Cincinatti Commercial. 
The latter newspaper subsequently republished Trumbull’s Chicago speech, along with a 
number of other prominent speeches by both advocates and opponents of the proposed 
amendment in book-form shortly after the conclusion of the 1866 election.  See SPEECHES 
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN OHIO, INDIANA, AND KENTUCKY, 6 (1866) [hereinafter 
“SPEECHES AND DEBATES”].   
276 Id. 
277 Id.  
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Cincinnatti Commercial, Aug. 20, 1866, p. 1 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, 
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Committee issued a campaign address to the American people in which the 
“substance” of Section One was described as follows: 
I. All persons born or naturalized in this country are henceforth citizens of 
the United States, and shall enjoy all the rights of citizens evermore; and no 
State shall have the power to contravene this most necessary and righteous 
provision.281 
In a written message submitting the proposed Amendment to the Illinois 
state legislature and urging its ratification, the state’s Republican governor 
limited his remarks regarding Section One to the following statement: 
Are not all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its 
jurisdiction rightfully citizens of the United States and of each State and 
entitled to all the political and civil rights citizenship confers?  and should any 
State possess the power to divest them of these great rights, except for treason 
or other infamous crime?282 
These statements, and similar remarks by supporters emphasizing the 
citizenship declaration as the central focus of Section One,283 are consistent 
with supporters’ efforts to link Section One with the Civil Rights Act, 
which was widely perceived as a relatively moderate measure.  Because the 
Citizenship Clause was the only portion of the Amendment that mimicked 
the language used in the Civil Rights bill, it was natural for supporters to 
focus on that provision in support of their claim that Section One did little 
more than “embody” the more specifically worded protections of the Civil 
Rights bill.284  
                                                                                                                            
supra note 275, at 14).  
281 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 22, 1866, p. 2.  The address was signed by New Jersey 
Governor Marcus L. Ward, the Committee’s chairman, and other party leaders, including 
Horace Greeley.  
282 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AT THEIR REGULAR SESSION BEGUN AND HELD AT 
SPRINGFIELD, JANUARY 7, 1867, 40 (Baker, Bailache & Co. 1867).  
283 See also, e.g., Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 27, 1866 (speech of Gen. Benjamin 
Butler) (“The first section [of the proposed amendment] … is that every citizen of every 
state shall have the right of every citizen of every state …”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND 
DEBATES, supra note 275, at 20); New York Times, Sept. 27, 1866 (quoting resolutions 
adopted by Pittsburgh Convention of Union Soldiers and Sailors) (proposed amendment 
“clearly defines American citizenship and guaranties all his rights to every citizen”); 
Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 31, 1866, p. 2 (speech of Rep. Columbus Delano) (describing 
Section One as “in substance, a definition of citizenship”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND 
DEBATES, supra note 275, at  23). 
284 See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 276 (quoting Trumbull’s characterization 
of Section One as a “reiteration of the Civil Rights Bill.”); text accompanying supra note 
280 (quoting Sen. Henry Lane’s statement describing Section One as “a re-affirmation of 
the first clause in the Civil Rights Bill”); Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 24, 1866, p. 1 
(speech of Sen. John Sherman) (describing Section One as the “embodiment of the Civil 
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The significance of the Citizenship Clause to supporters of the 
Amendment is also reflected in contemporaneous editorial commentary that 
appeared in the pro-ratification press.  An October 1866 editorial in the 
strongly pro-Republican Chicago Tribune titled “American Citizenship” 
praised the proposed Amendment for correcting the “anomaly” that had 
previously existed whereby “a citizen of the United States residing in Maine 
is not necessarily a citizen of the State of Virginia.”285  Observing that this 
“anomalous condition of civil rights exists in no other civilized country,” 
the editorial praised the proposed Amendment for “defin[ing] in the 
Constitution itself what constitutes a citizen and ... declar[ing] ... that a 
citizen of the whole Republic ... shall also be a citizen of the State in which 
he resides.” 286   While the paper observed that the “proposed provision 
making citizenship uniform” would “concede[] no political rights,” it 
nonetheless insisted that the provision would “entitle[]” the persons so 
recognized “to civil rights on equal terms” with other citizens, including 
rights to enter into contracts, to buy, sell, devise and inherit real and 
personal property and to bring actions in the courts.287  The author of the 
editorial appears to have assumed that all of these rights would follow as a 
result of the constitutional declaration of citizenship, which was the only 
provision of the proposed Amendment mentioned in the editorial.   
An anonymous editorial published a month later in the New York Times 
similarly praised the Amendment’s citizenship declaration as a much 
needed response to the problem of state discrimination and referred to 
Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion as indicative of “the “long-defined 
rights of a citizen of the United States, with which States cannot 
constitutionally interfere.” 288   An editorial in the North American and 
United States Gazette of Philadelphia during this same period declared “that 
the primary importance” of Section One “lies in the fact that it specifically 
places the citizenship of the republic above that of the States, and makes 
                                                                                                                            
Rights Bill, namely: that every body—man, woman and child—without regard to color, 
should have equal rights before the law; … that every body born in this country or 
naturalized by our laws should stand equal before the laws”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND 
DEBATES, supra note 275, at 39). 
285 American Citizenship, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 10, 1866, p.2. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 The National Question, The Constitutional Amendment—National Citizenship, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 10, 1866.  In a subsequent editorial in the same series describing the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the same unidentified author referred to the catalogue of 
rights listed “in the first number” (i.e., in the first unsigned editorial) as indicative of “what 
privileges and immunities were intended” by that provision.  The Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment—What it Provides, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1866.  This latter editorial also 
suggested that the Amendment would extend to citizens “protection … coextensive with 
the whole Bill of Rights” against the state governments.  Id.     
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every man, native or naturalized a citizen of the United States, so that 
hereafter there shall be no such excuse for rebels as that their paramount 
allegiance was due to their respective states.”289     
The Citizenship Clause also featured prominently in the arguments of 
those opposed to ratification.  But whereas supporters of the Amendment 
invoked the provision to tie Section One to the relatively narrow and 
uncontroversial rights enumerated in the Civil Rights bill, opponents 
emphasized the potential breadth of the Amendment, placing particular 
emphasis on the danger that recognizing blacks as “citizens” might require 
that they be admitted to suffrage on equal terms with white citizens.290  In 
                                                 
289 The Amendment Alone, Philadelphia North American and United States Gazette, 
Nov. 22, 1866, p.2. 
290 Such claims were pervasive among the Amendment’s opponents in both the North 
and the South.  See, e.g., TEX. HOUSE J. 578 (1866) (report of Committee on Federal 
Relations) (objecting to Section One on the ground that it “deprive[s] the States of the right 
… to determine what shall constitute citizenship of a State” and contending that its “object” 
was to declare “under the color of a generality” that “negroes [are] citizens of the United 
States, and therefore, citizens of the several Sates, and as such entitled to all ‘the privileges 
and immunities’ of white citizens,” including the right to vote, serve on juries and to bear 
arms in the militia); Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 9, 1866 (speech of Sen. Thomas 
Hendricks) (arguing that the Amendment would “confer citizenship on the Negroes and the 
Indians” and suggesting that such citizenship would entitle blacks to “stand by your side at 
the polls—and claim to be voted for, to hold office, sit upon juries, to exercise all the rights 
and enjoy all the privileges which you now enjoy”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, 
supra note 275, at 9); IND. HOUSE J. 102 (1867) (minority report of Select Committee on 
Constitutional Amendment) (first section “places all persons, without regard to race or 
color, who are born in this country, and subject to its jurisdiction, upon the same political 
level, by constituting them ‘citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they 
reside,’ thus conferring upon the negro race born in this country the same rights, civil and 
political, that are now enjoyed by the white race,” including the right of suffrage); WIS. 
SEN. J. 96 (1867) (minority report of Committee on Foreign Relations) (“The apparent 
object of the proposed amendments [sic] is to declare the Africans lately in servitude … 
citizens, and to give to the Congress of the United States the power to make them citizens 
of the several states wherein they reside, and thereby to extend to them the right of 
suffrage.”). 
These arguments found some support in leading dictionaries of the day, many of which 
defined the term “citizen” as a person who possessed political rights.  See, e.g., NOAH 
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 208 (George & 
Charles Merriam, 1850) (defining “citizen,” as used in the United States, to mean “a 
person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, or 
the qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real 
estate.”); 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION, (T. & J. W. Johnson, 1843) (defining “citizen” as “[o]ne who, under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote … and who is qualified to fill 
offices in the gift of the people.”).   These definitions failed to account for the existence of 
non-voting citizens, including women and children, a fact supporters of the Amendment 
were quick to point out in criticizing arguments that relied on such definitions.  See, e.g., 
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response to such claims, many supporters of the Amendment vigorously 
denied that extending citizenship to free blacks would confer suffrage or 
other “political” rights.  In a speech delivered in Indianapolis on August 8, 
1866, Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax ridiculed opponents’ reliance 
on the “chimera and hobgoblin of negro suffrage,” granting that “the man 
who votes has the right to be called a citizen,” but contending that “it don’t 
follow that every citizen has a right to vote.”291  Senator Lane of Indiana 
likewise dismissed the asserted connection between citizenship and voting 
rights claiming that “[t]here is no good lawyer who will contend that 
conferring citizenship alone implies the right to vote and hold office.”292  
Representative Columbus Delano of Ohio went even further, asserting that 
there was “nobody in this community so illy informed as not to know that 
voting does not follow from citizenship ...”293   
But denying that citizenship necessarily entailed suffrage was as far as 
most supporters of the Amendment were willing to go in cabining the 
effects of Section One.  Even those who denied that the Amendment would 
confer voting rights generally assumed that citizenship would confer 
equality with respect to more basic “civil rights,” including, 
paradigmatically, those enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.294   
III. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A.  Early Congressional Interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment 
On July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed the 
Fourteenth Amendment ratified.295  Even before that proclamation, members 
of the radical Republican faction in Congress had begun looking to the 
Amendment as a source of constitutional power to require states to allow 
black citizens to vote.  In March 1868, Thaddeus Stevens, who had served 
on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction during the 39th Congress, 
                                                                                                                            
Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 25, 1866 (speech of the Hon. John Hannah) (criticizing 
opponents’ reliance on definitions from Bouvier and Webster and insisting that citizenship 
does not require suffrage) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, supra note 275, at 21). 
291 Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 8, 1866 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, supra 
note 275, at 14). 
292  Cincinnatti Commercial, Aug. 20, 1866 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, 
supra note 275, at 13-14). 
293 Cincinatti Commercial, Aug. 31, 1866 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, supra 
note 275, at  23). 
294 See, e.g., Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 8, 1866 (speech of Rep. Colfax) (denying 
citizenship confers suffrage but pointing to Civil Rights Act as indicative of “what the 
rights of a citizen of the United States are …”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, 
supra note 275, at 14). 
295 See William H. Seward, 15 Stat 708, 708–10 (July 28, 1868) (announcing adoption 
of the Amendment). 
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pointed to the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as authority for such a bill: 
If by the amended Constitution every American citizen is entitled to equal 
privileges with every other American citizen, and if every American citizen in 
any of the States should be found entitled to impartial and universal suffrage 
with every other American in any State, then it follows as an inevitable 
conclusion that suffrage throughout this nation is impartial and universal so 
far as every human being, without regard to race or color, shall be found 
concerned, and so far as it affects the whole nation.296 
The most thorough explanation of the interpretation underlying the 
radicals’ claim that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized federal 
legislation conferring voting rights was offered by Representative George 
Boutwell of Massachusetts, who, like Stevens, had been one of the fifteen 
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.297  After quoting both 
the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, Boutwell observed 
that “[o]ne of the privileges, then, of a citizen of the United States is that he 
shall be a citizen of the State where he resides ...”298  This citizenship, 
according to Boutwell, was by its very nature equal. 299   Boutwell then 
attempted to demonstrate that voting was “one of the privileges of the 
citizen” by invoking the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 1822 decision in Amy v. 
Smith, 300  which Boutwell described as “an authority ... in which the 
characteristics of citizens are laid down ... in the most satisfactory and 
conclusive language.”301 Boutwell quoted at length from the Amy decision, 
including the Kentucky court’s declaration that one could not, “in the 
correct sense of the term, be a ‘citizen’ of a State, who is not entitled ... to 
all the rights and privileges” conferred upon “the highest class of society.”302   
Boutwell’s invocation of Amy v. Smith, which was one of the earliest 
judicial decisions denying that free blacks were “citizens” within the 
meaning of the federal Constitution, 303  as support for extending voting 
rights to blacks was more than a bit ironic.  But his argument illustrates the 
way in which the political valence of the citizenship issue was changed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption.  Before the Civil War, an expansive 
                                                 
296 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1967 (1868). 
297 MALTZ, supra note 170, at 81. 
298 Cong. Gobe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 558 (1869). 
299 Id. (“Under that Constitution, … [w]e cannot say that a white citizen shall enjoy 
privileges which are denied to a black citizen or to a naturalized citizen, white or black.”). 
300 11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326 (Ct. of App. 1822). 
301 Id.  
302 Id. at 558-59 (quoting Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326 (Ct. of App. 1822)).  
Boutwell’s invocation of Amy v. Smith was echoed by his fellow radical, Senator George 
Edmunds of Vermont. See id. at 1001 (Sen. Edmunds). 
303 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
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conception of citizenship such as the one reflected in Amy, had been used to 
deny that free blacks were eligible for citizenship.304 Proponents of black 
citizenship sometimes responded by embracing a narrower view of what 
citizenship entailed in order to demonstrate that recognizing such a status 
for free blacks was not necessarily inconsistent with denying them voting 
rights or even certain more basic civil rights.305  But after the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification, those seeking to further the goal of black 
equality no longer had reason to resist the expansive view of what 
“citizenship” entailed.  
Of course, Boutwell’s claim that the right to vote was one of the rights 
inhering in citizenship was hardly representative of the Republican 
mainstream.  The repeated pre-enactment assurances from supporters that 
the Amendment would not require black suffrage were still fresh in the 
minds of all concerned.306 The radicals’ proposed interpretation also stood in 
arguable tension with the Amendment’s second section, which appeared to 
recognize the right of states to regulate suffrage subject only to a 
proportionate reduction in Congressional representation for those states that 
refused to extend voting rights to all of their adult male citizens.307  Though 
Boutwell and other radicals had responses to such objections, 308  more 
moderate Republicans, including former members of the 39th Congress 
who had supported the Amendment, rejected the radicals’ claim that the 
Amendment authorized Congress to regulate suffrage in the states.309 The 
proposed legislation attracted relatively little Congressional support and 
was eventually abandoned in favor of an alternative strategy of securing 
equal suffrage through constitutional amendment.310 
                                                 
304 See supra Section I.C.1. 
305  See supra Part I.B.3.c (describing moderate pro-citizenship position); see also 
supra Part I.C.2 (discussing Justice Curtis’s Dred Scott dissent).  
306 See supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text. 
307 See U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 2 (providing that “when the right to vote at any 
[federal] election” is “denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged” (except as 
punishment for crime) “the basis of representation therein shall be” subject to a 
proportionate reduction); see also, e.g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869) 
(Sen. Howard) (contending that Section Two demonstrated that Section One did not confer 
voting rights). 
308  Boutwell acknowledged that “some  persons” in the 39th Congress may have 
conceded that the Amendment would not confer political rights but denied that he had ever 
made such a concession and contended that the provision in Section Two merely provided 
a “penalty” for a state’s failure to extend voting rights to all citizens as Section One 
required.  Id.at 559. 
309 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869) (Sen. Howard); id. at 
1002 (Sen. Drake); id. at 977-79 (Sen. Frelinghuysen).   
310 MALTZ, supra note 170, at 146-47. 
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A decidedly less controversial vision of the rights corresponding to 
citizenship appeared in the subsequent debate over the proposed Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, which reflected one of the earliest legislative 
interpretations of the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment.  The 1871 Act 
(popularly known as the “Ku Klux Act”)311 was motivated by the Southern 
states’ failure to adequately protect their black populations against political 
violence perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations and 
was targeted primarily at ensuring the protection of free blacks against 
private and official violence.312   
The law’s supporters naturally focused much of their constitutional 
argument on a straightforwardly literal interpretation of the term “protection” 
in the Equal Protection Clause.313  But multiple supporters buttressed such 
arguments with the claim that the constitutional recognition of blacks’ 
citizenship provided the requisite federal authority to protect them from 
racially motivated violence.  For example, Republican Senator John Pool of 
North Carolina, after quoting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause asked “[w]hy this express declaration of citizenship” had been 
included in the Amendment “unless it implies some right or class of rights 
as incident thereto, which were meant to have thus thrown around them a 
national protection?”314  Though Pool conceded that “[t]he full scope of the 
rights incident to citizenship may not be easy to define,” he insisted that 
such rights “[c]ertainly ... cannot be less than the three absolute rights 
recognized by the common law,” namely, the rights to “personal liberty, 
personal security and private property,” and contended that upon the failure 
of any state to “protect the rights incident to citizenship,” the “national 
Government must intervene ...”315   
To similar effect were the remarks of Representative Samuel 
Shellabarger of Ohio, the principal sponsor of the proposed legislation in 
the House.  Shellabarger began his argument in support of the 1871 Act’s 
constitutionality by averting to the constitutional theory underlying the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which Shellabarger described as having been passed “to 
enforce the rights of citizenship to which the slave was admitted by the act 
of his emancipation.”316  After observing that several courts had affirmed the 
constitutionality of that earlier measure, Shellabarger contended that 
                                                 
311  Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: 
Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RIGHTS L. J. 219, 239 
n.88 (2009).   
312 Id. at 224-25. 
313 See id. at 227-52 (collecting statements of supporters reflecting a “duty to protect” 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
314 Cong. Globe 42nd Congress 1st Session 607 (1871). 
315 Id. 
316 Cong. Globe 42nd Congress 1st Sess., app. 68 (1871). 
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Congress thus possessed power under the Thirteenth Amendment “to define 
and punish as a crime against the United States any act of deprivation of the 
newly made United States citizenship.”317  Shellabarger argued that “if the 
[T]hirteenth [A]mendment had done so much as this, the far more explicit, 
complete and careful provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment had done 
that much and more.318  According to Shellabarger:  
[W]hen the United States inserted into its Constitution that which was not 
there before, that the people of this country born or naturalized therein are 
citizens of the United States and of the States also in which they reside, and 
that Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the 
requirement that their privileges and immunities as citizens should not be 
abridged, it was done for a purpose, and that purpose was that the United 
States thereby were authorized to directly protect and defend throughout the 
United States those privileges and immunities ... which inhere and belong of 
right to the citizenship of all free Governments.  The making of them United 
States citizens and authorizing Congress by appropriate law to protect that 
citizenship gave Congress power to legislate directly for enforcement of such 
rights as are fundamental elements of citizenship.319        
Opponents adopted divergent and, to some extent, conflicting strategies 
in responding to the supporters’ citizenship-based arguments.  One strategy, 
reflected in Indiana Democrat Michael Kerr’s response to Shellabarger, 
focused on the “declaratory” nature of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause.320  According to Kerr, because birthright citizenship had 
been the rule even before the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, as 
recognized in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the Citizenship Clause conferred 
no new power on Congress but instead left both the definition of “citizen” 
and the “constituent elements of citizenship of the United States or of the 
States ... where it found them, to rest upon the common law and the laws of 
the several States.”321   
Not all opponents of the 1871 Act endorsed Kerr’s narrow interpretation 
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319 Id. at 69.  For other examples of Republicans invoking the Citizenship Clause as 
support for the bill’s constitutionality, see Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., 693-94 
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Citizenship Clause “only enlarges the body of citizens, nothing more”). Such arguments 
marked a significant shift from the rhetorical strategies of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
opponents prior to enactment.  See supra notes 200 & 290 and accompanying text 
(discussing opponents’ arguments that making blacks citizens would require that they be 
given full legal and political equality).  
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of the Citizenship Clause.  The more common response was simply to deny 
that Congress could invoke its Section Five enforcement power in the 
absence of overtly discriminatory state action.322  A notable example of this 
line of argument was offered by Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky who 
claimed that Congress’s Section Five enforcement power was limited to 
“pass[ing] acts declaring all State laws which contravene [the] objects” of 
Section One “to be unconstitutional, null and void or to provide for all cases 
involving them to be instituted in” or removed to federal courts.323  But 
despite this extremely narrow construction of Section Five, Davis endorsed 
a significantly broader interpretation of the Citizenship Clause: 
The only purpose of this provision [i.e., the Citizenship Clause] was to abolish 
discriminations and to give, “without regard to race, color or previous 
condition,” citizenship; and to invest those who previously had been withheld 
from any rights, privileges or immunities all that had been common to persons 
then citizens of the United States and thus to put the colored citizen upon the 
same level with white citizens.  ... [I]ts only effect is to abolish discrimination 
against the black or colored race.  To the extent that the laws of any State may 
make such discriminations Congress may intervene to abolish them, but no 
further.324 
Davis’s description of the Citizenship Clause was strikingly egalitarian, 
especially for a border-state Democrat who had opposed both the Civil 
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment while a member of the 39th 
Congress in 1866.325  Davis clearly viewed the Citizenship Clause as the 
source of a legally enforceable equality principle that would justify federal 
intervention if states engaged in explicitly race-based discrimination against 
their own citizens.  Significantly, Davis appears to have viewed this 
antidiscrimination requirement as arising directly from the Citizenship 
Clause itself, independently of the express prohibitions contained in the 
second sentence of Section One, which he discussed separately.326   
B.  The Slaughter-House Cases  
In 1869, the Republican-controlled legislature of Louisiana conferred a 
monopoly in the maintenance of butchering and slaughtering operations in 
New Orleans and its surrounding areas on a single private corporation, 
                                                 
322 See, e.g., id. app. at 218-19 (Rep. Thurman); id. app. at 138-39 (Rep. McCormick); 
id. at 573 (Sen. Stockton); id. at 337-38 (Rep. Whitthorne).  
323 Id. at 648. 
324 Id.   
325 See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1809 (1866) (recording Davis’s vote against 
the Civil Rights Act); id. at 3042 (recording Davis’s vote against the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
326 Cong. Globe 42nd Congress 1st Sess. 648-49 (1871). 
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prompting a series of legal challenges by individual butchers and smaller 
corporations whose livelihoods were threatened by the law.327  These legal 
actions culminated in the Supreme Court’s notorious 1873 decision in The 
Slaughter-House Cases328 in which the Court, by a five-to-four majority, 
rejected the private butchers’ constitutional claims and, in doing so, 
practically “eviscerated” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.329 
The Citizenship Clause featured prominently in Justice Miller’s 
majority opinion and provided the textual point of departure for the 
majority’s narrow construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  
Focusing on the fact that the former provision referred to both United States 
citizenship and state citizenship whereas the latter focused solely on United 
States citizenship, Miller claimed that it was “quite clear” that “citizenship 
of the United States, and ... citizenship of a State ... are distinct from each 
other” and claimed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause must therefore 
have been “intended” to protect solely those rights pertaining to the former 
status with rights pertaining to state citizenship left to the exclusive control 
of the states.330  Miller’s opinion classified all rights traditionally associated 
with Corfield and other Comity Clause cases as the exclusive province of 
state citizenship and state protection.331  The “privileges or immunities” of 
national citizenship, by contrast, were confined to a relatively narrow set of 
structurally derived rights such as the privilege of traveling from state to 
state and “[t]he right to use the navigable waters of the United States.”332 
Justice Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House is among the most 
widely criticized opinions in Supreme Court history. 333   Miller’s narrow 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is susceptible to 
                                                 
327  The background of the Louisiana legislation and the cases challenging its 
constitutionality are described in RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE 
SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (2003). 
328 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
329 See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 239, at 64 (describing Slaughter House as “famous 
…  for its evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause”); see also, e.g., Harrison, 
supra note 55, at 1387 (decision “virtually read [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] out 
of” the Constitution). 
330 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74. 
331 Id. at 77-78. 
332 Id. at 78-80. 
333 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U. S. 489, 522, n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Legal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the [Privileges or Immunites] 
Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873”); Akhil Amar, Substance and 
Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 601, 631, n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no 
serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that [Miller’s interpretation] is a 
plausible reading of the Amendment”). 
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numerous criticisms, the most familiar of which being that the interpretation 
finds no support in the extensive legislative and ratification debates that 
preceded the Amendment’s adoption.334  This difficulty might not have been 
dispositive if Miller had provided a persuasive textual account of the 
Amendment’s language.  But he did not.  As Justice Field observed in his 
dissent, because all the “privileges or immunities” of national citizenship 
that Miller identified would have been adequately protected without the 
Fourteenth Amendment,335 Miller’s interpretation rendered the Amendment 
“a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most 
unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.”336 
Miller’s interpretation is also difficult to reconcile with the text of the 
Citizenship Clause, a considerable difficulty given that provision’s 
centrality to his textual argument.  As Professor Harrison observes, 
although the Citizenship Clause “recognizes that there are separate 
citizenships of the states and the United States, the Amendment does not 
divide those citizenships, but staples them together” by conferring upon 
every United States citizen a citizenship in whichever state he or she 
chooses to reside.337  Miller himself conceded as much by acknowledging 
that, under the Citizenship Clause, “a citizen of the United States can, of his 
own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide 
residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.”338  It 
is thus difficult to escape the conclusion that the right to enjoy the privileges 
or immunities of state citizenship (at least on the same terms as are 
extended to other citizens of the same state) is therefore one of the 
“privileges or immunities” of United States citizenship protected by the 
                                                 
334  See, e.g., FONER, supra note 172, at 530 (observing that the Court’s “studied 
distinction between the privileges deriving from state and national citizenship, should have 
been seriously doubted by anyone who read the Congressional debates of the 1860s.”); cf. 
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J. dissenting) (contending that the 
majority’s interpretation “defeats, by a limitation not anticipated, the intent of those by 
whom the instrument was framed and of those by whom it was adopted.”). 
335 The clearest illustration of this observation’s correctness is provided by Miller’s 
principal example of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship—the right to travel 
from state to state and to the seat of the national government—which the Supreme Court 
had already recognized as constitutionally protected before the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 
(1867)). 
336 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96.  
337 Harrison, supra note 55, at 1415; see also KACZYROWSKI, supra note 176, at 262 
(observing that “Miller had to keep national and state citizenship distinct” in order to avoid 
“hav[ing] … to admit that national citizenship entitled the individual to state citizenship,” 
thereby “entitl[ing] [the individual] to all of the rights of citizens, even if they were derived 
from the states.”). 
338 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80 (second emphasis added). 
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Amendment.339 
The principal dissent in the case, authored by Justice Field, drew 
inferences from the Citizenship Clause that were directly contrary to those 
drawn by Miller’s majority opinion.  After noting the “diversity of opinion” 
that had existed before the Amendment’s adoption regarding the 
relationship between state citizenship and United States citizenship, Field 
observed that the Citizenship Clause: 
changes this whole subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and 
doubt. It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the 
United States ... . A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States 
residing in that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities 
which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen now belong to him as a 
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any 
State... . They do not derive their existence from [the State’s] legislation, and 
cannot be destroyed by its power.340 
 Field noted that the Amendment did “not attempt to confer any new 
privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those 
already existing” but rather “assumes that there are such privileges and 
immunities which belong of right to citizens as such.”341  Rejecting Miller’s 
narrow construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Field 
contended that the most logical interpretive source for identifying the 
“privileges or immunities” of United States citizenship was in the judicial 
interpretations that had been given to the similarly phrased Comity Clause, 
which Field described as “a clause which insures equality in the enjoyment 
of ... rights between citizens of the several States whilst in the same 
State.”342  Field argued that: 
[w]hat the [Comity Clause] did for the protection of the citizens of one State 
against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States, the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States 
against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, 
whether they reside in the same or in different States. If under the fourth 
article of the Constitution equality of privileges or immunities is secured 
between citizens of different States, under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment the 
same equality is secured between citizens of the United States.343 
Justice Bradley’s separate dissenting opinion likewise emphasized the 
inherent link between the newly recognized status of United States 
                                                 
339  Harrison, supra note 55, at 1415 (characterizing this conclusion as “virtually 
impossible to avoid”); see also infra notes 310-315 and accompanying text (discussing 
similar argument made by Senator Boutwell in post-Slaughter-House legislative debate). 
340 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95-96 (Field, J. dissenting). 
341 Id. at 96. 
342 Id. at 98. 
343 Id. at 100-01. 
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citizenship and the equality of all United States citizens: 
The question is now settled by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment itself, that 
citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country, and 
that State citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship 
of the United States and the citizen’s place of residence. … . A citizen of the 
United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State 
he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with 
every other citizen, and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain 
him in that right.... . Citizenship of the United States ought to be, and, 
according to the Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in 
any and every States in this Union, subject to such regulations as the 
legislature may rightfully prescribe. If a man be denied full equality before the 
law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship as a citizen of the 
United States.344 
Thus, for both Field and Bradley, 345  the status of United States 
citizenship along with the corresponding constitutional recognition of the 
“privileges or immunities” associated with that status provided sufficient 
grounds for a legally enforceable equality guarantee that was apparently 
distinct from the separate Equal Protection Clause, which both dissenters 
mentioned only in passing.346 
A great deal has been written about the possible motivations that may 
have driven Miller and the other members of the Slaughter-House majority 
to impose upon the Amendment the narrow construction reflected in the 
majority’s opinion.347  But whatever the Justices’ motivations, their decision 
unquestionably altered the subsequent development of constitutional law by 
de-emphasizing the significance of citizenship in interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment and channeling constitutional arguments toward the 
                                                 
344 Id. at 112-13 (Bradley, J. dissenting). 
345 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Swayne endorsed the opinions of Justices 
Field and Bradley as “full and conclusive upon the subject” of the legislation’s 
constitutionality under the challenged provisions.  Id. at 128 (Swayne, J.).  Chief Justice 
Chase joined in Justice Field’s dissent without writing a separate opinion. 
346 The only reference to “equal protection” in Field’s opinion was as part of a full 
quotation of the language of Section One.  Id. at 93-94 (Field, J. dissenting).  Following 
extended explanations of why the proposed Louisiana law violated both the Privileges or 
Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Bradley 
remarked without elaboration that “[s]uch a law also deprives those citizens of the equal 
protection of the laws, contrary to the last clause of the section.”  Id. at 122 (Bradley, J. 
dissenting).  
347 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 115, 133 (1994) (characterizing Miller’s opinion as “an attempt to assuage 
the conflict over Reconstruction by prudent compromise”); Michael Les Benedict, 
Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 61-62 
(1978) (attributing Miller’s decision to the “almost universal desire of Americans to 
preserve the basics of the federal system”). 
 2012] ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING 67 
Amendment’s separate Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, both of 
which referred to “persons” rather than “citizens.” 348   Although the 
Slaughter-House dissenters’ views strongly influenced the jurisprudence 
that developed under the latter two provisions,349 the damage inflicted by the 
Slaughter-House majority to the significance of citizenship in interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment persists to this day.350 
C.  The Civil Rights Act of 1875 
Although the Slaughter-House decision marked the beginning of the end 
of citizenship as a central concept in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
interpretation, the transition from citizenship-based arguments to equal-
protection arguments did not happen all at once or without resistance.  This 
transition played out most visibly in connection with the legislative debates 
surrounding a series of proposals that eventually culminated in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875.351   
In May 1870, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, a leader of the 
radical wing of the Congressional Republicans, introduced legislation that 
would prohibit racial discrimination in various public accommodations, 
including public schools, common carriers, inns, theaters, cemeteries, 
churches and benevolent institutions throughout the United States. 352  
Sumner’s proposed legislation sparked a series of legislative debates and 
counter-proposals that would span nearly five years. 353   In a speech 
                                                 
348 Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 239, at 62-63 (describing modern academic “consensus” 
that, if not for Slaughter-House, much of Supreme Court’s modern due process and/or 
equal protection doctrine could have evolved instead under the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause). 
349  See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, at 17-20 (2011) 
(describing the Slaughter-House dissents as “crucial to the development of the liberty of 
contract idea” in the late nineteenth century); Saunders, supra note 50, at 294-301 
(discussing influence of Field and Bradley in early development of equal protection 
doctrine). 
350 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3030-31 (2010) (plurality 
opinion) (refusing to overrule Slaughter-House and holding that the constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
351  18 Stat. 335 (1875); see McConnell, supra note 5, at 998-1005 (describing 
evolution of supporters’ constitutional theories in the wake of Slaughter-House). 
352 McConnell, supra note 5, at 987. 
353 See id. at 984-1117 (describing legislative history of the 1875 Civil Rights Act).  
Because the debates surrounding the proposed legislation reflect a far more detailed 
explication of the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements than was reflected in the pre-
enactment debates, scholars have looked to these debates as a “rich source of information 
about how the Fourteenth Amendment was understood at the time of its adoption …”  
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425; see also, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 984-1117 
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delivered in 1872 in support of an early version of the proposed bill, 
Sumner specifically invoked the newly conferred constitutional citizenship 
of African Americans as the basis for the legal equality the bill sought to 
confer: 
Ceasing to be a slave the former victim has become not only a man, but a 
citizen, admitted alike within the pale of humanity and within the pale of 
citizenship... . [A]s a citizen he becomes a member of our common household 
with equality as the prevailing law.  No longer an African, he is an American; 
no longer a slave, he is a component part of the Republic, owing to it patriotic 
allegiance in return for the protection of equal laws.  By incorporation with 
the body-politic, he becomes a partner in that transcendent unity, so that there 
can be no injury to him without injury to all ... . Our rights are his rights; our 
equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are his great 
possession.354 
Sumner was far from alone in drawing a link between the legal status of 
United States citizenship and the equality guarantees set forth in his bill.  
Republican supporters of the bill routinely connected the equality rights the 
bill sought to protect with the “privileges or immunities” of United States 
citizenship and drew a link between those rights and the newly ratified 
Fourteenth Amendment.355  Though this theory was sometimes tied to the 
specific language of the Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause,356 
many Republicans took the position that equality of rights and privileges 
inhered in the very nature of United States citizenship itself.357 
                                                                                                                            
(looking to evidence of legislative debates and votes regarding 1875 Act as evidence 
Reconstruction-era understanding concerning school segregation).   
354 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1872). 
355 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425 (referring to the legislative debates 
surrounding the 1875 Civil Rights Act as “show[ing] that the equality theory of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was prominent among Republicans.”).  
356 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 762 (1872) (Sen. Carpenter) (“The 
fourteenth amendment assumes that there are certain privileges and immunities belonging 
to citizens of the United States, and it declares that no State shall abridge those privileges 
and immunities… . [T]o abridge the rights of any citizen it must follow that the privileges 
and immunities of all citizens must be the same.”).  
357 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 4081 (1874) (Sen. Pratt) (“No one reading the Constitution 
can deny that every colored man is a citizen, and as such, so far as legislation may go, 
entitled to equal rights and privileges with white people.”); 2 Cong. Rec. 425 (1874) (Rep. 
Purman) (“A citizen of the United States and a State is always equal to any other citizen of 
said state.”); 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1873) (Rep. Lawrence) (“The colored man is a citizen of 
the republic, and his rights, equally with all others, this Congress must respect if this 
Constitution is to be obeyed.”); Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 436 (1872)  (Sen. 
Frelinghuysen) (“[A]n equality of citizenship is established [by the Constitution] and we 
are directed to see to it that citizenship is nowhere abridged.  It is therefore, perfectly 
constitutional for Congress to say to the States, … you shall treat citizenship as 
citizenship.”); id. at 845 (Sen. Sherman) (“It seems to me clear as day … that if in any 
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As in the earlier Congressional debates concerning the constitutionality 
of the 1871 Ku Klux Act, 358  many opponents of the 1875 legislation 
conceded the link between citizenship and equality posited by the 
legislation’s supporters but merely denied the supporters’ claim of broad 
Congressional authority.359  One of the most notable examples of such a 
concession came from Democratic Representative Alexander Stephens of 
Georgia, the former Vice President of the Confederacy who “was 
considered by many to have been the most eloquent defender of slavery in 
the later years of the antebellum period.” 360   But in the Congressional 
debates of the 1870’s, Stephens acknowledged that, as a result of the Civil 
War and the Reconstruction Amendments, “all classes of men, whether 
white, red, brown or black” now had “an equal right to justice and to stand, 
so far as governmental powers are concerned or exercised over them, 
perfectly equal before the law.”361  Describing the effect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment specifically, Stephens declared his understanding that  Section 
One had “but two objects,” first “to declare the colored race to be citizens of 
the United States, and of the States, respectively, in which they reside” and 
second, to “prohibit the States from denying to the class of citizens so 
declared, the same privileges, immunities and civil rights which were 
secured to the citizens of the several States, respectively, and of the United 
States, by the Constitution as it stood before citizenship to the colored race 
was declared by this amendment.”362 
                                                                                                                            
community where a great number of black men are, by law citizens, if a law of the State 
prevents those men from sitting on a jury because they are black men, such a law does 
deprive such citizen of a privilege and immunity which they have a right to enjoy in every 
part of the country as citizens of the United States”); id. at 900 (Sen. Edmunds) (“If it is not 
a privilege and immunity of a citizen, being otherwise equal and otherwise qualified, to 
stand on an equality irrespective of color, what is a privilege and an immunity of 
citizenship upon which you can stand?”); Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2nd Sess. 273 (1871) 
(Sen. Sawyer) (“I believe … that as long as the Constitution stands as it does now, every 
citizen of the country should stand upon an equal plane with every other; that to every 
citizen of the country, the same rights and privileges should belong as to every other.”).    
358 See supra notes 322-326 and accompanying text. 
359 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 241 (1874) (Sen. Norwood) (“Now, it is clear that all 
citizens of the United States possess the same privileges and immunities.  In their relation 
as citizens of the federal government, are not the rights of all citizens precisely the same?  
No one can deny it.”); id. at 1-2 (Rep. Southard) (conceding that Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed equality with respect to “fundamental rights” of citizenship, including 
protections set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but denying that it had any “relation to 
the peculiar and special privileges comprehended in the bill before the House”). 
360 McConnell, supra note 5, at 1065. 
361 2 Cong. Rec. 381 (1874). 
362 Id. at 380.  Though Stephens agreed that the Amendment prohibited states from  
discriminating against their black citizens, he argued that the only “proper remedies” for a 
state’s violation were “the judgment of courts, to be rendered in such a way as Congress 
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The Slaughter-House decision was handed down in the midst of the 
Congressional debates regarding the proposed civil rights legislation and 
significantly altered the trajectory of the debates.363  Prior to that decision, 
supporters had premised their claims to constitutional authority to enact the 
bill almost exclusively on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the 
inherent equality of United States citizens.364  Justice Miller’s opinion for 
the majority thus gave the legislation’s opponents a powerful weapon to 
argue against the bill’s constitutionality.365 
The bill’s supporters initially adopted divergent arguments in response 
to the opponents’ invocations of Slaughter-House.  Some simply denied that 
the case had any bearing on Congress’s authority to pass the proposed 
legislation.366  Others argued for a narrow interpretation of the decision, 
denying that it prohibited Congressional efforts to address racial 
discrimination.367   
The most forceful challenge to the decision’s authority came from 
radical Senator George Boutwell of Massachusetts. Though Boutwell 
conceded that the decision was the “law of the case” for the parties, he 
denied that the decision had any broader legal significance.368  Boutwell 
harshly criticized Justice Miller’s majority opinion, contending that the 
majority had “made a great mistake” by suggesting “that there were two 
classes of rights appertaining to citizens of the United States: those derived 
from the Government of the United States, and those derived from the 
                                                                                                                            
might provide …”  Id. at 380-81.  
363 McConnell, supra note 5, at 998 (observing that “[t]he constitutional argument” 
regarding the bill “took an abrupt and surprising turn in 1873, when the Supreme Court 
handed down its” Slaughter-House decision and that the decision “changed the tenor of the 
debate and forced the Republicans to clarify or revise the textual basis for their 
constitutional position.”).  
364 Id. at 997-98; see also Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425-29.  
365 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 1000 (“Democratic opponents of the bill 
immediately seized on the Slaughter-House decision and quoted it over and over.”); 
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1429 (observing that “opponents [of the legislation] took up 
Slaughter-House as a chorus”). 
366 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 304 (1874) (Sen. Alcorn) (denying opinion issued by 
“another branch” of the government was binding on Congress); 2 Cong. Rec. 3453 (1873) 
(Sen. Frelinghuysen) (conceding that “as citizens of the United States we are all bound to 
respect that decision and not erect slaughter-houses in that district” but denying that it 
affected Congress’s power to adopt the proposed law). 
367 See, e.g., 3 Cong. Rec. 943 (1875) (Rep. Lynch) (claiming that Slaughter-House 
allowed legislation to redress “distinctions and discriminations … made on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude” even if Amendment did not extend to other 
contexts). 
368 3 Cong. Rec. 1792 (1875) (stating that the Court’s decision “is the law of the case, 
but it is not law beyond the case; it is not law with reference to the rights of the States 
generally, and certainly is not law for the Senate”). 
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States.”369  Invoking the Citizenship Clause, Boutwell argued: 
Now, then, what is the effect of this [i.e., the Citizenship Clause]?  First, [the 
persons described in the Clause] are citizens of the United States; and 
secondly, they are citizens of the State in which they reside. First and best, the 
most comprehensive, indeed the only definition of citizenship, is equality of 
rights. You need no other definition... . and of course one of the first rights, 
not of the citizen of the State, but of the citizen of the United States, is that in 
the State in which he chooses to reside he shall be the equal of any other 
citizen in that State. That is his first immunity, his first privilege; and therefore 
he claims as a citizen of the United States every privilege and immunity of 
citizenship in the State in which he resides ... .  370 
Boutwell argued that even if the Fourteenth Amendment had contained 
“nothing substantive” except for the declaration of citizenship and 
Congress’s Section Five enforcement power, Congress would still possess 
sufficient authority to adopt the proposed civil rights bill.371 
Despite the many imaginative attempts to explain away, distinguish or 
reject the authority of Slaughter-House, the more common response among 
Republicans was to turn away from the Citizenship and Privileges or 
Immunities Clauses as grounds of the legislation’s constitutionality and 
embrace instead an alternative textual theory grounded in the Equal 
Protection Clause. 372   Because the Slaughter-House majority had only 
obliquely touched upon that provision, the equal protection justification 
avoided a direct conflict with the Court’s authority.373  The transition from 
the citizenship-based justification to equal-protection theories did not 
happen all at once and was hardly seamless.374  But the evidence of the 
transition was clearly reflected in the final language of the bill.  Unlike 
earlier drafts, which had prohibited discrimination against “citizen[s] of the 
United States,” the final version approved by Congress and enacted into law 
                                                 
369 2 Cong. Rec. 4116 (1874).   
370 Id.   
371  Id.; see also, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 359 (1874) (speech of Sen. Morton) 
(conceding that Amendment conferred no power on Congress to protect rights that “belong 
to the citizens of States as States” but insisting that the right to be free from racial 
discrimination was not such a right because the “right of a citizen of one State to go into 
another State and there enjoy all the privileges and immunities of citizens of that State on 
equal terms is one of the highest privileges of citizens of the United States.”).       
372 See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1002. 
373  Cf. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81 (identifying the existence of 
discriminatory laws “in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided,” as “the 
evil to be remedied by” the provision and expressing doubt that the provision should apply 
in any other context). 
374 See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1001 (“So unnatural was the Slaughter-House 
reasoning that most members of Congress continued to speak in terms of privileges and 
immunities except when explicitly discussing the decision itself”).         
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tracked the language of the Equal Protection Clause by extending protection 
to “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”375  
D.  The Civil Rights Cases 
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the last significant civil rights 
legislation adopted by the Reconstruction Congress. 376   Congressional 
Republicans suffered “disastrous” losses in the elections of 1874 and the 
1876 Republican Presidential nominee, Rutherford B. Hayes, narrowly 
secured election through a brokered agreement following a disputed 
Electoral College victory tainted by allegations of pervasive voting fraud.377  
The contested election of 1876 produced the notorious “Compromise of 
1877,” which resulted in the removal of federal military authority from the 
southern states and marked the effective end of Reconstruction.378  
Following the election of 1876, federal enforcement of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 was sporadic and haphazard.379  In addition to the declining 
national political will to protect the rights of southern blacks, federal civil 
rights enforcement was hampered by the Supreme Court’s narrow 
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House and 
subsequent cases. 380   The Court adhered to this pattern of narrow 
interpretation in its 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 381  its first 
decision addressing the constitutionality of the private discrimination 
provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act. 
In crafting the private discrimination provisions of the 1875 Act, 
Congressional Republicans had specifically targeted institutions that were 
assumed to operate under a common law or statutory duty to serve all 
members of the public without discrimination, such as inns, common 
carriers and licensed providers of public accommodations. Supporters thus 
contended that the law did not create any new legal rights or obligations but 
merely provided a means for enforcing rights to which all citizens were 
                                                 
375 Id. at 1070 (observing that the changed language “reflected the doctrinal shift from 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Equal Protection Clause” as the basis for the 
bill). 
376 McConnell, supra note 347, at 136.  
377 McConnell, supra note 5, at 1088-89.       
378 McConnell, supra note 347, at 127-30.  The background of the disputed Election of 
1876 and the Compromise of 1877 are described in FONER, supra note 172, at 564-87. 
379 McConnell, supra note 5, at 1087-88. 
380 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (invalidating portions of Ku 
Klux Act of 1871); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that right to 
assemble and right to keep and bear arms were not privileges or immunities of national 
citizenship that Congress had power to protect).   
381 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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already entitled.382  Justice Bradley’s opinion for the eight-Justice majority 
rejected the proponents’ constitutional theory, holding that “civil rights, 
such as are guarantied by the constitution against state aggression, cannot 
be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by state 
authority … .”383   
The Court’s lone dissenter, Justice Harlan, complained that Bradley’s 
decision had “proceed[ed] ... upon grounds entirely too narrow and 
artificial ...”384  Picking up on Bradley’s concession that Section Two of the 
Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress “power to pass all laws necessary 
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery,”385 Harlan first 
contended that the law could be defended as a proper exercise of that 
constitutional power.386   
Harlan then turned to the Fourteenth Amendment, focusing specifically 
and extensively on the significance of the Citizenship Clause.  Harlan 
argued that “[t]he citizenship … acquired by” the former slaves “in virtue of 
an affirmative grant by the nation,” could be “protected not alone by the 
judicial branch of the government, but by congressional legislation of a 
primary direct character” pursuant to Congress’s Section Five power. 387  
Harlan observed that the “essential inquiry” in determining the scope of 
such power was “what, if any, right, privilege, or immunity was given by 
the nation to colored persons when they were made citizens of the state in 
which they reside?”388   
Harlan asserted that there was at least one right, “if there be no others” 
that was “secured to colored citizens of the United States—as between them 
and their [own] respective states—by the grant to them of state citizenship,” 
namely “exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil right 
belonging to citizens of the white race in the same state.”389  According to 
Harlan: 
Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of civil rights 
                                                 
382  See McConnell, supra note 5, at 992-97 (describing supporters’ constitutional 
theory); see also Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425 (observing that “the private persons 
covered by the 1875 Act were those already under a duty to serve the public without 
discrimination.”). 
383 109 U.S. at 17.   
384 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
385 Id. at 20-21.  Bradley rejected the claim that the Thirteenth Amendment provided 
the requisite constitutional authority for the 1875 Act by denying that racial discrimination 
by common carriers, public accommodations and similar facilities was an “incident” of 
slavery.  Id. at 22-23. 
386 Id. at 34-37 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
387 Id.  
388 Id. at 47. 
389 Id. at 48. 
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among citizens of every race in the same State. It is fundamental in American 
citizenship that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no discrimination by 
the State, or its officers, or by individuals or corporations exercising public 
functions or authority, against any citizen because of his race or previous 
condition of servitude.390 
Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases is today one of the best-
remembered articulations of the “equal citizenship” interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment expressed during the Reconstruction era.391  It was 
also among the last. The ascendance of the Slaughter-House “dual 
citizenship” theory, which by 1883 had become firmly entrenched in 
Supreme Court doctrine, rendered Harlan’s effort to revive the Citizenship 
Clause as a source of legally enforceable equality rights a “lost cause.”392  
IV. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE 
The foregoing discussion has focused on surveying the copious 
historical evidence demonstrating that at least one widely shared 
understanding of “citizenship” at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
enactment entailed a commitment to extending equal civil rights to all 
persons legally recognized as “citizens.”  It remains to be shown, however, 
that this understanding should lead self-professed originalists to embrace an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause that 
encompasses such an “equal citizenship” component.  This Part assesses the 
equal citizenship interpretation of the Citizenship Clause in light of the two 
leading theories of originalist interpretation—original intent originalism and 
original public meaning originalism.  This Part also considers how the equal 
citizenship interpretation of the Citizenship Clause relates to the more 
explicit equality guarantee set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. 
A.  The Equal Citizenship Interpretation and Originalist Methodology 
Originalism has been famously described as a “theory working itself 
pure.”393  A perhaps more fitting description might be that of originalism as 
a “big tent” comprising diverse, and to some extent, conflicting theories 
                                                 
390 Id.  
391 See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L. 
J. 330, 355-56 (2006) (citing Harlan’s dissent as support for the equal citizenship 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreward: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1977) (same). 
392 Benedict, supra note 347, at 76-77; see also Karst, supra note 391, at 19 (observing 
that Bradley’s opinion for the majority in the Civil Rights Cases “sealed the fate of the 
equal citizenship principle for some seventy years.”). 
393   Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003). 
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united by a core commitment to the interpretive primacy of the “fixed” 
meaning of the constitutional text at the time of enactment.394  The existence 
of significant diversity among originalist theories complicates efforts to 
make definitive claims regarding whether a particular result either is or is 
not consistent with “originalism” as an interpretive methodology. At a 
minimum, such claims must be attentive to the diversity of originalist 
theories and, where necessary, clearly explain the particular version of 
“originalism” that is driving one’s argument.  
Though it is possible to categorize originalist theories across a range of 
dimensions, it is common to divide such theories into two broad families—
“original intent” theories, which focus on the intentions or understandings 
of the particular historical actors who participated in the relevant drafting 
and/or ratification processes, and “original public meaning” theories, which 
focus on how the relevant constitutional text would most likely have been 
understood by a hypothetical “reasonable person” at the time of 
enactment.395  Over time, the weight of academic originalist opinion has 
shifted away from intent-focused theories, which had predominated during 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, and toward approaches that emphasize original 
public meaning. 396  Despite this shift in emphasis, intent-based theories 
continue to attract the support of prominent adherents.397   
In the two subparts that follow, I consider how proponents of original 
intent and original public meaning theories, respectively, might assess the 
case for recognizing an equality component as inhering in the original 
meaning of the Citizenship Clause based on the evidence surveyed in Parts I 
                                                 
394 See, e.g., Thomas Colby & Peter Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244 
(2009) (arguing that “originalism” is “not a single, coherent, unified theory of 
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories … 
.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, at 2 (Illinois Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (acknowledging diversity 
among originalist theories but describing the proposition “that the meaning … of a given 
Constitutional provision was fixed at the time the provision was framed and ratified” as a 
core commitment uniting the “family of originalist theories”).  
395  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. 
L. REV. 751, 758-61 (2009) (identifying “original intent” and “original public meaning” 
approaches as the “two leading positive theories of [originalist] interpretation”). 
396  See, e.g., Colby & Smith, 394 note 409, at 247-55 (describing the shift from 
“original intentions” originalism to “original public meaning” originalism). 
397 Prominent intentionalist originalists include Keith Whittington, Richard S. Kay, 
Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash.  See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 110-59 (1999); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009); Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation 
Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).  
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through III above.  In view of the shear diversity among originalist theories, 
it may not be possible to construct an argument that will fully satisfy all 
originalists.  But as the following subparts will show, a compelling 
argument can be made for recognizing an equality component in the 
Citizenship Clause under both an original intent and an original public 
meaning framework.398   
1. Equal Citizenship and Original Intent 
Proponents of original intent theories generally argue that the meaning 
of language necessarily depends upon the intentions or understandings of 
some actual or assumed speaker.399  And because the Constitution’s status as 
law derives from its enactment by actual, historically situated framers and 
ratifiers, original intent theorists argue that the actual subjective intentions 
and understandings of these historical actors, rather than the understanding 
of some imagined “reasonable person,” must furnish the standard for 
interpretive correctness.400    
                                                 
398 At a minimum, the historical evidence surveyed in the preceding Parts should be 
sufficient to convince proponents of either approach that the equality interpretation 
defended in this Article falls within the broad range of historically plausible interpretations 
of the constitutional text.  Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 
659, 690 (1987) (observing that history “sometimes reveals a range of ‘original 
understandings’” rather than a single determinate understanding).  For some originalists, 
this conclusion alone would likely suffice to justify judicial invalidation of federal laws 
that subject citizens to legal inequalities on the basis of race.  Cf.  JACK BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM, 267-68 (2011) (defending a version of originalism that emphasizes objective 
meaning of the text and values history primarily “as a check on our assumptions about 
what” meanings the text can plausibly bear); see also id. at 249-54 & 433 n.150 (arguing 
that Bolling and its associated doctrine are consistent with the objective meanings of 
multiple provisions, including the Citizenship Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause).  Other originalists, however, insist on a more demanding standard that 
would limit courts to enforcing only the “most probable” interpretation from among the 
range of textually and historically plausible candidates.  See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, 
supra note 395, at 779 (arguing that interpreters should “choose the most probable 
interpretation available with the aid of interpretive rules—norms internal to the enterprise 
of originalism.”).  The analysis in the subparts that follow will be addressed primarily to 
those who advocate this more demanding standard. 
399 See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 397, at 969 (asserting that “one cannot 
interpret texts without reference to the intentions of some author.”); Richard S. Kay, 
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and 
Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988) (“Words are only meaningless marks on 
paper or random sounds in the air until we posit an intelligence which selected and 
arranged them.”).  
400 See, e.g., Kay, supra note 397, at 970 (arguing that substituting ordinary meaning 
for intended meaning “in interpreting a legal text raises an acute issue of authority because 
it replaces the actual lawmaker with a hypothetical normal speaker of the language.”).   
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One possible objection to the equal citizenship interpretation of the 
Citizenship Clause that might be asserted from an original intent 
perspective arises from the somewhat unusual circumstances through which 
the provision came to be included in the Amendment.  As discussed above, 
the provision was inserted late in the drafting process with relatively little 
debate or discussion and seems to have been added largely for the purpose 
of clarifying who would be entitled to claim the benefits of Section One’s 
separate Privileges or Immunities Clause.401   Based on this background, 
Professor Siegel contends that “[f]or originalists wedded to the constitution 
makers’ specific intent, the Citizenship Clause can be read only to specify 
those who participate in the status” of citizenship but “cannot be read to 
secure for status holders any particular panoply of rights.”402   
If one focuses narrowly on the specific motivations that drove the 
decision to include a definition of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
this objection has some force.  The Congressional debates preceding the 
Amendment’s enactment suggest that the drafters understood the 
Amendment’s separate Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection 
Clauses as the primary constraints on state discrimination.403  The principal 
motivation for including the Citizenship Clause was, as Siegel observes, 
simply to clarify who would be protected by the former provision. 404  
Moreover, there seems to have been virtually no explicit discussion of the 
potential effect of the Clause on the permissibility of discrimination by the 
federal government during the framing and ratification debates. 405   An 
original intent originalist who insists on identifying the relevant “intent” as 
encompassing only those consequences specifically foreseen and discussed 
during the enactment process may thus have difficulty accepting the 
Citizenship Clause as the source of a judicially enforceable equality norm 
applicable to the federal government. 
Without denying that some original intent originalists might insist upon 
a similarly narrow approach to identifying the relevant “original intent,” it 
is clear that such a narrow focus is neither compelled by the theory of 
original intent, as such, nor embraced by all original intent originalists.406  
                                                 
401 See Part II.D supra. 
402 Siegel, supra note 19, at 580. 
403 McConnell, supra note 5, at 997-1005. 
404  See supra notes 248-256 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Wade’s 
proposal to clarify the Privileges or Immunities Clause and subsequent addition of 
Citizenship Clause).  
405 See Siegel, supra note 19, at 585 (“[I]n extensive congressional and public debates, 
no one ever specifically intimated the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section had any effect 
on the national government beyond settling the vexed definition of citizenship.”). 
406  See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 397, at 178-79 (distinguishing between 
extratextual “motivations” or “expectations” that drove the decision to include a particular 
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For example, Professor Richard Kay, one of the leading modern proponents 
of original intent originalism, argues that “[a]s a practical matter, an 
approach which relies on ordinary meanings will usually result in the same 
interpretation that would follow from original intentions adjudication.”407  
As Kay explains: 
We expect the constitution-makers to use words according to ordinary usage 
at the time of enactment. The best evidence of the enactors’ intent is the 
language they used. Indeed, in many cases, any other conclusion is so unlikely 
that an explicit reference to extrinsic evidence of intent is unnecessary. 
Certainly, when most readers agree that a particular clause or phrase means 
one thing, the burden of persuasion ought to be on the advocate of some other 
meaning. Such a presumption is fully consistent with original intentions 
adjudication . . . .408  
Because enactors choose language deliberately for the purpose of conveying 
their intended meaning and because such language is carefully considered 
during the drafting and ratification processes, Kay argues that occasions 
where the intended meaning of a text fails to match its objective public 
meaning should be “extremely rare.”409  In fact, Kay contends that any such 
divergence would involve “some kind of mistake by the rulemakers” in 
attempting to convey their intended meaning.410   
Thus, an original intent originalist working within a framework similar 
to Kay’s, should presume that the “original intent” underlying the 
Citizenship Clause corresponds to the public meaning of its text at the time 
of enactment absent compelling evidence of some “mistake” by the enactors 
that caused its public meaning to diverge from the meaning they 
collectively intended.  Kay suggests two possible categories of “mistakes” 
that may cause the intended meaning of a constitutional provision to diverge 
from its original public meaning.  The first category involves a simple 
                                                                                                                            
provision in the Constitution and the “illocutionary intentions” conveyed by the text itself 
and arguing that only the latter should be considered binding); cf. RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
363 (1977) (defining “original intent” as “the meaning attached by the framers to the words 
they employed in the Constitution.”). 
407  Id. at 234; see also Kay, supra note 397, at 713 (contending that “the public 
meaning of the constitutional text will almost always mirror the intentions of the human 
beings who drafted and approved it.”). Kay’s work is unusually detailed in specifying a 
methodology by which the “intentions” of the relevant constitutional enactors may be 
discerned and aggregated together into a single collective “original intent.”  See, e.g., 
Solum, supra note 394, at 42 (crediting Kay with providing the “best answers to the 
collective intentions problem”). For this reason, I focus particular attention on Kay’s 
methodology for identifying the relevant “original intent” of the Citizenship Clause. 
408 Kay, supra note 399, at 234-35 (footnotes omitted). 
409 Kay, supra note 397, at 712. 
410 Id. 
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drafting or transcription error of the type typically associated with the 
“scrivener’s error” doctrine in statutory interpretation. 411   The second 
category involves situations in which the scope of a constitutional provision 
is vague or otherwise unclear such that results that were not collectively 
intended by all the enactors whose assent was necessary to enactment might 
nonetheless fall within the literal meaning of the enacted text.412   
Though these two categories are conceptually distinct and, on Kay’s 
account, call for different methods of resolution,413 they may, for present 
purposes, be collapsed into a single overarching inquiry—namely, whether, 
based on the available evidence of the intentions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers and ratifiers, we can be confident that a specific 
proposal to prohibit the federal government from discriminating against 
United States citizens would have been rejected.  If this question is 
answered in the affirmative, we can be reasonably confident that 
interpreting the Citizenship Clause to achieve this result would be 
inconsistent with the original intent of the relevant enactors, even if a 
hypothetical “reasonable person” at the time of enactment might have read 
the provision more broadly.414  By contrast, if this question is answered in 
the negative, a proponent of Kay’s version of original intent originalism 
should have relatively little difficulty concluding that the “original intent” 
of the Citizenship Clause on this particular issue is consistent with the 
“public meaning” of the enacted text. 
In assessing the evidence of the enactors’ intentions on this point, it will 
be useful to proceed in stages.  As an initial matter, it seems abundantly 
clear that the Citizenship Clause was intended to bind both state and federal 
actors.  This intention is plainly reflected in language of the provision, 
which, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment’s second sentence, is not limited 
to “state” conduct.415  Further evidence on this point is provided by the 
                                                 
411 Id. at 713. 
412 Id. 
413 Kay argues that mistakes of the first variety should be resolved by giving the text its 
obviously intended meaning rather than its unintended objective meaning.  Id. at 713-14.  
Somewhat more controversially, he urges that “mistakes” involving vague and open-ended 
provisions should be resolved by narrowing the provision to a “core” intended meaning 
shared by the group of enactors whose assent was necessary to enactment, excluding any 
“idiosyncratic” meanings that were held by only a minority of the enacting coalition.  Id. at 
713; see also Kay, supra note 399, at 248-51; cf. Brett Boyce, Originalism and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 954-55 (1998) (criticizing Kay’s 
proposed “core meaning” approach for summing different understandings).   
414  Cf. Kay, supra note 397, at 714-21 (criticizing public meaning originalism as 
insufficiently connected to the democratic processes that rendered the constitutional text 
authoritative and as unduly prone to manipulation by modern interpreters). 
415
 If anything, the applicability of the Clause to the federal government would have 
been even more apparent than its applicability to the states given the relevant background 
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remarks of Senator Jacob Howard, the provision’s principal sponsor, during 
the Senate debate of May 30, 1866.  During that debate, Senator Doolittle, 
who opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, asserted that the proposed 
Citizenship Clause demonstrated that the Amendment’s supporters 
entertained doubts regarding Congress’s authority to confer citizenship by 
statute, as it had done in the earlier-adopted Civil Rights bill.416  Howard 
denied Doolittle’s assertion and insisted that the provision’s goal was to 
entrench the citizenship definition against future repeal by a pro-Southern 
Congress: 
We desired to put this question of citizenship, and the rights of citizens and 
freedmen under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power of such 
gentlemen as the Senator from Wisconsin, who would pull the whole system 
up by the roots and destroy it, and expose the freedmen again to the 
oppression of their old masters.417 
This response would have been unavailable to Howard had he not 
understood the Citizenship Clause as a restraint on federal as well as state 
lawmaking and no other Senator questioned Howard’s explanation.  
It is equally apparent that many members of the 39th Congress shared 
the understanding that United States citizenship carried with it certain rights, 
including, paradigmatically, a right to equal legal treatment at the hands of 
government.  The legislative debates concerning both Section One and its 
predecessor provision in the Civil Rights bill abound with statements 
evincing this understanding. 418   Indeed, my review of the debates has 
revealed only a single occasion where a member of Congress expressed a 
contrary understanding.419  Those remarks not only failed to persuade but 
seem to have sparked genuine puzzlement on the part of those to whom they 
were addressed.420 
Combining these two understandings—namely, that the Citizenship 
Clause bound the federal government and that citizenship required legal 
                                                                                                                            
interpretive presumptions applied to constitutional provisions at the time.  See Barron v. 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (holding that “the limitations on power,” set 
forth in the Constitution “if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we think 
necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument.”).   
416 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1866). 
417 Id. 
418 See supra Parts II.A-II.C.  For particularly clear illustrations of this understanding, 
see the text accompanying supra notes 182-192 (Sen. Trumbull), 197 (Rep. Wilson), 202-
204 (Sen. Van Winkle), 269 (Sen. Howard). 
419  See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing remarks of Senator 
Henderson during the debate over the Civil Rights Act). 
420 See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text (quoting reactions to Henderson’s 
remarks).  Even Henderson himself seemed to embrace the broader conception of 
citizenship in a subsequent speech addressing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause.  See supra note 273. 
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equality with respect to civil rights—yields a fairly strong inference that the 
federal government, like the states, was constitutionally required to respect 
the legal equality of all U.S. citizens.   
There remains, however, the question of why this specific understanding, 
if intended, failed to leave any clear trace in the legislative record.421  Two 
plausible answers suggest themselves.  First, the central problem at which 
both Section One and the subsequent Reconstruction-era civil rights 
legislation were targeted was the problem of state discrimination.    
Constitutional debates surrounding these issues understandably focused on 
the source of Congress’s power to redress such state abuse and the scope of 
that power.  By contrast, Congressional efforts to eliminate racially 
discriminatory federal laws and policies—many of which had already been 
eradicated during the Civil War period422—raised no comparable questions 
of constitutional authority.  Because members of the Reconstruction 
Congress generally supported efforts to eliminate race-based discrimination 
in federal laws on policy grounds, invocations of the Constitution in such 
contexts would have been largely beside the point. It is thus hardly 
surprising that Reconstruction-era lawmakers devoted relatively little 
attention to the Amendment’s effect on the permissibility of federal 
discrimination.  
A second explanation for the lack of explicit discussion of the 
Citizenship Clause as a source for a federal constitutional equality 
requirement arises from the fact that many Reconstruction-era lawmakers 
assumed that the federal government was already prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of race before the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
enactment. 423   Though Republican lawmakers were not always clear or 
consistent in identifying the precise source of such a requirement,424 it is 
                                                 
421 See supra note 405. 
422 Siegel, supra note 19, at 549; see also id. at 559 (noting that “the Civil War and 
Reconstruction Congresses repealed almost all laws granting preferences to ‘whites.’”).  
423 See, e.g., Mark Graber, A Constitutional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why “No State” 
Does Not Mean “No State”, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 89 (1993) (“Leading 
participants in the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment treated as common knowledge 
the proposition that the pre-Civil War Constitution already prohibited federal laws 
inconsistent with equal protection.”); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the 
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 787-88 (1984) 
(“[T]here is substantial evidence that the framers of the fourteenth amendment ... believed 
that Congress was, and indeed always had been, bound by the principles that the 
amendment extended to the states”). 
424 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 398, at 250-51 (discussing belief by Bingham and 
others that “equal protection” was synonymous with the Fifth Amendment’s “due process 
of law”); Siegel, supra note 19, at 553-54 (discussing Sumner’s argument that the 
Declaration of Independence prohibited the federal government from discriminating on the 
basis of race); cf. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2549 (1866) (Rep. Stevens) (asserting 
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clear that many viewed the requirement as inhering in the very nature of 
United States citizenship itself. 425  Given the prevailing view among 
Congressional Republicans that the Citizenship Clause was merely 
declaratory of what existing law already required,426 it is hardly surprising 
that such lawmakers did not point to that specific provision as the source of 
the federal government’s obligation to treat all citizens equally—a 
requirement they presumed would have existed even if the Fourteenth 
Amendment was never added to the Constitution.427 
In arguing that the equal citizenship interpretation is consistent with the 
extrinsic evidence of the enactors’ intentions, I do not wish to be understood 
as making the stronger claim that such evidence is so overwhelming as to 
compel such an interpretation without regard to the objective meaning of 
the enacted text.  As discussed above, the original version of Section One 
that emerged from the Joint Committee in April 1866 contained no express 
limitation on federal conduct whatsoever. 428   Had this version of the 
                                                                                                                            
that “every one of [the] provisions” proposed to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment 
(including the Equal Protection Clause) was already “asserted, in some form or other, in 
our DECLARATION or organic law” and that the principal Amendment was needed 
because the existing limitations applied only to the federal government and not the states).   
425 See supra  note 418.  
426  See supra notes 170 & 193 and accompanying text (discussing pre-Fourteenth 
Amendment Republican belief that native birth alone established citizenship). 
427  The declaratory understanding of the Citizenship Clause does suggest that 
Congressional Republicans most likely expected that the Clause would only clarify, rather 
than change, the content of existing law.  It does not follow, however, that they did not 
understand or intend the provision’s language to require equality.  To see why, consider the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which opens with a declaration that “[t]he Senate of the United 
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State” before providing that such 
Senators are to be “elected by the people” of the State. U.S. Const. amd. XVII.  The 
enactors of this Amendment clearly expected that their “elected by the people” language 
would change the existing practice of allowing each state’s legislature to select its Senators. 
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  But they almost certainly did not expect that the language 
providing for “two Senators from each State” would change existing law, as that language 
merely repeated language that already appeared in the Constitution. Id.  It does not follow, 
however, that the “two Senators” requirement was not part of the Amendment’s intended 
meaning.  If, by some bizarre chain of events, the meaning of “two Senators” at the time of 
the Seventeenth Amendment’s adoption had somehow diverged from its original intended 
meaning at the time of Article I’s adoption, it would not change the fact that the adopters of 
the later amendment intended their own understanding of “two Senators” despite their 
failure to recognize the inconsistency between that portion of their Amendment and the 
intended meaning of the preexisting constitutional rule. Similarly, if the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers understood citizenship to require equality, then it seems natural to 
read the citizenship declaration they adopted as embodying that understanding, even if 
those framers had no conscious awareness that they were changing the content of existing 
law. Cf. Williams, supra note 13, at 500-09 (elaborating similar argument with respect to 
the relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses). 
428 See Part II.C supra. 
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Amendment been enacted into law without the addition of the Citizenship 
Clause, an original intent originalist might have a very difficult time 
accepting that Section One could nonetheless be interpreted to bind the 
federal government.429  
But if one accepts the seemingly uncontroversial claim that the 
objective meaning of the enacted text provides strong evidence of intended 
meaning, 430  then such objective meaning should provide an important 
interpretive baseline against which claims about intended meaning may be 
judged.  Identifying that baseline involves an inquiry that largely 
corresponds to the methodology of original public meaning originalism, 
which will be considered in the following subpart.431  For present purposes, 
the critical point is simply that the extrinsic evidence of the relevant 
enactors’ intentions provides no grounds for confidence that the enactors 
specifically intended to leave the federal government free to discriminate.432  
As such, there is little basis for believing that original intent originalism and 
original public meaning originalism would point to inconsistent 
interpretations on this particular issue.   
2. Equal Citizenship and Original Public Meaning  
Unlike original intent theorists, proponents of original public meaning 
originalism reject the proposition that the “meaning” of constitutional 
language is equivalent to the meaning subjectively understood or intended 
by the actual actors who participated in the drafting and ratification 
processes.433   Instead, most original public meaning originalists identify the 
relevant “meaning” as the objective public meaning of the constitutional 
text, when read in context, as it would have been understood by a 
reasonable observer at the time of the provision’s adoption.434   
                                                 
429  Professor Mark Graber has suggested such an argument, contending that the 
Amendment’s framers “chose the limiting phrase ‘No State shall deny’ only because they 
believed that the Constitution already prohibited federal officials from making arbitrary 
and discriminatory distinctions among individuals.”  Graber, supra note 423 at 91.  For a 
critique of Graber’s argument, see Siegel, supra note 19, at 573-78. 
430 See Kay, supra note 397, at 712. 
431 See id. at 712-14 (discussing overlap between original intent and original public 
meaning approaches).  
432 See also infra note 468. 
433  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of 
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 196 n.20 (2001) (“[M]ost modern 
originalists … reject any strict reliance on direct historical evidence of founding-era 
beliefs”). 
434 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra  note 246, at 92 (“[O]riginal meaning’ originalism seeks 
the public or objective meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in 
the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra 
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Though different public meaning originalists describe the “reasonable 
observer” at the center of their methodological approach in subtly different 
ways,435 most agree on a handful of key characteristics such an individual 
should possess, including the ability to competently speak and understand 
English and at least a reasonable degree of familiarity with the provision’s 
background political and legal context and the particular circumstances that 
motivated its adoption.436  To determine the objective public meaning that 
the relevant constitutional language would have conveyed to such a 
hypothetical observer, public meaning originalists consult a broad range of 
interpretive sources, including standard dictionary definitions, 
contemporaneous legal treatises and judicial opinions, public statements 
regarding the provision during the drafting and ratification processes, and 
early post-enactment interpretations and applications of the provision.437 
 Accepting these methodological premises as a starting point, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that most public meaning originalists would 
consider the full range of materials surveyed in Parts I through III as 
bearing on the most probable original public meaning of the Citizenship 
Clause.  A hypothetical reasonable person at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s enactment could at least potentially have been aware of all 
the materials surveyed in Parts I and II, all of which pre-date the 
Amendment’s adoption.  And although the early interpretations surveyed in 
Part III would not have been available at the time of enactment, they are 
nonetheless probative evidence of how actual interpreters at a point close in 
the time to the Amendment’s enactment understood and discussed its 
                                                                                                                            
note 395, at 761 n.29 (“Most original public meaning theorists rely on a reasonable reader 
or author.”).  
435 See, e.g., Kay, supra note 397, at 721-24 (describing various formulations public 
meaning originalists have used to describe the hypothetical “reasonable person”).       
436 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the original 
meaning of the text as understood by “intelligent and informed people of the time”); 
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 393, at 1132 (focusing on the understanding of a 
“hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader”). 
437  See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 393, at 1148 (identifying various 
“commonly-accepted” sources of original public meaning, including public statements 
made during ratification process, “early congressional, executive, and judicial precedents” 
and “the works of early commentators on the Constitution”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & 
Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (“In 
order to recapture the objective original public meaning of Section One, it is helpful to 
consult extratextual sources that document the events that led to the writing of the 
Amendment, the intellectual history of the times, contemporaneous dictionaries, the 
discussion of the Amendment, and newspaper accounts at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption”). 
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terms.438   
Viewing the Citizenship Clause in light of this background context 
gives rise to a strong inference that a hypothetical “reasonable person” at 
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption would most likely have 
recognized the Clause as doing something more than conferring a formal 
legal status on the persons it recognizes as “citizens of the United States.”  
During the antebellum period, both the pro-Southern theory underlying the 
denial of free black citizenship and the abolitionist theory supporting free 
blacks’ entitlement to equal civil rights were premised on the assumption 
that “citizenship” carried with it an entitlement to certain legal rights, 
including the right to equal treatment at the hands of government.439 This 
assumption was reflected in numerous antebellum legal opinions, including 
Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion—the specific holding that drove 
the decision to include a definition of citizenship in the Constitution.440  The 
assumption was also clearly reflected in the extensive legislative debates 
surrounding the Citizenship Clause’s predecessor provision in the Civil 
Rights Act as well as in the more abbreviated Senate debate preceding the 
adoption of the Citizenship Clause itself and the subsequent ratification 
debates in the states.441   
There are, however, at least two potential objections that might be raised 
against the equal citizenship interpretation of the Citizenship Clause under a 
public meaning originalist framework—one grounded in the provision’s 
text and the other in the background historical and legal context against 
which it was enacted.  
The textual challenge arises from the absence of a federal equivalent to 
the “No state shall ...” language that introduces the Privileges or Immunities, 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Amendment’s second 
sentence.  The absence of parallel prohibitory language explicitly binding 
the federal government to the restrictions expressly imposed upon the states 
through the latter set of provisions might reasonably be thought to invite the 
inference that the Amendment should be read to impose no similar restraints 
on federal conduct.442 
While an express prohibition of federal discrimination would have left 
                                                 
438 See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 393, at 1182 (arguing that post-enactment 
evidence “is probative of original linguistic meaning and should be consulted even when” 
pre-enactment evidence “is seemingly unambiguous.”).   
439 See Part I.B.3 supra. 
440 See supra Part I.C.1. 
441 See Part III.A-D supra.   
442 See Siegel, supra note 19, at 585 (suggesting that “originalists may decide that the 
… failure [of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers] to specifically constrain the power of 
the national government to discriminate indicates a determination to leave that power 
undiminished”).   
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little room for doubt, it does not necessarily follow that the absence of such 
express language should be understood to negate reasonable inferences that 
might otherwise be drawn from the Citizenship Clause as a standalone 
provision.  As an initial matter, while it is true that most rights-conferring 
provisions of the federal Constitution contain explicit mandatory or 
prohibitory language,443 this is not the only textual formulation capable of 
conveying an intention to confer rights.  Consider the following two 
alternative formulations for recognizing a right to be free from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” the first drawn from the Fourth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution and the second from the Declaration 
of Rights in Massachusetts’ Constitution of 1780: 
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated ...444 
2. Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all 
his possessions.445 
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which contains the familiar “shall not” 
language used in most of the federal Constitution’s rights-conferring 
provisions, the Massachusetts provision merely recognizes the existence of 
the right without expressly declaring that it “shall not” be infringed.  But the 
omission of express prohibitory language in the Massachusetts provision 
does not render it any less clear than its federal counterpart.  Because the 
prohibition on infringement inheres in the very nature of a “right,”  the 
textual recognition of the right itself connotes that governmental actors may 
not violate that right even if such a prohibition is not expressly spelled out 
on the face of the constitutional text. 446 
Of course, the Citizenship Clause stops short of even explicitly 
acknowledging a right to equal treatment at the hands of government as an 
incident of citizenship.  Instead the Clause merely declares who is entitled 
                                                 
443 See, e.g., Gregory Brazeal, A Machine Made of Words: Our Incompletely Theorized 
Constitution, 9 UNIV. N.H. L. REV. 425, 435 (2011) (“Unlike Declarations of Rights in 
many state constitutions, the federal Bill of Rights consists [almost] entirely of concise, 
functional rules in the form of ‘shall’ and ‘shall not’ statements …”). 
444 U.S. CONST. amd. IV. 
445 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV (1780). 
446 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 27 (1993) (“The term correlative to the [constitutional] claim-
right is, of course, the duty incumbent upon officials and others to respect and uphold that 
right.”); cf. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31-32 (1914) (describing correlative relationship 
between a grant of “rights” and the corresponding “duties” that arise as a result). 
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to citizenship without saying anything specific about what that status 
entails.447  But while the Citizenship Clause alone does not explicitly require 
the federal government to accord any particular rights to its citizens, the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole does something quite similar.  The 
Citizenship Clause requires the federal government to recognize certain 
individuals—i.e., those born or naturalized in the United States and subject 
to its jurisdiction—as its citizens.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause 
recognizes a class of “privileges or immunities” that belong to “citizens of 
the United States” and prohibits the states from “mak[ing]” or “enforc[ing]” 
any laws that “abridge” such rights.448  While the federal government is not 
similarly prohibited from “abridging” such rights by the express terms of 
the Amendment’s second sentence, reading that sentence in conjunction 
with the first sentence’s mandate that certain persons be recognized as 
“citizens of the United States” gives rise to a strong inference that the 
federal government, like the states, is bound to respect the “privileges or 
immunities” that belong to such individuals.449  As in the above-described 
example drawn from the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the textual 
recognition of certain rights as belonging to “citizens of the United States” 
suggests that the United States, like the states, may not abridge those 
rights.450  
Moreover, even if construed strictly as a standalone provision, apart 
from any additional inferences that might be drawn from the Privileges or 
                                                 
447 See Smith, supra note 62, at 683 (observing that “technically, the language of the 
first sentence of Section 1 does not provide a true ‘definition’ of the term ‘citizen,’ but 
rather a statement of the conditions sufficient for attaining the status of ‘citizen’ of a state 
as well as of the United States.”). 
448 Cf. Lawrence Solum, Incorporation and Original Meaning, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 
ISSUES 409, 423 (2009) (“The semantic content of the [Privileges or Immunities Clause] is 
sufficient, by itself, to support the conclusion that at least some rights must be included—
otherwise the clause would be without legal effect.”).   
449 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 29, at 87 (“[T]he text of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment 
recognizes and confirms the existence of privileges and immunities of national citizenship.  
If the states may not abridge these privileges or immunities, a fortiori neither may the 
federal government.”).   
450 See supra notes 444-446 and accompanying text.  This inference is particularly 
strong if the Privileges or Immunities Clause is understood to refer to “privileges or 
immunities” that persons possess by virtue of their United States citizenship.  On this 
reading, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be equivalent to a declaration that 
United States citizenship does, in fact, confer certain privileges and immunities.  It should 
be noted that this is not the only possible way to make textual sense of the Amendment’s 
reference to “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United Sates.”  See, e.g., Solum, 
supra note 448, at 423-26 (surveying various possible readings of this phrase).  But this 
reading is a very plausible way of understanding the text and is consistent with the way 
numerous contemporaneous interpreters actually described the “privileges or immunities” 
referred to in the Clause.  See infra notes 463-464 and accompanying text.            
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Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause alone could reasonably be 
construed to require that the United States refrain from abridging whatever 
inherent rights its citizens were understood to possess by virtue of their 
citizenship.  Sometimes, the mere textual recognition of a preexisting legal 
status or concept might be understood to incorporate the incidents or 
attributes traditionally associated with that status or concept.  For example, 
the Constitution’s textual recognition of certain public officials as 
“judges”451 might reasonably be understood “to mean not simply a judicial 
official who decides cases according to law” but rather “an official who 
possesses” at least some “of the traditional powers and immunities of 
Anglo-American judges,” such as the common law rule of absolute judicial 
immunity against damages suits.452  Nor is this example unique.  Similar 
textual arguments have been advanced in support of recognizing inherent 
attributes or incidents of other constitutionally recognized concepts, 
including “states,”453 “Indian tribes,”454 “Congress”455 and “war.”456 
If arguments of this form are acknowledged as legitimate ways of 
reasoning from the constitutional text, there seems to be little basis, at least 
in principle, to resist reading the Citizenship Clause as encompassing those 
rights that were widely recognized at the time of its adoption as traditional 
“incidents” of citizenship.   In fact, the proposition that the declaration of 
citizenship encompasses at least some rights that were not expressly 
identified in the Constitution seems difficult to resist.  For example, it 
seems dubious, under any reasonable understanding of “citizenship” (either 
in 1868 or today), that the federal government could forcibly deport persons 
                                                 
451 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III § 1 (referring to “[t]he Judges … of the supreme and 
inferior Courts …”). 
452  Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper 
Textual Basis for the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. 
U. L. REV. 819, 824 (1999).  
453 Id. at 831-60 (arguing that Constitution’s reference to “states” provides a defensible 
textual basis for immunizing certain aspects of states’ sovereign functions from federal 
regulation and control).  
454 See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 130 (2002) (arguing that Indian Commerce Clause and exclusion of 
“Indians not taxed” from the Census Clause reflects an “unquestionabl[e]” textual 
recognition of “the sovereignty of Indian tribes”).  
455 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 CHI. L. REV. 1083, 
1093-1131, 1143 (2009) (surveying historical foundations of Congress’s implied power to 
hold nonmembers in contempt and concluding “that such a power was considered inherent 
in what it meant to be a legislature”).   
456  See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304-06 (1870) 
(interpreting Congress’s power to “declare war” as encompassing “the power to prosecute 
it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted,” including 
the power to confiscate enemy property).  
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acknowledged to be “citizens” or make it a crime for them to remain within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.457   If one is prepared to 
concede that the status of “citizen” carries with it at least some 
corresponding rights and privileges (beyond the bare “privilege of writing 
‘citizen’ after your name”),458 then the question of which particular rights 
and privileges should be understood to inhere in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s declaration of constitutional citizenship under an original 
public meaning framework requires a historical and factual inquiry to 
identify the types of rights members of the ratifying generation generally 
understood “citizenship” to entail.459 
The contextual objection to interpreting the Citizenship Clause as 
encompassing a guarantee of constitutional equality stems from the 
narrower conception of “citizenship” that was embraced by Chancellor Kent, 
Justice Curtis and certain other legal commentators prior to the 
commencement of Reconstruction.460  This narrower view understood the 
status of “citizenship” to confer very few concrete rights and left 
governments free to prescribe different rules for different “classes” of 
citizens, even with respect to basic civil rights. The existence of this 
narrower conception of “citizenship,” which competed with the equally 
prominent, broader understanding throughout the antebellum period, might 
reasonably give one pause before concluding that the ratifying public at the 
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment would necessarily have 
interpreted the Citizenship Clause as encompassing the broader 
understanding.461  
                                                 
457 See, e.g., United States v. Worthy, 328 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1964) (“[I]t is 
inherent in the concept of citizenship that the citizen, when absent from the country to 
which he owes allegiance, has a right to return, again to set foot on its soil.”). 
458 Cf. CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
62-63 (1969) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “conferral of citizenship” must 
encompass some rights unless “one is prepared to say that all that relationship implies is 
the privilege of writing ‘citizen’ after your name”). 
459 In this regard, it is notable that contemporaneous dictionaries tended to define the 
term “citizen” by reference to  a bundle of rights inhering in that status, typically 
identifying “citizenship” with the right to vote and own property.  See sources cited in note 
290 above.  Though many supporters of the Amendment denied that citizenship would 
entail voting rights, see supra notes 291-294 and 322 and accompanying text, they were 
virtually unanimous in endorsing the proposition that citizenship entailed equality of basic 
civil rights.  See supra Parts II.A-D.  
460 See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (discussing Kent’s views) and 
supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text (discussing Curtis’s Dred Scott dissent). 
461 The difference between the narrow understanding of citizenship endorsed by Kent 
and Curtis and the broader understanding embraced by both southern courts and northern 
abolitionists during the antebellum era (and by most Reconstruction-era Congressional 
Republicans) reflect two markedly different conceptions of what it means to be a 
“citizen”—i.e., either a person who possesses a formal legal status, though not necessarily 
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Most textually minded originalists believe that ambiguities of this nature 
can usually be resolved by looking to the surrounding context of the 
ambiguous term, including the immediately surrounding linguistic context, 
how well each proposed meaning fits within the broader constitutional 
structure and the circumstances surrounding the provision’s enactment.462  
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, there are reasonably 
strong grounds for concluding that the broader conception of citizenship 
provides the more plausible of the two senses of “citizens” as that term is 
used in the Citizenship Clause. 
A significant problem with viewing the narrower understanding of 
citizenship as reflecting the relevant sense of the term “citizens” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s first sentence is the difficulty that such an 
interpretation would pose for interpreting the reference in the Amendment’s 
second sentence to the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”  As reflected in Senator Howard’s speech introducing the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate (before the addition of the Citizenship 
Clause), a common way of interpreting the Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause at the time of its enactment was as a protection for those 
privileges and immunities that belonged to “citizens of the United States as 
                                                                                                                            
any particular rights or privileges (under the Kent-Curtis view), or the possessor of a set of 
rights and entitlements, the possession of which inheres in and defines the status of 
citizenship (under the broader view).  See supra Section I.B.3; cf. Linda Bosniak, 
Constitutional Citizenship through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285, 1305-06 
(2002) (noting a similar distinction between “thin” and “thick” conceptions of citizenship 
in modern political and social theory).   
Identifying which of these two conceptions reflects the most probable original 
meaning of the term “citizens” in the Fourteenth Amendment involves a problem of 
ambiguity in that there are two distinct senses of the term from which to choose; the term 
“citizens,” particularly as used in its broader sense, might also be vague to the extent there 
was disagreement regarding how broadly the rights inhering in the status of citizenship 
should be understood to extend.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 67 (2012) (explaining that “language is 
ambiguous when it has more than one sense” and “is vague when its meaning admits of 
borderline cases that cannot definitively be ruled in or out of its meaning”).  Though public 
meaning originalists generally agree that problems of ambiguity will usually be resolvable 
by looking to the surrounding historical and linguistic context of a given provision, see 
infra note 462, they express differing views regarding the extent to which such interpretive 
methods are capable of resolving vagueness.  Compare Barnett, supra at 68 (arguing that 
vague provisions, even when interpreted contextually, “simply do not contain the 
information necessary to decide matters of application”), with, McGinnis & Rappaport, 
supra note 395, at 774-76 (predicting that constitutional vagueness will usually be 
resolvable through traditional interpretive techniques). 
462 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 461, at 68 (“When it comes to resolving ambiguity, 
the context of a statement usually reveals which sense is meant.”); Rappaport, supra note 
452, at 823 (“When judges are resolving an ambiguity, textualism requires that they take 
various considerations into account,” including structure, purpose and background history).   
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such,”463 that is, those rights that citizens enjoyed by virtue of their status as 
United States citizens.464  Another common view of that provision was that 
it would protect (at least) the types of non-discrimination rights identified in 
Corfield and in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.465   
But under the narrower of the two available senses of “citizenship,” at 
least one of these understandings must have been mistaken.  If one’s status 
as a “citizen of the United States” conferred no or very few legal rights or 
privileges, then prohibiting states from abridging the “privileges or 
immunities” belonging to persons in their capacity as United States citizens 
would not support a Corfield-type equality rule. Rather, the prohibition of 
abridging the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” 
would yield, at most, a relatively narrow set of rights similar to those 
described by the Supreme Court majority in Slaughter-House.466  But while 
such a narrow interpretation might reflect a thinly plausible linguistic 
reading of the text, it faces the considerable historical and contextual 
difficulties of having virtually no relation to either the public statements 
regarding the Amendment that were made before the Slaughter-House 
decision itself or to the types of concerns that motivated the Amendment’s 
adoption.467   If one takes seriously the contemporaneous characterization of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting a class of preexisting 
rights that individuals possessed by virtue of their United States citizenship, 
                                                 
463 See text accompanying supra note 251 (quoting Senator Howard’s speech).   
464  See also, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2nd Sess. 820 (1872) (Sen. Morton) 
(referring to “the privileges or immunities that belong to citizens of the United States as 
such”); id. at 1650 (Sen. Butler) (“The only privileges and immunities secured by the 
Constitution are those of citizens of the United States as such.”).  Notably, this 
understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting rights that inhere in the 
status of United States citizenship was one of the few points of agreement between the 
majority and dissenting Justices in the Slaughter-House Cases.  See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 
74-75 (Miller, J.) (identifying “privileges or immunities” protected by the Clause as 
“privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such”); id. at 96 
(Field, J. dissenting) (Privileges or Immunities Clause “assumes that there are such 
privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such”); id. at 119 (Bradley, J. 
dissenting) (“It was not necessary to say in words that the citizens of the United States 
should have and exercise all the privileges of citizens … . Their very citizenship conferred 
these privileges, if they did not possess them before.”).  The Justices, of course, divided on 
the question of precisely what “privileges or immunities” United States citizenship 
entailed.  See Part III.B supra (discussing Justices’ opinions) 
465 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 55, at 1414-33 (surveying evidence supporting this 
understanding); see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull) 
(identifying Corfield and other Comity Clause cases as providing the judicial sense of 
“what was meant by the term ‘citizen of the United States.’”). 
466 Cf. supra notes 328-339 and accompanying text (describing Miller’s interpretation 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
467 See supra notes 334-335 and accompanying text. 
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it seems necessary to acknowledge the broader understanding of “citizens” 
as reflecting the more plausible meaning of “citizens of the United States” 
in both sentences of Section One.  
The broader understanding of “citizens” also provides a better fit with 
the Amendment’s overall structure and the constitutional structure as a 
whole.  The Fourteenth Amendment significantly altered the relationship 
between the states and the federal government by repudiating the doctrine 
of primary state citizenship through which the Confederate states had 
justified their rebellion and emphasizing the paramount nature of national 
citizenship.  An important component of this changed relationship was the 
conferral of an express power on Congress and the federal courts to protect 
the rights of United States citizens against state infringement and 
discrimination.  In restructuring this trilateral relationship between the state 
and federal governments on the one hand and between those two 
governments and their respective citizens on the other, it would have been 
more than a bit odd for the federal government to have reserved to itself a 
right to violate the very same rights of its citizens that it was simultaneously 
seeking to protect against state infringement.468  Thus, while Chief Justice 
Warren’s “unthinkable” dictum in Bolling might have overstated the matter, 
his remark nonetheless reflects a reasonable intuition that there would be 
something at least deeply incongruous about prohibiting the states from 
discriminating against their citizens on the basis of race while leaving the 
federal government free to engage in identical forms of discrimination.  
Of course, the original version of Section One that emerged from the 
Joint Committee in April 1866 proposed to do exactly that.  By focusing 
                                                 
468 Such differential treatment might have made sense if the Republican lawmakers 
who championed the Amendment had believed that the federal government was less prone 
to abusing its citizens’ rights than were the states.  Cf. McConnell, supra note 18, at 166-67 
(suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers may have believed that “the federal 
government [was] less likely to countenance the systematic oppression of minority 
groups”).  But the evidence for such a hypothesis is lacking.  The members of the 39th 
Congress and their contemporaries had lived through the fugitive slave controversies of the 
1850’s and had witnessed first-hand the dangers posed by discriminatory and oppressive 
federal legislation.  See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Prelude to Reconstruction: Black Legal 
Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 450-63 (1986) (discussing northern 
hostility to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and conflict between federal enforcement of that 
law and “personal liberty laws” enacted by northern states to protect accused fugitives).  
And, as Professor Siegel, notes, the threat of a future, pro-Southern Congress hostile to 
black equality was “very much on the … minds” of those who framed the Fourteenth 
Amendment and was reflected in multiple of its provisions, including the Citizenship 
Clause itself.  Siegel, supra note 19, at 572-73 (citing the Citizenship Clause as well as 
provisions limiting Congress’s power to allow certain ex-Confederates to hold public office 
and prohibiting the federal government from paying Confederate war debts as examples of 
provisions restricting future federal lawmaking).    
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narrowly on the problem of state abuse and selecting language that 
expressly and exclusively applied only to “state” governments, the Joint 
Committee’s proposal seemed to foreclose any plausible reading that would 
ban federal racial discrimination.469  The addition of the Citizenship Clause, 
however, significantly changed the meaning of Section One.  That provision 
required both the states and the federal government to recognize as “citizens” 
all persons who were born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
its jurisdiction.  Following the Amendment’s adoption, the entitlement of 
such persons to “citizenship” was no longer a matter of governmental 
discretion or political morality but rather a legally enforceable right 
recognized in the text of the Constitution.  While the types of structural 
concerns identified above might not have sufficed to contradict the plain 
meaning of the Amendment’s second sentence, 470  the use of such 
considerations to resolve a textual ambiguity of the type presented by the 
reference to “citizens” in the Amendment’s first sentence is fully consistent 
with both textualism and originalism.471  
B.  Equal Citizenship and the “Equal Protection of the Laws” 
To this point, I have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause provides a more historically defensible textual source for 
the equality guarantee that the Bolling Court applied to the federal 
government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  But just 
as Bolling raised questions about the relationship between Fifth Amendment 
due process and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection,472 the arguments 
presented here raise similar questions regarding the precise relationship 
                                                 
469 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 577 (“To the extent that originalism is a species 
of textualism, ‘No state’ is what the [Amendment’s second] sentence enacts, and ‘no state’ 
is all that originalists can read the sentence to encompass.” ).   
470
 See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. 
L. REV. 969, 972 (2008)  (“A historical textualist will be skeptical of conclusions 
supposedly based on an abstract constitutional ‘structure’ or ‘purpose’ but not tied to 
particular words and phrases.”); Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of 
Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 568-69 (2011) (collecting additional criticisms of 
such abstract structural reasoning).   
471  See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2067 (2009) (“Modern textualists 
readily embrace” the “proposition that when a structural provision is semantically 
indeterminate, its meaning can sometimes be illuminated by considering its fit with, and 
functional relationship to, other provisions of the text.”). 
472 See Primus, supra note 19, at 986-89 (describing initial uncertainty regarding the 
precise relationship between the due-process standard applied to federal conduct and the 
equal-protection standard applied to the states but observing that “[b]y the mid-1970s, the 
Court asserted flatly and repeatedly that the” two standards “were, and had always been, 
the same”). 
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between the equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.  
The Equal Protection Clause complicates the argument for viewing the 
Citizenship Clause as Bolling’s proper constitutional source in two ways.  
First, because the Citizenship Clause applies to states as well as to the 
federal government, some might question whether identifying that provision 
as containing an equality component would violate the familiar “anti-
surplussage” canon by rendering the Equal Protection Clause wholly 
redundant.473  Second, and conversely, if the Equal Protection Clause were 
originally understood to be broader than the equal citizenship aspect of the 
Citizenship Clause, the federal government might be permitted to make 
certain types of race-based distinctions among its citizens that would be 
unconstitutional if made by the states.  The available evidence regarding the 
public understandings of “citizenship” and “equal protection” at the time of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, however, render both of these 
possibilities unlikely.    
Responding to the surplussage argument does not require looking very 
far beyond the text of the two provisions.  The class of persons who can 
claim the rights of state citizenship under the Citizenship Clause is 
obviously limited to those whom the Clause itself identifies as “citizens”—
i.e., persons born or naturalized in the United States and who also reside 
within the state.  The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, extends 
protection to all “persons” within the state’s territorial jurisdiction, 
regardless of whether or not those persons are also citizens. 474   This 
distinction did not go unrecognized during the pre-enactment Congressional 
debates.  Multiple members of the 39th Congress, including Bingham and 
Howard, expressly noted that the Equal Protection Clause, unlike the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, would extend protection to non-citizens.475  
Thus, even if there is a perfect overlap between the equality rights citizens 
enjoy by virtue of their status as “citizens” and the “equal protection” to 
which they are entitled as “persons,” the Equal Protection Clause would not 
                                                 
473  Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore 
such construction is inadmissible unless the words require it.”). 
474  U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 1 (“No State shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
475 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (Rep. Bingham) (“Is it 
not essential … that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have 
equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and 
property?”); id. at 2765-66 (Sen. Howard) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment would 
“disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, 
whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from 
denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State.”). 
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be redundant. 
The distinction between “citizens” and “persons” also suggests a likely 
relationship between the rights inhering in citizenship and the “equal 
protection” that states must extend to citizens and non-citizens alike.  
Nineteenth-century legal and political thought recognized a clear distinction 
between the rights of citizens and the rights of persons who were not 
citizens.476  In view of this background, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
rights extended to “citizens” by the Amendment’s Citizenship and 
Privileges or Immunities Clauses are broader than the rights extended to all 
“persons” by the Equal Protection Clause.477 
A clear indication of the relationship between the equality rights thought 
to inhere in citizenship and the equality rights protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause is provided by a federal law adopted in 1870 to extend to 
non-citizens the protections of most (but not all) of the protections of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.478  The legislative history of that provision, which 
was adopted as part of the Voting Rights Act of 1870,479 indicates that it was 
“designed to enforce the Equal Protection Clause for the benefit of alien 
immigrants, mainly Asians in California.”480  The 1870 Act largely mirrored 
the language of Section One of the 1866 Civil Rights Act with two 
significant exceptions.  First, unlike the Civil Rights Act, which was limited 
to “citizens of the United States,” the 1870 Act applied to all “persons.”481 
Second, the 1870 Act omitted language that had been included in the Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibited states from making race-based distinctions 
                                                 
476  Certain scholars have argued that the Equal Protection Clause was originally 
understood to apply solely to the types of legal “protection” to which non-citizens were 
presumptively entitled, such as the right to claim protection by law enforcement and the 
right to bring legal actions in court.   See, e.g., Green, supra note 311, at 219-20 (endorsing 
a “protection-only” reading of the Equal Protection Clause); Harrison, supra note 55, at 
1434-51 (same).  This view has been contested by other scholars who argue that the 
original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was much broader.  See, e.g., Saunders, 
supra note 55, at 251-93; cf. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 437, at 23 (observing that “a 
number of the [Fourteenth Amendment’s] Framers seemed to understand ‘equal protection 
of the laws’ as a requirement of equal legislation …”).  For reasons explained in the text, I 
believe that even under the broader of these two interpretations, the equality rights the 
provision extends to all “persons” are properly viewed as a subset of the equality rights that 
citizens enjoy by virtue of their status as “citizens.”  See infra notes 478-490 and 
accompanying text.            
477  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 1002 (arguing that “the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause applies to a smaller class of persons and a larger class of rights” than 
the Equal Protection Clause). 
478 The background of the enactment is described in Harrison, supra note 55, at 1443-
47. 
479 Act of May 31, 1870, cl. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144. 
480 Harrison, supra note 55, at 1444. 
481 Id. 
96 ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING [2012 
with respect to the right to buy, hold, sell, lease or convey real or personal 
property.482  The omission of the 1866 Act’s property provisions, which the 
sponsor of the 1870 Act acknowledged had been intentional, 483  strongly 
suggests that Reconstruction-era lawmakers understood the Equal 
Protection Clause to allow at least some race-based distinctions among 
“persons” that would not be permitted if the “persons” discriminated against 
were also “citizens.”484  
An additional indication that the equality rights attaching to citizenship 
were understood to sweep at least as broadly as the equality rights derived 
from the Equal Protection Clause is provided by post-enactment statements 
regarding the relationship between the status of citizenship and the “equal 
protection of the laws.”  In Strauder v. West Virginia, 485  “the Supreme 
Court’s first great Equal Protection Clause case,”486 the Court described the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as having been intended 
merely to provide a mechanism by which the federal government could 
enforce the preexisting rights that former slaves possessed by virtue of their 
citizenship: 
By their manumission and citizenship, the colored race became entitled to the 
equal protection of the laws of the States in which they resided, and the 
apprehension that, through prejudice, they might be denied that equal 
protection, … was the inducement to bestow upon the national government 
the power to enforce the provision that no State shall deny to them the equal 
protection of the laws. Without the apprehended existence of prejudice, that 
portion of the amendment would have been unnecessary, and it might have 
been left to the States to extend equality of protection.487 
In other words, according to the Court, the entitlement of citizens to the 
“equal protection of the laws” derived from their status as citizens and it 
was only out of apprehension that state officials would, “through prejudice” 
deny them that right that the framers had included an explicit guarantee of 
equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment.   
To similar effect were the remarks of Justice Bradley in an 1870 Circuit 
Court opinion, which addressed one of the early constitutional challenges 
                                                 
482 Id. 
483  Id. at 1445-46 (recounting colloquy between Senator Stewart, the 1870 Act’s 
sponsor, and Senator Samuel Pomeroy of Kansas). 
484 Id. at 1446; see also, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A 
History and Critique of the Supreme Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1135, 1148 (1996) (citing the 1870 statute as evidence that “the rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to persons generally were viewed as less sweeping than those 
guaranteed to citizens”). 
485 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
486 Harrison, supra note 55, at 1443. 
487 100 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).     
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that eventually culminated in the Supreme Court’s Slaughter-House 
decision three years later.488  Bradley’s opinion, which reflects one of the 
earliest judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared that 
one of “the essential privileges which belong to a citizen of the United 
States, as such, and which a state cannot by its laws invade” was “to have, 
with all other citizens, the equal protection of the laws.”489  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court of Indiana, on multiple occasions in the 1870’s, declared its 
understanding that “[t]he only effect of the” Fourteenth Amendment had 
been “to extend the protection and blessings of the constitution and laws to 
a new class of persons” by conferring citizenship upon them and that when 
these persons had been: 
made citizens they were as much entitled to the protection of the constitution 
and the laws as were the white citizens, and the states could no more deprive 
them of privileges and immunities than they could citizens of the white race. 
Citizenship entitled them to the protection of life, liberty, and property, and 
the full and equal protection of the laws.490   
Thus, according to multiple courts during the immediate post-
ratification period, the right of equal protection recognized in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s second sentence arose by virtue of, and existed as a 
necessary incident and consequence of, the citizenship that had been 
recognized in the Amendment’s first sentence.  In view of this background, 
there is a strong basis for concluding that whatever equality rights citizens 
possess against state governments by virtue of their status as “persons” 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause are equally enforceable against the 
federal government by virtue of their status as “citizens” under the 
Citizenship Clause.  
CONCLUSION 
I do not entertain any illusions that the fate of originalism as an 
interpretive theory will stand or fall based on its ability to justify the result 
in a single case, even a case as significant as Bolling (or, for that matter, 
Brown).491  Likewise, more than a half-century of skepticism that Bolling 
can be reconciled with a plausible account of the Constitution’s text and 
                                                 
488 Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & 
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408). 
489 Id. at 652. 
490 Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 353 (1874) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gibson, 
36 Ind. 389, 393-94 (1871)); cf. State v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 306-07 (1866) (holding state 
constitutional provision prohibiting migration by free blacks was void in view of the 1866 
Civil Rights Act’s recognition of blacks’ citizenship).   
491 Cf. Harrison, supra note 55, at 1463 n.295 (“Man is not the measure of all things … 
and neither is [Brown] … An interpretation of the Constitution is not wrong because it 
would produce a different result in Brown.”). 
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original understanding has not prevented that decision and its associated 
doctrine from becoming deeply entrenched in modern constitutional law.   
At the same time, however, neither originalism nor Bolling emerges 
fully unscathed from a conclusion that the former is incapable of justifying 
the latter.  If originalist theory aspires to real-world practical significance 
for constitutional adjudication, then it seems fair to judge the desirability of 
such an adjudicative approach at least in part by asking what real-world 
changes in legal doctrine that approach requires.  While the inability of 
originalism to justify a particular politically popular result—or even a series 
of such results—would not necessarily be fatal to the theory’s acceptance, 
such inabilities should certainly be counted as a mark against the theory.492 
And, in the absence of sufficiently desirable offsetting benefits, such results 
might legitimately call into question the utility of a strictly originalist 
approach to resolving constitutional controversies.   
Bolling too suffers to at least some extent from its perceived 
inconsistency with the Constitution’s text and original meaning.  Though 
originalism as a distinctive theory of constitutional interpretation remains 
controversial, virtually all plausible interpretive theories acknowledge an 
important role for the Constitution’s text and original meaning.493  Decisions 
like Bolling that appear to ignore (or openly flout) such traditional 
interpretive criteria thus raise legitimate concerns regarding the proper role 
of courts in our constitutional system.494  
If this Article’s conclusions are correct, then the longstanding 
conventional wisdom regarding Bolling’s suspect originalist provenance has 
been mistaken.  Although Chief Justice Warren’s opinion identified the 
wrong textual source for the prohibition of federal racial discrimination, his 
intuition that there would be something deeply problematic about 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to subject states to an equality 
principle that the federal government was free to violate at will was hardly 
                                                 
492 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 636, 641 (1999) (arguing that “[f]ormalism should be defended pragmatically, 
with close reference to the likely performance of various institutions, and in terms of its 
consequences …”).  
493  See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 11-12 (1982) (identifying 
arguments from text and history as common forms of constitutional argument); Sanford 
Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 
19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 501 (1996) (observing that “almost all of us pay homage 
to some kind of originalism”). 
494  One leading constitutional law casebook asks students to ponder whether “the 
method used to obtain the result in Bolling could be used to obtain any result at all” and 
asks students if they can “imagine why Bolling poses a challenge to every approach to 
constitutional interpretation?”  RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN 
CONTEXT, 538-39 (2008); see also Rubin, supra note 14, at 1885-86 (discussing 
ambivalent treatment of Bolling in other leading casebooks).   
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ahistorical.  Rather, this intuition was widely shared among participants in 
the Fourteenth Amendment framing and ratification debates, as evidenced 
by the pervasive characterizations of the rights protected by the Amendment 
as rights that citizens already possessed by virtue of their United States 
citizenship.  The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause constitutionalized this understanding by requiring both the states and 
the federal government to recognize certain persons as “citizens” and 
foreclosing future legislative efforts to deny such citizenship.    
Of course, a comprehensive originalist defense of Bolling could not end 
here.  Just as the mere existence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s express 
prohibition of state discrimination through the Equal Protection and 
Privileges or Immunities Clauses did not resolve all questions regarding the 
originalist defensibility of Brown, the mere existence of an analogous 
constitutional ban on federal discrimination does not answer the question of 
whether Bolling was correctly decided.  Among other things, a 
comprehensive originalist defense of Bolling would require proof that 
public education fell within the class of interests to which the citizen-
equality principle would have been understood to extend and that racial 
segregation in public schools should be understood to deny equality in a 
constitutionally relevant way.495   
But questions of this nature, which apply with equal force to both 
Bolling and Brown, do not account for Bolling’s distinctive status or explain 
why originalists who readily defend Brown as correctly decided balk at 
similarly defending Bolling. 496  Instead, Bolling’s assumed originalist 
indefensibility has stemmed largely from the assumption, encouraged by 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, that a judicially enforceable constitutional 
equality principle applicable to federal conduct must be located in an 
eighteenth century Constitution that not only tolerated but openly supported 
the institution of slavery.497  Once the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause is recognized as the appropriate textual source for the ban on federal 
racial discrimination and understood in light of its full historical context, 
this difficulty evaporates.  Those originalists who support Brown as 
correctly decided should thus feel little hesitancy in concluding that Bolling 
was correctly decided as well. 
                                                 
495  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 1036-43 (discussing Reconstruction-era 
debates over whether public education was a “civil right” protected by the Amendment); id. 
at 1006-23 (discussing arguments that segregation did not violate equality).   
496 Cf. supra note 45. 
497 Cf. Graglia, supra note 15, at 774 (observing that Bolling asks us “to believe that a 
constitutional provision adopted in 1791 as part of a Constitution that explicitly recognized 
and protected slavery was meant to prohibit school racial segregation.”). 
